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In this dissertation, cash holding level are analysed with 2004 - 
2013 data from all firms in 13 industries from Bureau Van Dyke 
Fame database. The main hypothesis is that cash holding level 
should be positively related to the risk level. There are two 
dependent variables used for measuring cash holding level, cash to 
asset ratio and cash to sales ratio. Using cash sales ratio, the 
hypothesis is supported. There are mixed evidence of trade off, 
pecking order and agency theory in the results. Income smoothing 
practice and low level of cash distribution is implied by the results. 
There sales risk is also more sensitive with cash sales ratio compare 
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1.1 Corporate Cash holding  
 
Corporate cash management has become an increasingly important 
topic from researchers and practitioners. There are many areas of 
practices involving strategic, tactical and operational decision in 
managing cashes (Srinivasan and Kim, 1986).Corporate cash 
holding including not only the cash in the bank, but also the low 
premium assets that can be liquidated easily (Opler et al., 1999). 
   
The topics are mainly focused on the determinants that affect cash 
holding level (Opler et al., 1999), the motivation of cash holding 
level (Han and Qiu, 2007), from both developed countries (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004), to developing countries (Ogundipe et al., 2012). 
Understanding the reason why firm have different cash holding level 
is important. From shareholders point of view, firm with high level 
of cash holding is looked to be safer (Acharya et al., 2011), but the 
cash holding is also costly to shareholders since they do not 
JHQHUDWHLQFRPH)URPPDQDJHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZZLWKKLJKOHYHORI
cash holding in hand, manager have more power to control what 
the firm can spend the money on or use the cash for their own 
benefit (Harford, 1999; Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003).  Therefore 
a high level of cash holding is not necessarily a good decision for 
shareholders but is always a better choice for managers. Hence the 
cash holding level can cause agency and shareholder conflicts. 
On the other hand, from economic point of view, some firms can 
LPSURYH ILUP¶V YDOXH E\ KROGLQJ PRUH FDVK 7KLV LV D WUDGH-off 
theory which suggested that firm should have an optimal cash level, 
so to reduce the financial distress costs and the cost of raising 
external debt (Baskin, 1987, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). There is 
also the pecking order theory, which firms are anticipating the profit 
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made and the investments need, if the firm has more cash than 
they requires, they would reduce the cash holding level and 
distribute those to shareholders, otherwise they would first spend 
the cash for investment then ask for debt and equity financing 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  The third is agency theory where the 
ILUPV¶ YDOXH ZLOO EH UHGXFH LI WKHUH DUH KLJK OHYHO FDVK KROGLQJ DV
manager use these to gain personal benefit or investing in poor 
projects (Hartford, 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003) 
From operational points of view, firms also have different motives 
for holding cash. The transaction motive suggested that firm hold 
more cash for future payments instead of selling assets and raising 
external fund, as these are expansive for the firm (Bates et al., 
2009). There is also precautionary motive, where firms are 
expected to hold more cash if there is more risk in future returns 
(Opler et al., 1999). Thirdly, there is also the tax motive where 
shareholders are beneficial for not having dividend paid since they 
are charged twice in tax (Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003). 
Economic and industrial conditions are also found to be affecting the 
ILUP¶V FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO )LUPV DUH ILQDQFLDOO\ FRQVWUDLQHG LQ SRRU
economic conditions, as raise cash is more difficult, therefore having 
higher level of cash flow actually adds value to the firm (Moyen and 
Boileau, 2010).  Similarly, firms also following the industrial trends 
LQFDVKKROGLQJOHYHOIRUFRPSHWLWLYHDQGOLTXLGLW\SXUSRVHV'¶0HOOR
et al., 2009). 
In this research, there are mixed evidence of agency theory, 
pecking order theory and trade off theory across different 
determinants listed as above. The precautionary motives are least 
evident in macroeconomic and firm level characteristic. In industrial 
level factors, the pecking order theory is presented. There is also 
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some trade-off theories present as firms are not release cash to 
shareholders.  
1.2 Sales risks and cash holding level 
 
In this paper several sales risks directly related factors are also 
added to the analysis. Sales risks are less researched in previous 
literature when related to the cash holding level. In theory that firm 
is aiming to stabilise earning and sales incomes to give shareholder 
FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH ILUP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH 6WXO]  %XW WKH ILUP
always has some type of sale risks in term of unpredictable sale 
revenues, payments risks from buyers, inventory risk and costs 
raise in the production (Michalaski, 2008). Therefore the firms have 
to manage the volatility in the sales earning since the firm needs 
the income from sales to make payments to debtors and expenses; 
otherwise firms will be in liquidity problem. On the other hand, if 
firm having problem with making income, then the firm will have to 
borrow or issues equity, both activities are costly (Richards and 
Laughlin, 1980). Therefore increase in sales risk would be one of 
the factors that increase the cash holding level of the firm. However, 
it is also difficult for firm to keep high level of cash holding if the 
income is low.  
From management point of view, there is an incentive to hide away 
these sales risks by smoothing the income and earning (Jayaraman, 
2008). In the previous researches, there are evidence of firm with 
smoothed income have better external credit rating, and valued 
higher by shareholders and reduce the costs of borrowing 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). This is the earning is more 
predictable when they are smoothed for external shareholder 
without having any information in the firm, therefore reduce the 
information value of firm insiders. Secondly, the lender treated 
firms with smoothed earning as a sign of ability of making 
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continuous payments and can lend based on this history (Dichev 
and Tang, 2008).  
To the cash holding point of view, earning and income smoothing 
can be costly to the firm and reduce the available cash flows (Goel 
and Thakor, 2003). With smoothing using accounting accruals, 
there are no real cost to the firm but the adjustment level is limited 
with strict accounting policies. Another option is to make real 
FKDQJHVWRWKHILUP¶VRSHUDWLRQVW\SLFDOO\IURPPDNLQJGLVFRXQWVWR
goods before the end of period and therefore increase the earning in 
the current period and reduce the income of the next period 
(Roychowdhury, 2003). But the firm suffers a loss in profit and 
relatively increase in the production costs, therefore the cash 
holding level could be lower for the next period as the firm needs to 
spend more to recover the stocks. And typically these firms would 
either have high level of cash flows but lower level of sales volatility, 
or a low level of cash flow corresponded to income smoothed 
periods and high level of cash flow corresponded to a normal period. 
In this dissertation, we found that sales risks are in a mixed of 
positive and negative relations with the cash holding level. Negative 
relationships means the higher the volatility in sales income, the 
lower cash holding level for the firm. And firms with lower sales risk 
tend to accumulate cash in hand. This is some evidence of earning 
smooth effects since these sales volatility is not transferred to 
earning volatility. We further found firms are cautions about the 
credit risks in the sell risks with higher level of cash holding but 
then tends to allow income to accumulate. So there are some 
evidences of active cash holding management in anticipation of the 





1.3 Dissertation Structure 
 
The main objectives of this dissertation are two folds. First, the 
previously identified significant determinants to cash holding levels 
are investigated, these are around firm level statistic, industrial 
conditions and macroeconomic environment. Second, which is the 
primary objective, the influence of sales risks to cash holding levels 
are investigated by using the variables in first objective as control 
variables.  
There are five sections in this dissertation. The next one reviews 
some of the existing literature for theories and empirical evidence 
around the determinants of cash flows and the sales risks. Then the 
identified determinants to use will be summarised in this section. 
The third section will describe the data that will be used in this 
dissertation with statistics. There will be one main hypotheses 
identified centred on sales risks. Modelling and diagnostic methods 
are identified here. The fourth section analyse the results from 
variables models and their implication to the hypothesis. Part of 
that section will also attempt to contribute some managerial 
recommendations based on the results examined. Last section 










The literature review will focus on previous research and findings on 
determinants of cash flows with focus on the impact of sales risk. 
The two sections explains the three central cash holding models, 
pecking order, trade off and agency cost, and some relevant 
evidence. The third and fourth section examined the sales risks in 
terms of operation and earning management, with some evidence 
of how it affects the cash holding level. The last section summarised 
the list of factors affect cash holding level.   
2.2 Theory of corporate cash holding 
2.2.1 Cash holding models 
 
Corporate has two incentives to holding liquid assets (Opler et al., 
1999). Firstly, these liquid assets can cover payments needed 
without incur any transaction costs or liquidating fixed assets to 
raise cash. Secondly, firm can capture the investment opportunities 
and financing their operation activities when borrowing is not 
available or available at a very high premium. These form the two 
main motives of cash holding, reducing the transaction costs and 
preparing for situation of limited cash sources (Keynes, 1936). On 
the first motive, because organisation constantly incurs outgoing 
FRVWVVXFKDVGHEWRUSD\PHQWVHPSOR\HH¶VVDODU\ UHQWDQGRWKHU
operational costs, each would require cash payments. If these cash 
payments have to be met with sources outside of organisation, 
there certainly would be additional premium that organisations need 
to pay. Secondly, because all of these cash outgoing are critical to 
the continuous operation of organisation or maintaining 
relationships with buyers and customers. If organisation does not 
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have enough cash, it always carries liquidity risks and heavily 
relying on the health of external credit market (Keynes, 1936). The 
third motive is the speculative motive for cash holding. Firm may 
consider that there is a raise in the future interest, therefore it is 
better to lend at future time to gain extra income. These are often 
less focused in the firm as only a large amount of cash can create 
significant benefit.  
7KH RWKHU WKHRU\ RI WUDGH RII PRGHO GLUHFWO\ UHODWHV WKH ILUP¶V
LQFRPH 2SOHU HW DO  ,Q 0RGLJOLDQL DQG 0LOOHU¶V FDSLWDO
VWUXFWXUHLQGLIIHUHQFHWKHRU\WKHILUP¶VGRHVQ¶WFDUHDERXWWKHPL[
of debt and equity. In the similar way, the cash can also be 
LQWHUFKDQJHDEOHZLWKGHEWWKHUHIRUHWKHUHLVQ¶WDQ\RSWLPDOOevel of 
cash holding (Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003). The firm would 
naturally accumulate cash if cash flow from sale is high, and 
conversely would naturally accumulate debt if cash flow from sale is 
low. But this level of raising debt would be limited whereas if there 
is no investment opportunity the cash flow would increase 
indefinitely. But in real world, there are various levels of transaction 
costs and tax system that would unbalance the trade-off model 
since raising debt and sell assets are inherently expansive for firm.  
The pecking-order theory can also explain part of the cash holding 
level. Firm prefers to spend resources with the least cost first, 
hence generally firm will be expensing cash first then liquid asset, 
then less liquid asset than external financing. These costs can be 
transactional costs and adverse selection costs which are the costs 
rose by information asymmetry between investors and managers. 
Brown and Petersen (2011) analysed the R&D smoothing effects of 
corporate cash holding. Firm often require a consistence cash inflow 
to fund R&D activities and needs to prepare for overrun of the 
budget. However majorities of the firm would have unpredictable 
cash inflows from sales, then at the cash shortage, it is expansive 
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to raise fund externally and costly to put R&D project on hold. 
Therefore with pecking order theory, the firm would likely to 
accumulate a cash stock act as a buffer to smooth out the R&D 
spending.  If R&D spending is modelled with cycles of peak and 
trough, then the change of cash holding would be negatively 
correlated with the R&D spending (Brown and Petersen, 2011).  
There are other operational motives of cash flows that directly affect 
WKHFDVKKROGLQJ OHYHO ,QWKHDQDO\VLVRIVSLQRIIV'¶0HOORHWDO
2009), the cash holding decisions are usually made together with 
leverage policies and heavily influenced by the type of operations of 
the company.  This follows closely with the transaction theory where 
firms tends to change their cash holding levels depended on the 
change of the short and long term cash outflow in the firm (Beltz 
and Frank, 1996). In transaction theory, the corporate is interested 
in lowering the transaction costs of the funding, therefore the term 
structure of interests and discount in interest rate from large 
borrowing both affect the level of cash holding. Firm that have 
higher level cash flows would tend to focus on keeping a target cash 
level to prevent firm in liquidity problem (Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano, 2008).  
Overall, corporate uses cash holding level to manage various types 
of risk exposures in the firm. There are both corporate internal risks 
and external environment risks.  Belts and Frank (1996) specified 
the firm have three risks directly related to internal cash flow, first 
is R&D expenditure risks, second is the variability of sales and 
assets and third is the value risk of the corporate assets in the 
ILQDQFLDO PDUNHWV 7KH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH ILUP¶V FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO LV
fitted with the transaction theory of cash flow. Externally, there are 
volatility of the interest rate and unpredicted instability of the 
financial markets. The cash holding level increases with volatility 
and probability of the instability of the financial markets as a 
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precautionary approach and does not necessary associated with the 
change in the money demand (Belts an Frank, 1996).  
2.2.2 Costs and Benefits 
 
From above theories, there are several main benefits of cash 
holding. First, there is saving on transaction costs (Schwetzler and 
Reimund, 2003). Firm normally incurs infrequent large amount of 
fixed costs and frequent small amount of variable costs. But raising 
cash externally is often costly given the information asymmetry and 
other transaction barriers, therefore firms rarely use external 
financing. And often these financing is in large amount to spread 
the transaction costs. But often firms can be hit with unexpected 
cash demand; hence keeping liquid asset is beneficial in reducing 
transaction costs in these circumstances (Schewetzler and Reimund, 
2003). The implicatioQ LV WKDW ILUP¶V FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO LV DOZD\V
increases with the external transaction costs. Because firm fears 
that if there is not enough liquid assets, then it has to resort to fire 
sale of illiquid assets at a discount, which means a reduction in the 
sKDUHKROGHU¶V ZHDOWK  7KHUHIRUH WKH OHYHO RI FDVK KROGLQJ DOVR
GLUHFWO\ LQFUHDVHV ZLWK WKH ILUP¶V GLVWUHVV OHYHO ZKLFK FRUUHODWHV
with debt level and threat of acquisition.  
Secondly, this reduces the exposure of the firm to the asymmetric 
information in the market. There are two problems for the company. 
First in equity financing, because outsideUGRHVQRWXQGHUWKHILUP¶V
value therefore there is always a heavy discount in the price even 
when the share is actually overpriced in the market (Myer, 1984). 
Second competitors can extract information about the firm when 
firm enter the financial market for funding (Campell, 1979).  Hence 
external financing activities increase the costs of investment and 
reduce the competitive advantage, cash holding level would then 
increase with the level of information asymmetry.  
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Thirdly, corporation gains strategy advantage with flexibility in cash 
holding when the market has many investment opportunities 
(Baskin, 1987).  There are two main advantages of cash holding. 
First large cash hold can create entry barrier for competitors to 
enter the market, since the firm can have price advantages if 
required to drive the competitors out. Second, when there are 
investment opportunities, the firms with cheaper funding can offer 
higher price and have more immediate cash availability to capture 
the opportunities. Hence growth firms and firm in low technological 
entry barriers tends to accumulate high level of cash holding. But 
there is also counter argument that high growth firm usually 
spending more therefore always short of cash, only mature firm 
tends to accumulate high level of cash to seek acquisition 
opportunities.  
However cash holding also incur costs to the organisation (Opler et 
al., 1999). First, holding cash is expansive becauVH LW GRHVQ¶W
generate income and cash is always devaluating. In Kim et al. 
¶V PRGHO WKH FDVK KROGLQJ SULPDULO\ XVHG WR FRYHU WKH
shortfall between different financial periods. Each firm has different 
income cycle between getting cash inflow and cash outflow. 
Therefore also firm has foregone the interest could be earned on 
the cash held; these are offset by the reduction in agency costs and 
tax saving in the interests.  There is also a trade-off between the 
current investment and future investment. When firms believe that 
the future investment have higher return than the current 
investment, the firm is willing to hold cash to wait for the future 
investment opportunities to arrive. But there are times where the 
firm can misjudge the NPV of different investments and end up 
invest on a less profitable project due to pressure from loss in 
interest.    
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Secondly, there are ranges of agency costs associated with holding 
cash. Agent always prefer holding more cash than necessary since 
cash provide agency more power in terms of spending and reduce 
their employment risk.  Hence there is a conflict between agency 
and shareholder in terms of holding cash (Opler et al., 1999). There 
are several models behind the adverse effects in agency model. 
Managers often has higher discretion on investment with high level 
of cash holding since by information asymmetry, outside 
shareholders could not distinguish between value adding or value 
destroying investment. Therefore if managers want to pursue 
personal gain, they would hold higher amount of cash and waiting 
IRU LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLWLHV WKDW JRHV WR PDQDJHU¶V IDYRXU
(Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003). Evidence suggested that there is 
a positive correlation between high level of cash holding and value 
destroying activities (Harford, 1999). Managers also use cash flow 
to defend take over activities therefore not providing shareholders 
with best income from investing the cash. Conversely managers 
also have difficulties of selling unprofitable business when there is a 
high level of cash holding.  
Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) found that firm tends to 
underperform with excessive cash holding. This resonates with the 
DJHQF\ K\SRWKHVLV WKDW ZKHQ ILUPV¶ KDYH DFFXPXODWHG ODUJH FDVK
holding with high level income, the managers tends to invest in 
SURMHFWV WKDW LV OHVV SURILWDEOH XQGHU VKDUHKROGHU¶V SUHVVXUH 7KH
performance of these projects is often less than the projects would 
be selected by firms with lower cash holding.  
2.2.3 Alternative Models 
 
$OWKRXJK FDVK KROGLQJ GRHV UHGXFH WKH OHYHO RI ILUP¶V ULVN WKH
decision of cash holding is not always beneficial to the shareholder 
and some can be viewed as CEO pursuing self-interested goals, and 
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WKHUH FDQ EH QHJDWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH 7RQJ 
7KHUH LV FORVHO\ OLQNHG WR WKH YDOXH &(2¶V VWRFN RSWLRQV DQG WKH
YRODWLOLW\RI WKHVWRFNUHWXUQ,W LV LQ&(2¶V LQFHQWLYHWRUHGXFHWKH
effect of stock volatility on option value, since increase in cash 
holding can reduce the risks exposed by the firm, therefore lower  
the exposure of the optional value to the stock volatility (Tong, 
2006). Managers who are more concerned with personal gain in the 
stock options are opted to hold more cash as risk-free investment, 
ZKLFKWKHQDUHWKHGHWULPHQWDOWRWKHILUP¶VYDOXH7KLVVFHQDULRLV
especially significant for countries with poor shareholder protection 
(Dittmar et al., 2003).  Since there are little law enforcement to 
proWHFWVKDUHKROGHU¶VULJKWIRUWKHFRUSRUDWLRQPDQDJHUVDUHPRUH
likely to hold extra cash rather than distribute these to shareholders.  
As the central argument of the requirement of cash holding lies on 
the availability of alternative financing when required, various 
literatures have contributed to identifying the type of firms that are 
sensitive to cash holding level. Subramaniam et al. (2011) identified 
that diversified firm require much less cash holding than focused 
firm. First, there are more cashes available from other areas of the 
firm which can support cash outflow in a particular areas, therefore 
reduce the needs of holding internal cash. Second, these types 
firms are more likely to find a buyer to pay right price for assets 
given the varieties of the assets owned by the firm. Thirdly, 
because each segment are competing against each other within the 
firm, therefore managers are more likely to invest cash on hand 
rather than holding it, then these firms are more prone to the risk 
of overinvestment. The agency costs of cash holding is very high , 
therefore the central management of firm would be more likely to 
deploy cash to segment that requires rather than ask the segment 
to hold the cash. This is consistent as using cash holding as a 
hedging for the future financing risks, diversified firms use different 
20 
 
operating activities as hedging against future cash shortages in a 
particular segments (Denis and Silbilkov, 2010).   
2.3 Empirical evidence of cash holding  
2.3.1 As Buffer  
 
Evidences have shown that cash holding has strong correlation to 
the cash flows of the firm. Opler et al. (1999) found corporate cash 
holding is negatively correlated with the operating cash flow. With 
low sales income that firms tends to keep more cash in the firm as 
buffer for outgoings.  Financial constraint is one of the important 
conditions to consider for cash holding as buffer. Brown and 
Petersen (2011) shown that using time series analysis that firms 
with financial constraints are likely to hold more cash to buffering 
the increasing in R&D costs. Han and Qiu (2007) also shown that 
when financial constraint firm has high level of cash flow volatility, it 
would increase cash holding level according. However if the firm is 
financial unconstraint which means they can raise cash funding at 
need, then there is no evidence of using extra cash holding as 
buffer (Han and Qiu, 2007). 
Therefore the maturity and the conditions of the financial market is 
important as part of the control variable for analysing cash flow as 
buffer. An immature financial market or financial market that is in 
credit crunch would transfer a normally financial unconstraint frim 
to a financial constraint firm. Therefore cash holding is expected to 
increase in an unfavourable financial market.  This is supported by 
the analysis of the boom and bust in the financial market 
between1998-ZKHUHILUP¶VFDVKKROGLQJOHYHOKDYHGDPSHQHG
the effect (Brown and Petersen, 2011). There is also an after effect 
in cash holding level after financial crisis, as shown by Beltz and 
Frank (1996), the cash holding level is doubled after the market 
crash in 1987. Similarly, the change in the financing costs such as 
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taxes and issuing costs can also create incentive for firm to increase 
cash level as a precaution to external financial shock (Moyen and 
Boileau, 2011). Although this self-insurance is less robust 
explanation for cash flow increment.   
Level of leverage and the amount of short term debt also affects the 
cash flow level (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). The 
level of cash holding is higher for firms with high level of debt and 
higher proportion of short term debt, especially for firms with 
financial constraints. In particularly, the private firm is most likely 
to prepare for cash payment on debt rather than rolling the debt 
further on with other short term debt or long term debt like public 
firm.  
The effect of buffering is lessened when there is a high level of 
asset liquidity in the firm where other non-cash asset can be easily 
converted into cash. In the similar argument, when the real-asset 
liquidity is high for an industry, then the corporate cash holding 
level is generally low for firms in this industry compare to other 
industry (Huang, 2010).  Because if firm can sell the industrial 
specific asset to other firms with smaller loss then the firm would 
have less incentive to hold cash hedging against future cash 
outflows. Similarly this reduces the level of financial distress of the 
firm. Although there is a risk of relying on the transferability and 
liquidity of the asset, however because of the cost of holding cash 
flow, the firm would be more likely to hold these resalable assets 
than holding cash (Huang, 2010).  
The other evidence is WKH FRUUHODWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V VDYLQJ LQ
proportion to the cash flows. Alemida et al. (2004) found that the 
saving and cash flow is significantly correlated for financially 
constrained firm but it is not significant for unconstrained firms.  
The sample is largely applied to manufacturing firms who often 
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have consistent cash outflows therefore a high demand for liquidity.  
Moyen and Boileau (2010) supported this motion proving that cash 
saving increased with liquidity motive to mitigate the increased 
volatility of cash requirement using data from 1971 to 2006. Firm 
was identified to less likely to change their capital structure and 
investment policy due to cash constraints, the cash holding level 
has increased two folders during these periods to reduce the 
impacts of liquidity problem 
2.3.2 Agency costs 
 
One of the proxies for agency costs is the ownership structure of 
the firm, as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) found that firm with high level 
of equity tends to keep lower cash holding as investors are 
demanding cash to be distributed or reinvested, while firm with high 
debt level tends to increase the cash flow holding since creditors 
demand the firms to keep above a liquidity level. Tong (2006) found 
managerial risk aversion is highly related to the cash holding level.  
With CEO stock option, stock return and interest rate as input with 
data from 1993-200 in UK firms excluding financial firms, cash 
KROGLQJ OHYHO LQFUHDVHV ZKHQ &(2¶V VWRFk option is at more risk 
(Tong, 2006).     
Agency costs of corporate cash holding are also found to be 
depended on the ownership of the firm (Lau and Block, 2012).  
:KHQVKDUHKROGHU¶VSURWHFWLRQ LVDGHTXDWHRU WKH FRQFHQWUDWLRQRI
WKHILUP¶VRZQHUVKLSLVKLJKWKHVKDUHKROGHUVKDYHPRUe bargaining 
power over the manager, the cash holding level is low as cash are 
distributed (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Family shareholders also 
tend to hold high cash level that is costly to external shareholder, 
but Lau and Block (2012) found that agency costs of holding cash at 
family firm is high due to adverse selection in the US firm, firm 
value also decreases with cash holding. On the other hand, if firm is 
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managed by founder then the agency costs of hold cash is much 
lower as founder are likely to use cash effectively instead for their 
own benefit (Lau and Block, 2012), firm value also increases with 
cash holding. 
There are also evidence suggested when firm have agency problem 
the cash holding level can be high since the manager has more 
power to conWURO WKH ILUP¶V FDVK IORZ %RSNLQ  XVH *KDQD
Stock Exchange as data source, found the better corporate 
disclosure and transparency would led to lower cash holding as 
raising fund is easier.  
The severity of the agency problem in cash holding is highly related 
WRWKHVKDUHKROGHU¶VSURWHFWLRQ.DOFKHYDDQG/LQVXVH
firms across 31 countries found that firm with shareholder 
protection would have adequate cash holding, and without 
protection the firm would have high cash holding level than normal. 
However, Ginglinger and Saddour (2007) rejected this hypothesis 
DQG IRXQG WKDW WKH ILUP¶ FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO LV QRW DIIHFWHG E\ WKH
JRYHUQDQFHTXDOLW\DQGILUPZLWKVWURQJVKDUHKROGHU¶VULJKWDFWXDOO\
hold more cash. But this result is only based on the French firm, 
ZKHUH WKH EHWWHU VKDUHKROGHUV ULJKWV DFWXDOO\ JLYH VKDUHKROGHU¶V
more confidence in the manager and give up more discretionary 
power. Such in switzland, the cash holding level increase with 
concentrated ownership wile minority shareholders are less likely to 
be protected (Jani et al., 2004). 
2.4 Sales Risk: earning volatility and smoothing 
 
The direct sales risk is related to uncertainty in the future sales 
revenue, which mostly represented as the volatility in cash flow or 
predicted downward trHQGLQFDVKIORZ+DQDQG4LX)LUP¶V
earning and income are directly affected by the volatility of the cash 
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flow from the project invested, and the focus of risk management in 
the firm is most likely to be reducing the variance of the volatility 
and therefore stabilising the earning and income (Stulz, 1996). 
Therefore corporate would engage in number of hedging activities 
and diversifications to reduce the risk exposed to the volatility of 
the cash flows, which are vastly contributed by the literatures as 
income smoothing or dividend smoothing. Stulz (1996) argued that 
although shareholders do not benefit from the reduction of the 
ILUP¶V ULVNV VLQFH VKDUHKROGHUV WHQGV WR VHH LQYHVWPHQW LQ ILUP DV
risky investment, but firm is benefited from the reduction of 
outgoing resources, and have better shareholder relationships and 
perceived with low risk by the market (Goel and Thakor, 2003).  
The earnings volatility represented several risks for the firm. First 
investors pay less to the firm with high earning volatility (Goel and 
Thakor, 2003). Shareholders suffer from adverse selection costs 
when they trading with informed investors inside firm. The cost of 
getting information is part of costs of buying shares; a high earning 
volatility would make this private information more valuable, so the 
shareholders are only willing to pay lower price for firms with high 
earning volatility (Goel and Thakor, 2003).  This will reduce the firm 
shares liquidity therefore increase the costs of funding.  Secondly, 
the perceived bankruptcy risk is high for firms with high earning 
volatility; therefore the borrowing costs would increase (Trueman 
DQG 7LWPDQ  7KLUGO\ IURP VKDUHKROGHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH KLJK
volatility of earning would normally mean a high volatility in 
expected dividend. Therefore for shareholders that using dividend 
as income stream, they will be more likely to reject firm with high 
volatility of earning (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  This borrowing 
cost would be translated into high transaction costs when seeking 
external funding.  Both of these two aspects have shown the 
increase of cost of raising funds, therefore if firm cannot manage 
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the earning volatility effectively, the firm would be become more 
financially constrained. So it is especially important for firm that is 
highly levered, if firm does not show consistent earnings because of 
some badly managed projects, the firm will also loss opportunity to 
invest in a good project in the future (Stulz, 1996).  Therefore firm 
has incentive to represent a smoothed earning trends to show their 
financial and income stability.  
A high earning volatility is not favoured by the manager. Fudenberg 
DQG 7LUROH  DUJXHG WKDW VLQFH PDQDJHU¶V UHWDLQLQJ GHFLVLRQ
are made based on the current performance. The risk of being fired 
is greater for firms with high earning volatility, since there is higher 
FKDQFH WKH ILUPZLOO EH KHDY\ ORVVHV 7KHUHIRUH LW LV LQ PDQDJHU¶V
incentive to keep the earning smoothed so that managers can 
leverage gain from one period to loss of the other period. For 
similar reason as shares liquidity, when managers have higher 
number of share options, the high earning volatility reduce the 
liquidity of shares therefore it is hard to sell shares in the market 
(Hunt et al., 2000).  Firms are covered by analyst, if the earning 
volatility is high, analyst will find it hard to predict the future 
earning of the firms, and therefore there will be fewer 
recommendations in the market or the recommendation is always 
incorrect (Dichev and Tang, 2008). There will make a bad 
reputation for the manager, and shareholders will suffer from low 
OLTXLGLW\ KHQFH SXW WKH PDQDJHU¶V SRVLWLRQ DW ULVN 7KHUHIRUH
manager has incentive to keep firm income smoothed since their 
expected length of time in the position will increase (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1995).  
 
Firm has two ways to smoothing the income, an artificial 
adjustment suing accounting principle or a real smoothing which 
involving adjustment real cash flow of the firms (Goel and Thakor, 
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2003). An artificial adjustment of the income does not involve 
actual movement of cash. The account is adjusted using different 
way of accounting method, such as altering time of sales and 
mixing between expenses and capital account. In real smoothing, 
managers change the operations to adjust the actual cash flows, 
these may involving change the frequency of ordering, offering 
sales at end of accounting period and change the time of 
maintenance (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  These changes in 
operations will affect the cash flow level of the firm resulted in an 
unexpected fluctuation in the cash level. And also these operations 
ZLOO LQFXU HFRQRPLF FRVWV WR WKH ILUP EXW IURP PDQDJHU¶V
SHUVSHFWLYH DQG ILUP¶V H[WHUQDO LPDJHV WKLV FRVWV DUH RIWHQ
outweigh the personal loss of manager or financing costs of the firm.  
The paper will focus the effects of second way of smoothing income 
RUGLYLGHQG)URPPDQDJHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHRIH[WHQGLQJWKHLUWHQXUH
they will save in the good time for future bad time and increase 
earning at bad time. Therefore the cash holding level is expected to 
be high in good time and low in bad time since these cash are likely 
to be translated into earning or paying dividend above earning 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). The expectation of the earning is 
important since manager want to shift earning from good period to 
a bad period. Therefore manager may spend cash for investment or 
reduce the current cash income to defer the earning to later in 
order to have higher capacity to manipulate future incomes.   
Jayaraman (2008) identified two types of regime between earnings 
and cash flow management.  A firm is smooth if the earnings 
volatility is lower than cash flow volatility, or is volatile if the 
earnings volatility is higher than cash flow volatility. In the smooth 
regime, the manager is using earnings stability as a market signal 
to inform the investors that the company is a highly valued (Chaney 
and Lewis, 1995).  In the volatile regime, the firm is opportunistic 
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with earning report corresponding to financing or taxing incentives 
(Turner, 2001).  The stock price is likely to be inflated when firm 
has higher than expected earnings, as the equity financing is 
cheaper the cash inflow is likely to increase. On the other hand if 
the firm want to avoid paying taxes, they could recognise losses in 
this period, to offset the profit, therefore reduce the cash outflows. 
Both would smooth the operational cash flows.  A particular 
measure is to use the difference between variance of earnings and 
YDULDQFH RI FDVK IORZ $OWKRXJK ILUP¶V YDOXH LV ORZer with both 
increased cash flow volatility and earnings volatility (Allayannis and 
Weston, 2003), but the earning volatility is much more significant 
JLYHQWKHIRFXVRILQYHVWRUDQDO\VWDQGPDQDJHU¶VIRFXV7KHUHIRUH
LI WKH ILUP¶VPDUNHW WRERRN UDWLR LV high and earning is smoothed 
WKHQWKHILUP¶VFDVKIORZYRODWLOLW\LVOLNHO\WREHKLJK 
This brings another model of cash holding level related directly to 
the expected operating cash flows (Richards and Laughlin, 1980). 
The firm goes through a cycle of liquidity from expensing operating 
and inventory costs to receiving sales cash inflow. If the firm allows 
trade credit to be used, then there is an expected cash flow upon 
collection as account receivable. In general, the firm with loose 
credit policy usually have higher proportion of account receivable 
compare to current cash flows, the size of receivable is also larger 
than firm with tight credit policy (Richards and Laughlin, 1980).  
However because these debtors tend to have low credit rating, 
therefore the average time take to collect these receivable will be 
longer and less predictable, implies the cash conversion cycle is 
longer.  On the other side of equation, firm can delayed the 
payment for purchasing the production materials, this is the account 
payable. If the account repayable turn is longer, these will reduce 
the current cash outflows but increase the future cash outflows. The 
third factor is the inventory turnover, firm with short inventory 
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turnover means that firm can turn raw materials into sales quicker, 
hence a potentially shorter  cash conversion cycle.  Organisation 
can afford to have lower cash holding if the account receivable term 
is shorter than the account payable period, then firm can afford to 
have lower level cash holding since part of the future expected cash 
outflow is covered by the cash inflow.  On the other hand, if the 
ILUPV¶FDVKSD\DEOHWHUPLVVKRUWFRPSDUHWRDFFRXQWUHFHLYDEOHDQG
inventory turnover is longer, then the firm would need to keep a 
high level of cash holding in order to cover the payments (Richards 
and Laughlin, 1980).   
There is the trade-off between credit risk and sales risks. Firm can 
reduce the sale risks by allowing buyer to use trade credit. This can 
increase the sales volume and shift from the current cash flow to 
future cash flows (Michalaski, 2008), therefore the firm would not 
require as high level of cash holding. However these trade 
receivables are also risky asset since the buyers could default the 
cash payments, therefore the organisation is exposed to the credit 
risk in cash flows. Without the trade credits, the firm may face a 
long stock turn over period and high cash conversion cycle, both of 
these would reduce the total cash inflow to the firm and increase 
the cash flow volatility.   
If the goDO RI RUJDQLVDWLRQ LV WR PD[LPLVH ILUP¶V YDOXH 0LFKDODVNL
(2008) found that increase in trade receivable can decreased the 
ILUP¶V YDOXH VLQFH WKH QHWZRUNLQJ FDSLWDO DQG FRVWV RI DFFRXQW
management would both increase. But if the accounts receivables 
are pURSHUO\PDQDJHGWKHILUP¶VYDOXHFDQLQFUHDVH7KLVPHDQVLI
organisation has ways to reduce the trade receivable risks therefore 
limited the default and increase the stability of the sales cash flow 
also, this allows the firms to have low cash flow volatility by 
allocating cash through different sales periods.    
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For firms with greater volatility in their sales revenues and couples 
with the uncertainty in cash inflow timing and economic conditions, 
there will be more liquidity problem and cash flow management 
would be more difficult. The firm can mitigate the problem with 
maintaining high level of cash flow; however it would be difficulty to 
raise borrowing capacity to accumulating cash flow if the earning 
volatility is high, and therefore the cash flow volatility is likely to 
high for these firms and directly related to cash conversion cycle, 
inventory turnover and account receivable and payable level.   
Another factor affects the earning related cash flow effect is 
dividend pay-out. Shareholders expects continuous dividends in the 
firm that follows the long term growth of the firm, and firms tends 
WRNHHSDVWDEOHGLYLGHQGWRVKDUHUDWLRVLQFH LW LVDILUP¶V LQWHUQDO
GHFLVLRQE\PDQDJHU&KHQHWDO+RZHYHUWKHILUP¶VJURZWK
often goes through different phases especially for young firms, and 
the sales revenues are likely to volatile and not matched to the 
expected dividend pay-out (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore firms 
have to manage cash flow to satisfy dividend smoothing. If firm is 
aiming at a stable dividend policy then the cash holding level would 
be naturally low when the earning is poor and vice versa. Firm with 
high level sales volatility would have consistently high level of cash 
holding to cover unexpected losses and maintaining expected level 
of dividend. Chen et al., (2010) use the ratio between standard 
deviation of the dividend growth to the earnings growth to identify if 
firm is following a smoothed dividend pay-ratio, if the ratio is low 
WKHQWKHILUP¶VGLYLGHQGLVVPRRWKHGVLQFHWKHUHLs a low variation in 
the dividend.  
2.5 Empirical evidence of sales risks  
 
Previous literatures have supported the theory where low sales risk 
reduce the cash holding level and a high sales risk increase the cash 
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holding level. In the US and UK market, firm with high level of cash 
flows would keep a higher level of cash as internal fund for future 
projects (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). However Kim et al. (1998) 
argued that when firm a consistent level of cash flows, the cash flow 
level has would be lower as these cash flows are treated as cash 
substitute.  
The managerial incentive to smooth income is also supported with 
various analysis use discretionary accruals as independent variable 
(Defond and Park, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Defond and 
Park (1997) found that the change in total accrual is negatively 
related to the expected future earnings by manager using data from 
20 industries. The total accrual is measured as net earning less than 
the operating cash flows, therefore if the expected future earning is 
high and the current performance is poor, then the total accrual is 
low as manager shifts from future earning to the current earning. 
There will be a negative impact to the cash flow. Conversely, there 
will be a positive impact to the cash flow if expected future earning 
is low as manager is saving up earning accrual to be realised in the 
future. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) also founded that if volatility of 
the future earning is higher than risk adverse manager will increase 
cash as expected future earning is biased toward negative.   
The earnings YRODWLOLW\LVVLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWLQJWKHILUP¶VYDOXHZKLOH
cash flow has impact.  Allayannis and Weston (2003) examined the 
firms from 1986-2000 using Compustat data, found that earning 
YRODWLOLW\ LV VLJQLILFDQWO\ QHJDWLYH LQ DIIHFWLQJ WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH DQG
cash flow volatility is not significant. Therefore firm will often 
sacrifice the cash flow stability in return for the earning stability. 
The small firm and firm with less leverage are also shown to be 
more affected in this area; therefore the expected cash flow 
volatility is even higher for these types of firms (Allayannis and 
Weston, 2003).   
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There are distinct positive relationships between cash holding level 
and income smoothing in analysis of Tehran Stock Exchange 
(Mohammadi et al., 2012). With simple regressions over 70 firms 
between 2005 and 2010, the cash holding level would increase with 
degree of income smoothing, however the change of cash holding 
and change of smoothing level are not related.  Therefore the cash 
may not be used directly in corresponding to the income smoothing 
level.   
There are also evidences that firm use real activity that affects the 
operational cash flow to influence the earning level with data from 
all firms in Computstat between 1986 and 2001 (Roychowdhury, 
2003). These are mainly reflected in term of the low cash flow from 
operations and relatively high production costs, since the firm tends 
to engage in high discounted sales towards end of period in order to 
increase reported earnings. Firm may also reduce the expense to 
report better earnings. Because these activities have true costs, 
therefore firm would only engage in real activities with there is real 
benefit.  
2.6 Determinants of corporate cash holding 
  
This section summarised the factors that affect the corporate cash 
holding. 
- Size of firm  
,Q9RJHODQG0DGGDOD¶VUHVHDUFKFRUSRUDWHFDVKKROGLQJ LV
much lower for large firm; reflect both in the lower cash-to-asset 
ratio and cash-to-sales ratio. This was explained as by ease in 
access to the credit market because these firms tend to have higher 
credit rating therefore much lower in transaction costs and less 
incentive to put aside precautionary cash.  A similar result is 
confiUPHGE\'¶0HOORHWDO  WKH VPDOOHU ILUP WHQGV WRKROG
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more cash because of expansive transactional costs. Another proxy 
for size of the firm is the total sales of the firm (Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano, 2008). There are evidences where size is 
positively correlated to cash holding in some emerging countries 
(Megginson et al., 2010; Afza and Adnan, 2007), and negatively 
correlation in developed countries (Hoffmann, 2006; Saddour, 
2006).   
- Age of the firm 
Young firm tends to have higher transaction costs with less access 
to financial market. Therefore young firm tends to hold relatively 
higher level of cash compare to more mature firms (Brown and 
Petersen, 2011).    
- Growth of the firm  
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) found that high level of 
growth of firm affect negatively to the cash flow level.  However the 
small and high growth firm also have high level of cash holding 
since they require high level of investment but are likely to be 
financially constraint. In Rettl (2011), firms were found to 
accumulate cash in anticipation of future expected investment 
opportunities. When investment opportunity is gone, the firm will 
reduce the cash and return to shareholders.  
- Non-cash working capital  
Availability of other liquid asset also reduces the incentive for firm 
WR KROG PRUH FDVK '¶0HOOR HW DO  DQG *DUFLD-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano (2008) found that firm with high level of non-cash 
working capital tends to hold less cash.  There is a negative 
relationship between net working capital and cash holdings 
(Ogundipe et al. ,2012) 
- Capital expenditure 
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Capital expenditure is usually negatively correlated with cash 
holding level. This capital usually turned into asset and used as 
collateral, so the firm can borrow at a low cost (Xi, 2011).  This is 
from the view point of pecking order theory, with trade off theory, 
the higher level of cash expenditure would resulted in high level of 
cash holding in order to avoid transaction costs (Jani et al., 2004)  
- Investment 
From pecking order theory, firm prefer internal financing than 
external financing. In evidence, firms with high level of investments 
would have high level of cash holdings, especially when the sales 
income not likely to cover the costs.  One example is the research 
and development expenses, firms with high R&D expenses tend to 
DFFXPXODWH PRUH FDVK DYRLGLQJ H[WHUQDO PDUNHWV '¶0HOOR HW DO
2009).  Because any investments would require a disclosure of 
information to investors, hence if investment is likely to cause high 
level of information asymmetry, the adverse selection costs of the 
raising cash would be high. Since investors would require a higher 
return than normal to cover unexpected loss.  Therefore activities 
such as R&D would cause a high level of cash holding.  
- Market to Book Ratio 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) found a positive relationship between 
ILUP¶V YDOXH DQG FDVK KROGLQJ IRU ILQDQFLDOO\ FRQVWUDLQHG ILUPV
0DUNHW WR ERRN UDWLR LV D JRRG DSSUR[LPDWH IRU WKH ILUP¶V UHODWLYH
value since the higher the market value, the more perceive values 
to be generated by the firm in the future. This positive correlations 
LV QRW DOZD\V VLJQLILFDQW '¶0HOOR HW DO  VLQFH ILUP¶V YDOXH
can be affected by other variables therefore firm may be also have 
low values if cash was not going to be used for productive purposes.   
- )LUP¶VGHEWOHYHO± debt to asset ratio 
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In the classic transaction costs model, there is always an optimal 
level of cash to hold with a fixed amount of debt (Keynes, 1936).  
Because there is always a fixed cost related for accessing the credit 
market or selling the assets, therefore firms would use external 
resource until the internal fund is depleted. Hence the higher the 
level of debt the higher level of the cash holding is expected for the 
ILUP 7KHILUP¶VGHEW OHYHOFDQEHDSUR[\IRUWKHILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO
distress level, but this is also thHVXSSRUWHGE\OLWHUDWXUH'¶0HOORHW
al., (2009) found that cash holding level is not related to the 
financial distress costs, but solely to the ability to raise external 
debt. The general finding is that firm with higher debt level tends to 
have higher level of cash flow since the capacity of raising external 
debt is low (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ogundipe et al. ,2012), both 
in emerging and developed countries.   
- Dividend 
Dividend pay-out and shares repurchase is directly related to the 
cash holding level. If dividend pay-out ratio is high then there are 
less cash being hold in the firm for reinvestment or as buffer. The 
dividend pay-out level is a managerial decision and is often 
associated with the type of firm and type of shareholders in the firm. 
If the firm has a stable dividend pay-out ratio, then the cash flow 
level would be affected directly by the earning level. However if the 
firm smooth the dividend level according to future cash flow rate, 
then the cash flow would not be affected by the earning level 
directly but the relative level of the earning and expected dividend. 
The cash flow is higher at year when earning is poor and vice versa.  
- Cash flow volatility and cash flow level 
Firm usually holds high level of cash with high cash flow volatility to 
mitigate possibility of cash shortage (Jayaraman, 2008). And the 
high cash flow level has also resulted in a high level of cash holding 
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since firms tends to save up cash for future investment (Ferreira 
and Vilela, 2004; Ogundipe et al. ,2012) 
- Industry trends  
Cash holding level varies dramatically by industry (Chudson, 1945). 
Opler et al. (1999) found that firms that accumulate excessive cash 
are more likely to use for covering future loss, therefore biased 
towards the precautionary side of trade off theory. The industrial 
trend can be approximated by the industry average cash, this 
indicates that firms tend to cover similar amount of cash close to 
other competitors in order to maintain similar competitive levels 
'¶0HOORHWDO6XEUDPDQLDPHWDl. (2011) also found that 
some industries can have as much as ten times more cash than 
other industries.  The industrial wide of asset liquidity is also proven 
to be important in affecting the cash holding levels; firms in 
industries that have high levels of asset liquidity usually have lower 
cash liquidity. Also the more competitive the industry the higher 
level of cash holding required since the firm can cover itself the in 
the event of price war.   
- Return on asset 
The trade-off theory predicting that return on asset is low with  high 
cash holding level since cash generate near to no returns and 
pecking order theory predict that return on asset is high with high 
level of cash holding since funding is cheaper.  
- Cash conversion cycle 
Cash conversion cycle is positively related to the cash holding level, 
firm that have long cash conversion cycle would have high level of 
cash holding due to precautionary approach. However these firms 
are also difficult to accumulating cash flow since their cash flow 
volatility is normally higher.   
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- Transaction costs  
A high level of external transaction costs would increase the level of 
cash holding as examined in transaction costs theory. These are 
costs are equity financing costs, taxes and interest rate. These are 
directly reODWHG WR WKH ILUP¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJ WKH KLJKHU WKH FUHGLW
rating the lower the transaction costs.  
- )LUP¶VPDUJLQDOWD[UDWH 
There is a tax incentive for not holding the liquid asset (Opler et al., 
1999). Income from these liquid asset is taxed twice at corporate 
level and at personal level, therefore shareholder much prefer share 
repurchase from the firm as they are only taxed as capital gain. 
Hence the higher the marginal tax rate, the lower the cash holding 
level is expected. This relationship is depended on the tax system. F 
In German, there is a trade-off between paying corporate tax with 
excessive cash holding and dividend tax paid to the shareholder 
(Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003).   
- Ownership structure  
Guney (2005) found that legal structure and ownership structure 
has significant influence in determining the cash holding level. With 
higher equity proportion, the investors tend to ask manager to 
either release cash to repurchase the shares or use those in 
investment opportunities. With higher debt proportion, creditors 
usually ask managers to keep higher cash holding to reduce the 
likelihood of default.  
- )LUP¶VGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ 
)LUP¶V GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ LQFUHDVHV WKH VRXUFH RI FDVK DQG DFW DV D
hedging for future financing options. Subramanianm et al. (2011) 
XVH WKH FRUUHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ VHJPHQWV¶ JURZWK SHUIRUPDQFH WR
evaluate the level of hedging from the diversification. A simplified 
37 
 
measure would be that the higher number of segments of the 
industries used by the firm, the higher level of hedging hence lower 
cash holding required.   
- Managerial risk aversion 
,Q7RQJ¶VDQDO\VLVWKDWDJHQFLHVULVNDYHUVLRQLVLPSRUWDQWLQ
determine the corporate cash holding level. The value of the 
remuneration is central to determine the managerial incentive to be 
risk averse.  As the higher the remuneration value the higher 
likelihood of the risk aversion behaviour, thus the higher cash 
KROGLQJOHYHO$GGLWLRQDOLIWKH&(2¶VRZQHUVKLSLVKLJKLQWKHILUP
WKH &(2 KDV PRUH LQFHQWLYHV WR ORZHU WKH ILUP¶V ULVN E\ KROGing 
more cash.   
- Prior cash holding level 
Cash holding level is also highly auto-correlated investigated by 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010).  Financially constrained firms with 
persistent low level of cash holding often have shown declining of 
cash inflows and insufficient external financing due to high level of 
costs. This is a vicious circle for these firms often accompanied with 
high level of out spending such as R&D.      
- Macroeconomic conditions 
Almeida et al. (2004) showed that firms tend to accumulate more 
cash flow in the adverse financial conditions. Also if the 
macroeconomic volatility is high, the firm is likely to increase the 
cash holding as well (Baum et al., 2006).  
- Agency costs of cash holding 
Firm with high agency costs tends to have low cash holding as it is 
more expense, however manager could also use this to holding cash 
at firm therefore a high cash holding level. The agency costs are 
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approximated with the stock options by the manger and disclosure 
RI WKH ILUP¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH QXPEHU RI LWHPV
disclosed (Bopkin, 2012).   
- Type of firms 
Saddour (2004) have shown that relationship between size, liquidty 
assets and investment are differ with the type of firm. From data 
collected in French, growth firm tends to have high level of cash 
flow with small size and low level of liquid asset, the mature firm 
would have low level of cash flow when size is small and liquid asset 




3 Data and Methodologies 
 
3.1 Data Collection  
 
Firm and industrial Data are collected using FAME database 
provided by Bureau Van Dyke, the macroeconomic data is collected 
from Worldbank. Bank and financial industry is not included in the 
sample due to its operating nature is much closed to cash. 
Government controlled firms are also excluded from the sample. All 
of the remaining sectors are selected including most of the major 
manufacturing and service sectors. There are total 52711 
companies selected from 13  sectors which have around 502662 
data points, these data are from the 2004 to 2013 and there are 
some companies have missing data in some of the variables or the 
full years.  OECD data are collected from the similar years.  The 13 
industries are shown as below with their dummy variables.  
 




CHEM Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products
CONS Construction
FOOD Food, beverages, tobacco
UTIL Gas, Water, Electricity
HOTEL Hotels & restaurants
MANU Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling
METAL Metals & metal products
POST Post and telecommunications
PUB Publishing, printing
TEXT Textiles, wearing apparel, leather
TRANS Transport
RETAIL Wholesale & retail trade




Figure 2 Variables Explanation 
Because not all firms have reported total assets and sales, therefore 
the final valid counts of data points are 247378 for cash asset ratio 
and 198112 for cash sale ratio. The top 2% and bottom 2% of the 
data based on the values of dependent variables are removed to 
Variables Explanation
CASH_SALE Cash to sale ratio
DIV_GROWTH Dividend Growth






CASH_CONV_CYC Cash Conversion Cycle
CASH_FLOW_VOL Cash Flow Volatility
EARN_VOL Earning Volatility
GROWTH_VOL Sales Growth Volatility
PRD_COST_VOL Product Cost Volatility
PROFIT_VOL Profit Volatility
TOTAL_ACCR Total Accrual 
SIZE1 Log of total asset
SIZE2 Log of total sale
AGE Years of firm in operation
SALE_GROWTH Sales growth
OP_CASH_GROWTH Operational cash flow growth
DOA Debt to asset ratio
MTB Mark to book ratio
DIVERSE Number of subsidiaries
OP_CASH Operating cash flow
CE Captial expenditure
INV Investment and R&D
NON_CASH_WC Non cash working captial




GDP Gross Domestic Product
REAL_INT Real Interest
DEBT Countries Debt Level
ECO_INV Economic Investment
IND_AVG Industrial Average Cash Holding
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reduce any problem with outlier in statistics, therefore cash asset 
data has 237486 observations and cash sales ratio has 190189.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables excluding 
dummy variables. 
For the dependent variable, cash asset has a positive skewness and 
kurtosis is less than 3, hence the cash asset follows a normal 
distribution without fat tail. The majority of the variables are not 
normal, except the TOTAL_ACCR, SIZE1, SIZE2, OP_CASH and INV. 
This is expected since these variables are most commonly 
represented in the financial data and are more accurately reported, 
other variable such as CASH_FLOW_VOL and GROWTH_VOL are all 
subjected to some form of fat tails. Because they are influenced by 
wide economic performances and therefore have a high level of 
negative or positive skewness and its value is also more volatile.   
The variables with more than 25% of missing values are excluded 
from the data because their missing values would invalid other 
variable in the observation. These variables are DIV_GROWH, 
DIV_PAY, CE, RENUM and NON_CASH_WC. For the first two 
variables, since they are only valid in the public companies and the 
data could also be missing from the database. The cash expenditure 
and working capital is also most likely missing since most likely they 
are not reported separately. Remuneration is also more likely to be 
presented in the public firm and also not directly represented in the 
financial statement. Therefore these variables are excluded from 




The descriptive statistic for cash sale data is in the Appendix 7. 
CASH_SALE is also positively skewed and but with a high kurtosis at 
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
CASH_ASSET 237486 .3673 .28380 1.264 1.405
DIV_GROWTH 1019 1.7853 12.04391 13.529 211.105
EXP_OP_CF 124114 .0082 .15952 -16.426 4168.418
EXP_SALES 196395 .0916 .88905 40.842 2684.893
PAY_TO 183171 118.7129 9139.46839 298.290 103941.629
DIV_PAY 1292 -5.0117 442.88983 -7.201 464.160
INV_TO 161375 47.6436 107.19170 4.667 26.031
RECEIV_TO 175007 28.7911 83.06656 6.614 52.292
CASH_CONV_CYC 151997 65.5235 222.30150 89.993 13822.149
CASH_FLOW_VOL 99510 -.3760 158.42064 -154.313 31129.377
EARN_VOL
173537 -78.8353 9949.65323 32.636 13654.870
GROWTH_VOL 154558 -2.8479 1391.13144 -387.679 151767.357
PRD_COST_VOL 157107 6.1621 1170.13246 338.661 124091.492
PROFIT_VOL 189569 .5993 280.31293 150.422 60179.058
TOTAL_ACCR 196792 2.4672 .88218 .257 .831
SIZE1 237486 3.9006 .68417 .807 2.374
SIZE2 190178 4.1431 .70117 .270 2.330
AGE
237392 24.1289 21.25872 1.699 3.375
SALE_GROWTH 169473 .1196 .52293 8.053 101.149
OP_CASH_GROWTH 96081 35.5033 8677.70813 173.809 39914.067
DOA 221658 .0625 .23738 3.058 320.188
MTB 237243 .6612 .61544 95.062 15940.408
DIVERSE 237486 2.0445 13.57487 27.579 1100.572
OP_CASH 88637 2.9443 .70959 .544 3.139
CE
10536 2.0547 1.00895 -.218 .119
INV 91220 2.1024 1.70933 -.703 .935
NON_CASH_WC 27870 3.0848 .86154 .153 .987
TAX 197972 .0763 43.05046 -358.584 151068.449
RENUM 2007 8.9093 93.65722 13.246 190.623
IND_LIQ 237486 .87120620342 .030569196147 .310 -.605
CONC 237486 .33571985978 .153395899657 2.120 6.385
GDP 237486 .01512225444 .024446202800 -1.238 .296
REAL_INT 237486 .00894640010 .017319885472 -.643 -.849
DEBT 237486 .17979854739 .032006769442 .063 -.799
ECO_INV 237486 3.69701871880 .542886821868 -.057 -1.549
IND_AVG 237486 4.2838 .22350 .419 1.076
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Cash Asset Ratio Data
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18.61, therefore CASH_SALE is not normally distributed. This may 
create a problem when running this using OLS model. The variables 
excluded because high level of missing are also same as in the cash 
asset data.  The two sets of data have very similar characteristic 
which means there are many cases overlapped. 
3.2 Variables and Hypothesis 
 
The dependent variables are cash holding level. There are two 
measures of cash holding level. CASH_ASSET represent the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalent to the total asset of the firm less cash 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ogundipe, 2012). CASH_SALE represent 
the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to the total sales of the firm. 
For some industries that are not asset intensive, the sale is a better 
measure for corporate size.  Cash level is not directly represented in 
the dataset, the sum of bank deposit, bank overdraft and short 
term loans and overdraft.  
The primary analysed variables are sales risk variables. Relating to 
the precautionary approach and trade off theory reviewed in the 
previous section that firm would increase cash holding level to 
enable income smoothing and reducing future transaction costs. 
When sales risks are low, firm is like to follow pecking order theory 
to distribute or invest excess cash. Our main hypothesis is that: 
Cash holding level increases with sales risks and decreases 
when future income risk is lowered.  
The sales risks are measured in different ways. First is to measure 
directly with volatility and forecasting in sales and cash flows. There 
are eight variables related to this measure. The earnings volatility 
represented with EARN_VOL which is the continuous 5 years 
VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIWKHILUP¶VQHWLQFRPHRYHUQHWLQFRPH7KLVLV
DVVXPLQJWKDW ILUPV¶YRODWLOLW\ LV LQIOXHQFHZLWK WKHUHFHQW\HDUVRI
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trend. Second is the growth volatility represented by GROWTH_VOL, 
this is thHFRQWLQXRXV\HDUVVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIWKHILUP¶V\HDU
on year growth rates.  This means if the firm has uneven revenue 
JURZWK LW LV OLNHO\ WKH ILUP¶V UHYHQXH LV QRW VWDEOH 7KLUG LV WKH
YRODWLOLW\ RI WKH JURVV SURILWDELOLW\ 352),7B92/ LI WKH ILUP¶V has 
considering variation in volatility, then the firm may have in some 
period engaged in fire sale to make sure earning is made in the 
period, calculated in the same way as earning. Fourth is the 
volatility of production costs, PRD_COST_VOL, again this is to do 
with the real cash adjustment in the sales, calculated in the same 
way as earning. Last one is CASH_FLOW_VOL measured by the 
previous 5 years volatility over the cash flow level. Cash holding 
level is expected to be positive relate to these four volatility 
measures.  
Fifth is the log of expected sales represented with EXP_SALES, 
these are calculated with 5 years of moving average of the sales if 
manager is expecting a trend of the sales. Sixth is the log of 
expected net operating cash flow, this is also using moving average 
of the cash flow to represent, EXP_OP_CF. Both of these variables 
are adjusted in unit of million. Third is the growth of the firm, which 
is calculated as the year on year growth percentage in sales, 
SALE_GROWTH and the year on year growth of the operating cash 
flow, OP_CASH_GROWTH. Cash holding level is  expected to reduce 
with these four variables.   
There are also measures not directly related to the sales but related 
to the payment cycles of the sales. First the receivable turnover 
ratio which is net credit sales divided by account receivables, 
RECEIV_TO. Second is the inventory turnover ratio which is the 
sales divided by inventory of the year, INV_TO. Third is the payable 
turn ratio, which is the total purchase order, divided by accounts 
payables, PAY_TO. The total purchase is calculated as the ending 
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inventory plus cost of goods sold minus the beginning inventory.  
Fourth is a combination of the three ratios which is the cash 
conversion ratio that is calculated as 360/RECEIV_TO plus 
360/INV_TO minus 360/PAY_TO, CASH_CONV_CYC.  Cash holding 
level is expected to negative related to receivable turnover, 
inventory turnover and cash conversion cycle, positively related to 
payable turnover.  
The third part of the sales risks is to control for the accounting level 
RIFKDQJHVVLQFHWKHVHFKDQJHLQDFFUXDOVKRXOGQ¶WDIIHFWWKHDFWXDO
cash flows however it is difficult to distinguish between accounting 
accrual and the change in real activities. The total accrual is 
included in here, measured as net earning less the operating cash 
flows, this is accrual is divided by the net assets to adjust as the 
total accrual ratio in the earning, TOT_ACCR. High accrual means 
the firm is not engaging much of the real activity to achieve 
smoothing. Cash holding level is expected to be low with high level 
of accrual.  
Because there are many different level of relationship represented 
that affects cash holding level.  I have used several control 
variables that are identified in the literature reviews to adjust for 
those. There are type of control variables used, the firm level 
variables, the industrial level variables and the macroeconomic 
variables. 
First is to introduce the firm specific variable. Size is measured with 
log of the total asset, SIZE1 and the log of the total sales SIZE2. 
Firms in different industry tend to have different indicator for size, 
expected to be negatively related to cash holding level. Second is 
the age of the firm, which is the number of year since it is first 




DOA, a higher level of DOA implies a high level of financial distress 
which means the liquidity demand is higher and also representing 
thH ILUP¶V RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH &DVK KROGLQJ OHYHO LV H[SHFWHG WR
positive with DOA. Fourth is the Return on Asset, ROA, a high level 
of return indicates that cash is used effectively, so negatively 
related to Cash holding level. Fifth is the market to book ratio, MTB, 
WKLVLVDSUR[\RIWKHILUP¶VYDOXHFDOFXODWHGDVDFFRXQWLQJYDOXHRI
asset less the equity plus the market value of equity over the 
accounting value of asset. Increase cash holding is expected 
LQFUHDVH ILUPV¶ YDOXH LI ILQDQFLDOO\ FRQVWUDLQHG  6L[WK LV WKH ILUP¶V
diversification, DIVERSE, which is the number of subsidiaries the 
firm has, cash holding level is expected to be lower for diversified 
firm. Seventh is the log of net operating cash flow, OP_CASH which 
determine the level of cash inflow. Cash holding level is expected to 
EH QHJDWLYH UHODWHG WR RSHUDWLQJ FDVK IORZ /DVW LV WKH ILUP¶V
marginal tax rate, TAX, this is one minus ratio EBIT and earning.  
Several dummy variables are created for controlling the effects of 
firm type which are GLOBAL and PRIVATE.  
Second is to control the industrial level variables that were found in 
the literature which are significant to cash holding level. Industrial 
wide asset liquidity (IND_LIQ) is measured as the ratio of the firms 
with debt rating to the total number of firms in the industry. This is 
calculated in the randomly selected samples. Although Huang (2010) 
has also suggested using number and values of transaction as proxy 
however these information are not readily available in the database 
therefore they are not used. Cash holding level is expected to lower 
with high level of industrial liquidity.  Second is the industrial 
average cash, again this is measured as the log of average cash in 
the randomly selected sample, IND_AVG. Cash holding level is 
expected to be positive related to industrial average cash. Third is 
measuring the competitive level of the industry, which we use the 
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four firm concentration ratio, CONC, it is expected to be negatively 
related to cash holding level.  For each industry we use a dummy 
variable represented each type of industries are also used to cover 
any additional industrial specific effects. 
The macroeconomic variables cover the external financial conditions 
since cash holding level normally reflects the health of 
macroeconomic environment. First is the year on year GDP growth 
rate of UK, GDP, which is the proxy for the overall financial health. 
Following the pecking order theory, a good economic environment 
would reduce the cash holding level. Second is the real interest rate, 
which is the risk free interest less the inflation rate, REAL_INT, a 
proxy for the financial cost. Firm would increase the cash holding if 
the financial cost is high based on transaction motives. Third is the 
log of overall outstanding debt in the economy as ratio to GDP, 
DEBT, this represents the capacity of the lending. Fourth is the 
overall investment in the economy as ratio to GDP, ECO_INV, and a 
high level of investment means the society may be over invested. 
Cash holding level is expected to increase with DEBT as 
precautionary motive but negatively related to investment in 
pecking order theory.  
3.3 Models and tests 
 
There are several advantages of using this type of panel data for 
analysis compare to cross-sectional or time series data alone. First, 
there are more degree of freedom and variability (Hsiao, 2007). 
Second, there are more hypotheses can be tested with this 
complicated form of data, since human behaviour are both influence 
by their historical knowledge and current status. Thirdly, even if 
there are some omitted variables, the panel data should have large 
enough set of data to cover. Hsiao (2007) suggested that effects of 
omitted variable are reduced as the dataset can either be recovered 
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with additional connections between variables or able to isolate 
some individual effects bypassing the missing variables. Fourthly, 
the computation and statistical interference are simplified since 
there are more choice of doing analysis and transformation. 
To analyse this type of panel data, there are many modelling 
techniques. Wooldridge (2002) specified that there are linear and 
non-linear models. In our example, there may be some non-linear 
relationship; however it is simpler to follow linear model examples 
that are shown by previous researches. 
We will use two approaches here, one is OLS estimation that 
frequently used by literatures reviewed in the previous section, the 
other is random and fixed effects model as recommended in Baltagi 
(2008) and Hsiao (2003) for differentiating time variant and time 
invariant effects. In Opler et al. (1999), a method called Fama-
MacBeth regression which first to regress in the cross-sectional level 
so that serial correlation between the years not considered, and 
treating each as independent. In this research, it is assumed the 
time serial correlation between data is 0 in OLS regression. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) have also investigated cash holding using 
OLS regression without considering the serial correlation. 
Mohammadi et al. (2012) have used the OLS regression over 5 
years model to estimate the relationship of cash holding.  
 
In order to consider for some potential variation between the years, 
the random and fixed effects model with diagnostic tests is one of 
the suitable methods in panel data analysis (Hsiao, 2007). The 
assumption of fixed effects that regard of the different between 
different years, the effects should be same so there is one common 
relationship size. For random effects, it is assumed that coefficient 
estimated could be different to different characteristics of accounts, 
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so there is not a common effect to be used across different type of 
samples.  
 
From the above, there are two set of models techniques are 
planned to use here. One is the ordinary least square (OLS) 
methods. Because we have a large set data, therefore it is likely 
these variables are normally distributed. SPSS is also better at 
handling missing values with OLS. The main statistical tests for 
assumptions are heteroskedasticity tests, collinearity tests and 
testing for normality of the dependent and independent variables.  
The model equation is as below 
CASH_ASSET(or CASH_SALE)  = C + a1*EXP_OP_CF + 
a2*EXP_SALES + a3* PAY_TO a4*INV_TO + a5*RECEIV_TO + 
a6*CASH_CONV_CYC + a7*CASH_FLOW_VOL + a8*EARN_VOL + 
a9*GROWTH_VOL + a10*PRD_COST_VOL+ a11*PROFIT_VOL + 
a12*TOTAL_ACCR + a13*SIZE1 + a14*SIZE2 + a15*AGE + 
a16*SALE_GROWTH + a17*OP_CASH_GROWTH + a18*DOA + 
a19*MTB + a20*DIVERSE + a21*OP_CASH + a22*TAX + 
a23*GLOBAL + a24*PRIVATE + a25*IND_LIQ + a26*CONC + 
a27*GDP + a28*REAL_INT + a29*DEBT + a30*ECO_INV 
+a31*IND_AVG + Industrial Dummy     eq(1) 
Where C is constant and a1-a31 are coefficients.  
The second model are random effects model and fixed effects model, 
these are better at explaining if the variables are come from the 
firm specific effects or are affects by some other random factors. 
Using the year as time variables, the model is specified with 
variables in eq(1) to form matrix, the industrial and firm dummy 
variables are removed. The fixed effects model focused on variables 
that changes over time, the covariance is calculated to adjust for 
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errors in predictors, assuming that time-invariant characteristics are 
not correlated with other error terms.  
CASH_ASSET/CASH_SALE(it) = B*X(it) + C + U(it)  eq(2) 
Where B is coefficient, X(it) represent the list of variables across 
time, C is constant and U(it) is the error term 
For random effects the assumption is that the difference between 
the cases does have some affects to the coefficient, so which means 
that individual companies are actually different, so they will affect 
the cash flow level. The random effects model is  
CASH_ASSET/CASH_SALE(it) = B*X(it) + C + U(it) + T(it)      eq(3) 
Where U(it) is now the between-group error and T(it) is within the 
group error. The Hausman test is used to estimate that if the results 
are random or not. A further 11 regressions are run to understand 
the individual impacts of the different measures sales risks using 
cash asset model under the selected method based on Hausman 
Test. And only the significant control variables are included.  
Because there are many variables being used in the model, 
therefore it is likely some of these variables are missing. Howell 
(2007) suggested that there are three types of traditional treatment, 
list-wise deletion delete the case with any missing value, pairwise 
deletion delete variable that is missing but not the other one and 
last replacement with mean data. List-wise deletion is safer, but a 
lot of data can be deleted from the sample. The data can be kept 
with pairwise deletion but the model is likely to be incorrect since it 
is biased towards the variables with more values. Howell (2007a) 
also suggested that a better method is data imputation which works 
out the missing values based on the relationship with other 
variables in the same cases. Two methods of treating missing will 
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be used here, one is the pairwise deletion and the other is 
imputation methods in SPSS.  
Another problem is the model misspecification, where the model 
could be over fitted or some important variables are missing from 
the model. The plot of residual is used to check if there are other 
missing variables (Baltagi, 2008). The over fitting problem can be 
identified with split the sample to two, one is used to build model 
and the other is to test if the model is still correct. Given the 








In this section, the output of two models will be analysed. The OLS 
model from the original data with cash asset and cash sale ratio as 
dependent variables are analysed in the next section. The OLS 
model also run against the imputed data calculated from correlation 
to validate the added data that replaced missing value. On fixed and 
random effects model, because there are so many missing values in 
the original data, there are no valid observations. So the fixed and 
random effects models are performed against the imputed data, 
and with Hausman and Breusch Pagan test to validate the results. 
The last two sections discuss the results from sales risk variables 
and control variables and some of the limitations of this test.  
4.2 OLS Model 
 
4.2.1 Firm Level analysis 
 
The first regression model used only the firm level data without 
industrial level and country level data as control variables. The t-
statistic testing is used to analyse the level of significance of each 
variables. Because backwards model estimation is used therefore 
only the variables with less than10% significance are included in the 
equation, this is to make sure the estimated relationship is accurate. 
This is to examine how much variation in the cash holding level is 
H[SODLQHGE\WKHLQWHUQDOILUP¶VFKDracteristics.  
Table2 represents the model results and the model summary is 
represented in the Appendix 8. The SPSS standard outputs have 
included the following analysis to the variables. The unstandardized 
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coefficient represents estimates under the current values in the 
model and the related standard errors associated with the estimate. 
From this a student t-test and related significant values are 
provided. The standardised coefficient is estimated by making all 
independent and dependent variables into the same scale. This is 
beneficial to check between variable to see which one has more 
effect, but potentially affected by the data range and the normality 
of the data, therefore it is not accurate. A 95% confidence interval 
for the estimates is also provided, if the signs are the same, 
meaning that the variable is not significant. Correlation analyse 
represents the correlations with the dependent variables and it is 
closely related to standardised beta value.  
The R-square value is quite low at 0.058, which means that firm 
level data can only explain 6% of the variation in the firm level data, 
and there are 53237 cases remaining after pairwise deletion. With 
ANOVA analysis, that F-statistic is significant at 5% level, therefore 
the model is valid but the explanatory power is low.  
First, none of the volatility sales measures are significant, therefore 
the relative cash asset holding level is not related to the level 
changes observed in the sales and cash flow changes. Both the 
expected sales and expected cash flow are significant at 10% level. 
EXP_OP_CF is not significant at 5% level. The cash holding level is 
negatively related to the EXP_OP_CF, with 1 million increased in the 
operational cash inflow, the cash holding level would be lower by 
1.76%.  And with 1 million increased in the EXP_SALES, the cash 
holding level would increase around 0.4%. This result supports the 
pecking order theory since firm are likely to spend more in firm 
money first as expected future cash flow is high. The effects on the 




All cash conversion related variables are significant, but judging 
from the size of coefficient, their explanatory power is weak and 
WKHUH LV D FRQWUDGLFWRU\ UHVXOW )LUP¶V FDVK KROGLQJ LQFUHDVHV ZLWK
both the receivable turn over and payable turnover, which 
suggested that firm who have loose credit policies may also have 
require their suppliers to have loose credit policies. So the cash 
holding level is high given both ends of payments are unpredictable.  
Cash holding level increase with longer conversion cycle, suggested 
firm tends to have precautionary approach which fitting with the 
trade-off theory.  
Moving on to the firm level control variables, SIZE1 and SIZE2 are 
both negatively correlated which confirmed with previous literatures 
reviewed where firm¶V FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO WHQGV WR EH ORZHU ZLWK
larger firm.  The cash holding level is lower by 2.5% with 10 folds 
increase in the firm asset level and lower by 3.5% with 10 folds 
increase in the sales level. There are close correlation between 
asset and sales, and the level of sales is more directly influencing of 









Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.514 .009 56.083 0.000 .496 .532
EXP_OP_CF
-1.760E-08 .000 -.010 -1.892 .059 .000 .000 -.029 -.008 -.008 .647 1.546
EXP_SALES 3.929E-09 .000 .012 2.284 .022 .000 .000 -.026 .010 .010 .609 1.642
PAY_TO 3.181E-07 .000 .010 2.434 .015 .000 .000 .011 .011 .010 .999 1.001
RECEIV_TO 9.740E-05 .000 .029 6.764 .000 .000 .000 .027 .029 .028 .996 1.004
CASH_CONV_CYC 7.539E-05 .000 .059 13.837 .000 .000 .000 .057 .060 .058 .971 1.029
SIZE1
-.025 .004 -.061 -6.835 .000 -.033 -.018 -.085 -.030 -.029 .220 4.552
SIZE2
-.035 .003 -.086 -11.108 .000 -.041 -.029 -.097 -.048 -.047 .298 3.360
AGE
-.001 .000 -.042 -9.344 .000 -.001 .000 -.089 -.040 -.039 .889 1.125
SALE_GROWTH
.012 .002 .022 5.125 .000 .007 .016 .035 .022 .022 .978 1.023
DOA
-.047 .005 -.040 -8.740 .000 -.058 -.037 -.063 -.038 -.037 .863 1.159
MTB
.077 .002 .166 37.965 0.000 .073 .081 .185 .162 .160 .922 1.085
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.034 -7.035 .000 -.001 -.001 -.050 -.030 -.030 .775 1.291
OP_CASH
.027 .003 .068 8.964 .000 .021 .033 -.043 .039 .038 .310 3.224
GLOBAL
-.021 .005 -.029 -4.308 .000 -.031 -.012 .012 -.019 -.018 .395 2.530
PRIVATE
-.073 .006 -.081 -12.231 .000 -.084 -.061 -.049 -.053 -.051 .399 2.505
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a. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
















Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.815 .015 55.717 0.000 .786 .844
EXP_OP_CF 0.085-         .000 -.030 -6.629 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.029 -.023 .619 1.614
EXP_SALES 0.017         .000 .029 6.240 .000 .000 .000 -.017 .027 .022 .580 1.724
INV_TO
.000 .000 .029 8.222 .000 .000 .000 .022 .036 .029 .968 1.033
RECEIV_TO
.000 .000 .046 12.988 .000 .000 .000 .042 .056 .046 .993 1.007
CASH_CONV_CYC
.000 .000 .104 28.482 .000 .000 .000 .203 .123 .100 .932 1.073
CASH_FLOW_VOL 8.602E-05 .000 .020 5.572 .000 .000 .000 .001 .024 .020 .960 1.042
PROFIT_VOL
.000 .000 -.017 -4.923 .000 .000 .000 .004 -.021 -.017 .998 1.002
TOTAL_ACCR
.007 .003 .012 1.964 .050 .000 .014 .007 .009 .007 .356 2.806
SIZE1
.640 .006 .895 99.358 0.000 .628 .653 .105 .396 .350 .153 6.535
SIZE2
-.792 .006 -1.044 -140.070 0.000 -.803 -.781 -.185 -.519 -.494 .223 4.474
AGE
-.001 .000 -.031 -8.174 .000 -.001 -.001 -.044 -.035 -.029 .884 1.131
SALE_GROWTH
.012 .004 .012 3.397 .001 .005 .019 .002 .015 .012 .978 1.023
DOA
-.234 .007 -.126 -32.334 .000 -.248 -.220 -.133 -.139 -.114 .822 1.216
MTB
.000 .000 -.014 -3.702 .000 .000 .000 .006 -.016 -.013 .872 1.147
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.034 -8.359 .000 -.001 -.001 -.013 -.036 -.029 .766 1.305
OP_CASH
.090 .005 .130 19.379 .000 .081 .099 .073 .084 .068 .278 3.603
GLOBAL
-.023 .007 -.016 -3.077 .002 -.037 -.008 .029 -.013 -.011 .473 2.114
PRIVATE
-.078 .009 -.042 -8.306 .000 -.097 -.060 -.048 -.036 -.029 .480 2.085
7
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
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Cash holding level is negatively related with AGE but of a smaller 
ratio, a 0.1% decrease in cash holding level is expected with one 
year in operation. When firm have seen continuous sales growth, 
the cash holding level also increase. This is expected according to 
trade-off model as firm is not likely to spend cash since raising cash 
is expensive. OP_CASH_GROWTH is not significant. Both of these 
two hypotheses support the trade-off theory since it is more difficult 
for young firm to raise cash. 
A high DOA ratio has negative impacts on the cash holding level; 
this is in contrast with some of previous literatures where firm are 
likely to hold more cash if there is more debt. This results follows 
the pecking order theory since firm would only raising debt if there 
is no internal funds, so these firms with high level debt is expected 
to have low level RIFDVK'¶0HOORHWDO 
A high market to book ratio indicates that the firm would have high 
cash holding level in this model, this agrees with the Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010), where  a positive relationship is expected. These 
growth firms instead of spending cash, they acquire more capital 
from the market for future investment purposes. The ROA is not 
VLJQLILFDQW LQ WKLV PRGHO )LUP¶V GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ GRHV QRW KDYH KLJK
level of negative impacts, an increase in one subsidiary only reduce 
the cash level by 0.1%. The result confirmed with the previous 
analysis where firm tends to hold less cash given there are multiple 
incomes from different area of business (Subramanianm et al., 
2011).  
OP_CASH have positive relationship with cash holding level, an 
increase in 10 folds of cash increase the holding level by 2.7%, this 
result follows the trade-off theory since a high level of cash income 
would result in high level of cash holding as it is expansive for firm 
to raise cash from external finance (Opler et al., 1999).  
58 
 
In term of firm type, the GLOBAL and PRIVATE firms all have lower 
cash levels than other types of firms. But there are different theory 
supports this, the GLOBAL firms tends to be larger and therefore 
likely to holds less cash. For PRIVATE firms, although external 
finance is more difficult, but they are more likely to distribute cash 
to shareholders or use for investment since it is also more 
H[SDQVLYHIRUWKHVHILUPVWRKROGFDVKWKDWGRQ¶WJHQHUDWHUHYHQXH 
The explanatory power is higher for CASH_SALE ratio and more 
variables are significant with R-square at 34% and F-statistics being 
higher also significant. Compare to CASH_Asset model, the 
relationship with EXP_OP_CF and EXP_SALES still holds but with 
lesser effects. The three out of four cash conversion cycle related 
variables are significant, INV_TO, RECEIV_TO and 
CASH_CONV_CYC, however it appears to be the influence is minimal. 
CASH_FLOW_VOL is significant and at positive, but the coefficient is 
also small. The results follows the trade-off theory where if the firm 
is likely to save up cash if they are not sure about future revenue.  
There is also a small influence on accrual level of the firm as 
expected by earning management theory. A 10 fold increase in 
accrual level would increase the cash sale level by 0.7%. This is due 
to that firm is using more accounting adjustment to make earning 
management; therefore the cash reserve is not affected.  
7KH ILUP¶V DVVHW OHYHO LV QRW KDYLQJ D SRVLWLYH LPSDFW WR WKH FDVK
holding level relative to sales. There is 64% of more cash holding is 
observed for 10 fold increase in firm size. One possible explanation 
is that large firms may tends to have relatively lower sale to asset 
ratio and they are better at operation, therefore majority of the 
sales would be converted into cash, and they will also have more 
cash available for other activities where small firms are likely to 
spend the cash out. So that the cash level relative to sale is always 
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higher for large firm size. The Sale size is self-explanatory since as 
sale increases, the cash to sale ratio will be smaller.  
SALE_GROWTH is positively related to the cash holding level, this 
again follow the trade-off theory since high growth firm are likely to 
save up cash for future investment rather than distribute to 
shareholders.  The remaining variables, DOA, MTB, DIVERSE, 
OP_CASH, GLOBAL and PRIVATE are following similar conclusions as 
presented in cash asset ratio model.  
 





Figure 4: PP-plot of Residual of Cash Asset Ratio firm level 
 
 




The model validity is also worth testing since OLS model is not 
suitable for all panel data. First is to look at collinearity, variables 
with high level of collinearity can affect the significance of other 
variables. In table 1 and 2, All VIF score is less than 3 and tolerance 
is greater than 0.1, therefore no collinearity is presented in any of 
model. Second is to look at heteroskedasticity, the residual is 
negatively skewed and appear to have a fat tail in the positive end 
in Figure 3 for cash asset model, therefore the residual is probably 
not random. The PP plot also suggested that the model estimated is 
not normal, therefore the results may be biased. But in term of 
model misspecification, there is a clear pattern shown in figure 5, 
therefore the problem is to do with normality of the variables but 
less likely to do misspecification. In the similar analysis for cash sale 
model as figure show in Appendix 9, that the residual is more 
normally distributed but it is still not normal based on the P-P plot. 
As the scatter plot shows a pattern of wider spread in the residual 
against the predicted value, this means there is a potential mis-
specification of the model.  
4.2.2 Industrial and Country level 
 
Using OLS equation 1 and 2 as basis, the industrial model and 
macroeconomic models are added in steps to test if the relationship 
changes with the firm level variables and if there are more variables 
become significant.  First is to look at the cash asset ratio industrial 
level model (Appendix 8). The R-square is improved by 1% 
compare to firm level model, and F-statistics is still significant. The 
two forecasting variables EXP_OP_CF and EXP_SASLES are not 
significant anymore and the PROFIT_VOL is now having a negative 
relationship with cash holding level, but it is only significant at 10% 
level. Other variables returns coefficient of the similar order and 
same signs as in the firm level model. The IND_LIQ is negatively 
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related to the cash holding level, this confirms the finding of Huang 
(2010). Cash holding level also positively related to the industrial 
average cash, IND_AVG, that an increase in 10 fold of industrial 
FDVKZRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHKROGLQJOHYHOE\)LUP¶VFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
is not significant.  
Moving on to the industrial dummy variables, TRANS, RETAIL, TEXT 
and POST are not significant and at least one of them is excluded 
for collinearity problem. All of the remaining industry variables have 
negative correlation with the cash holding level. Except HOTEL 
which is a service industrial, all of the others are manufacturing 
industry. While in the non-significant industries, only TEXT is a 
manufacturing industry. Therefore, cash holding level is likely to be 
low for manufacturing industry in this period. Comparing the 
coefficients, WOOD and UTIL industry are most negatively affected. 
Comparing the industrial level model for cash sale ratio (Appendix 
9), the explanatory power increased by 0.8% and the model is still 
valid at F-statistics. All firm level variables remain as the same. 
IND_AVG follows the same positive coefficient as in the industrial 
level cash asset model, but the IND_LIQ is no longer significant, the 
CONC is now negatively related to the sales level. This confirms the 
ILQGLQJRI'¶0HOORHWDOVLQFH WKHKLJKHU WKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
ratio the lower the competition, then there is less incentive for firm 
to keep cash level.  
All of the significant industrial dummy variables has positive 
coefficient. CHEM, WOOD, MANU, METAL are not significant. All of 
the four service industries, HOTEL, TRANS, RETAIL and POST are 
significant, this suggested that service industries normally has 
higher cash holding than manufacturing industry per previous 
results. This is because they have less fixed assets and they have 
more turn over in cash for buying products, for manufacturing 
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industries their cash outflow is normally stable and they have more 
fixed assets to use when borrowing. POST and UTIL also have a 
significant high level of positive proportion in this. Considering both 
results, UTIL may have lower sales relative to their asset level. 
While POST may require higher level of cash to keep operations, 
because telecommunication industrial tends to have more asset in 
lease.  
The four country level variables are added to make the full 
regression model. In cash asset model (Appendix 8), all of the 
previous identified significant variables have shown the similar order 
and same sign. GDP is not significant while other three are 
significant. REAL_INT is positive related with cash holding level, this 
confirms with trade-off theory. Because a high real interest rate 
OHYHO UHGXFH WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR ERUURZ VR WKH\ EHFRPH PRUH
financially constrained, therefore the firm is likely to hold more cash. 
Increase in DEBT level reduce the CASH_ASSET level, this is 
different to expected in the trade off theory but confirms with 
pecking order theory, since firm would only borrow if there is no 
internal funds, therefore DEBT level can only go up if the internal 
cash fund level is low.  When economic investment increases, the 
cash holding level also increases. This means in the UK, the firm 
wold have more cash available when the overall investment in the 
society is high.  
For the cash sale model, there are no significant country level 
variables; there is some difference in the estimation due to the 
regression process being different. Hence the country level variables 
only affects firm asset related cash holding level but does not affect 
sales since majority of the variation are explained at firm and 




4.2.3 Imputed data Regression 
 
Regression models are also run against the imputed data in order to 
test for the consistency of those added values in the model 
(Appendix 9 and Appendix 10). The estimated coefficients of these 
regressions are compared against the original data, if the values are 
close and of the same signs, then the predicted values in those 
additional values are correct. First the backward regression is run 
against the full range of variables used in the original data model.  
The R^2 values are closer to one suggested that the imputation has 
made the data overall more correlated, therefore a few of the 
variables have failed the collinearity tests, with VIF >10.  So to 
improve the test results by deleting any variables with VIF >9, the 
variables CASH_CONV_CYC, MANU, TRANS, RETAIL, ECO_INV, 
IND_AVG, MTB, TAX and OP_CASH are deleted from the cash sale 
ratio model. There is no problem with collinearity cash asset model.  
First is to look at the tests for model validation (Appendix 10). In 
histogram, the residual are shaped with symmetrical distribution 
and it is more normal from the PP-plot, although it still remains with 
the similar shape as the original model. There is also no model 
specification problem as the predicted value evenly spread out in 
scatter plot with predicted value.  Compare with the full model with 
original data on CASH_ASSET, majority of the variables are present 
with similar order and same signs. There are further input of 
EXP_SALES, INV_TO and TAX, but the coefficient is small. This 
concludes that imputed model has filled the new values following 
the original data trend. 
Second is to look at test validation for CASH_SALE (Appendix 11). 
Compare to the model from original data, that the residual is still 
symmetric and have the same characteristic in the PP-Plot. The 
scatter plot shows a better pattern between residual and predicted 
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values, therefore the previous problem of misspecification 
disappears. Except the variables that we have removed due to 
collinearity, the remaining variables have shown similar trends as in 
the original model. The differences are for coefficient of FOOD and 
METAL, instead of having positive value, has now become negative.  
4.3 Random and fixed effects Model 
 
The fixed effects (FE) model is used to control for the time-invariant 
variables and random effects (RE) model take those into accounts. 
$VVXPLQJWKDWWKHW\SHRIILUPGLYHUVLW\RIWKHILUP¶VEXVLQHVVDQG
the industry of the firm are not correlated with other time-varying 
firm variables, the FE model is favoured. Otherwise, if they are 
related, then the RE model is favour. There are three models for 
each of dependent variables, CASH_ASSET and CASH_SALE. By 
checking the Hausman tests across all six models (Appendix 1-6), 
all the probability is less than 0.05, therefore we rejected the 
hypothesis that errors are correlated with variables therefore the FE 
model is favoured. The correlation is around 25-29% for 
CASH_SALE FE model and around 0.5%-0.7% in CASH_ASSET FE 
model.  Because of in FE model that all time invariant variables are 
removed, so DIVERSE, GLOBAL, PRIVATE and industrial dummy 
variables are all omitted in the independent variables list.  
Also looking at the Breusch and Pagan Test that we rejected the 
hypothesis that there is no difference across different companies. 
So according to this test, the OLS models have some limitations. 
From Rho value across the FE test results, the difference between 
the companies explains around 70% in the variance.  
First is to focus on the CASH_SALE Model. In the firm level model, 
both EXP_OP_CF and EXP_SALES are positive related to CASH_SALE. 
Firm are more closely following trade-off theory that they like to 
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keep accumulating cash reserve. CASH_CONV_CYC is positively 
related to holding level, again shows the precautionary approach in 
cash management when there is high collection risks. PROFIT_VOL, 
GROWTH_VOL and PRD_COST_VOL are all significant, but 
GROWTH_VOL has relative small effect in CASH_SALE. The other 
two are negatively related to holding level at 5% significance. This 
confirms with the theory of real smoothing activity in the firm (Goel 
and Thakor, 2003). The firm are likely to have high volatility in 
profit and costs when trying to use sales to boost earning for a 
certain period, so the profit will go down and costs will go up. 
TOTAL_ACCR is negatively related to CASH_SALE contrary to the 
OLS result, implies that firm may only use accounting methods 
when there is a problem with true cash holding level.   
Looking at other firm control variables, SIZE1 and SIZE2 follow the 
same trends as in OLS model.  AGE shows a positive signs instead 
of negative in OLS model. Relate to the literature that older firm 
only have higher level of cash holding than young firm in financial 
constrained situation, since they can deliberately save up cash with 
funding from external sources.  MTB and OP_CASH are positive as 
expected by hypothesis 21 and 23. DOA is negative as reflected by 
OLS model. Other variables are not significant.  
In firm level CASH_ASSET FE model. EXP_OP_CF and EXP_SALES 
are no longer significant compare to OLS model. The three turn over 
ratios are significant. The results shows evidence of pecking theory 
where firms that are expected to hold more cash if the inventory 
turnover is fast receiving days is short for future investments, and 
reduce the cash holding if there are more frequent payments needs 
to be make to creditors. An increase in EARN_VOL and 
CASH_FLOW_VOL increase the cash holding level, this means the 
firm is risk averse. TOTAL_ACCR is negative in same way as in 
CASH_SALE FE model. For other control variables, SIZE1, SIZE2, 
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DOA, OP_CASH_GROWTH, MTB and OP_CASH all follow the same 
sign as in CASH_SALE FE model.  
Next is to analyse the industrial level and country variables. In the 
CASH_SALE industrial FE model, CONC and IND_AVG are following 
WKH VDPH UHVXOWV LQ 2/6 PRGHO ZKHUH ILUP¶V FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO
decreases with less competition and follows the industrial cash 
holding trends.  In CASH_ASSET industrial FE model, IND_LIQ and 
IND_AVG also follows the OLS model, with higher level of liquidity in 
the industry reduce the cash holding level.  GDP and ECO_INV are 
now significant in CASH_SALE FE model as oppose none is 
significant in OLS model. GDP is positive related to CASH_SALE. 
+HQFHWKDWILUP¶VFDVKOHYHOWHQGVWREHORZZKHQWKH\HFRQomic is 
LQGRZQWXUQVRWKDWWKH\ZLOOILUVWGLVVLSDWHLQWHUQDOILUP¶VFDVKWKHQ
raising external debt.  The result of ECO_INV is similar to the 
CASH_ASSET OLS model. The country variables results in 
CASH_ASSET FE model is similar to corresponded OLS model, 
where GDP is insignificant, REAL_INT and ECO_INV is positively 
related and DEBT is negatively related.  
4.3.1 Individual Sales risk tests 
 
In order remove some over fitting and noise around the insignificant 
variables and interaction between sales risks. The significant control 
variables are chosen to and each sales risk variable is modelled 
individually with those variables to validate the results we have 
seen from the main tests (Appendix 12 and 13). Only a few changes 
are observed where payable turnover is now insignificant against 
cash asset ratio and growth volatility become positive with sales. 
And the overall result confirms our main hypothesis where the cash 
holding ratio is positively related to the risk in sale income and cash 
flow. The two exceptions been the profit volatility and prod cost 
volatility, which are two variables directly related to the earning 
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smoothing as identified by Roychowdhury (2003). Firms however 
have high level cash holding with ExP_SALES and EXP_OP_CF, 








4.4.1 Model comparison 
 
 
Table 4 Overall results summary 
Table 4 summarised the results across the four models across the 
hypothesis.  The results from FE model is more convincing given the 
estimate have not assumed that correlation is zero between the 
errors and variables, and also taking into accounts of variance 
between the industrial firms. However many variables have agreed 
outcomes between the models, suggested for the purpose of this 
study that both OLS and FE models are acceptable methods of 
investigation.  







EARN_VOL Positive NS NS Positive NS Positive NS
GROWTH_VOL Positive NS NS NS Negative NS Positive
PROFIT_VOL Positive Negative Positive NS Negative NS Negative
CASH_FLOW_VOL Positive NS Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
PRD_COST_VOL Positive NS NS NS Negative NS Negative
EXP_SALES Negative NS Positive NS Positive NS Positive
EXP_OP_CF Negative NS Negative NS Positive NS Positive
RECEIV_TO Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
INV_TO Negative NS Positive Positive NS Positive NS
PAY_TO Negative Positive NS Negative Negative NS Negative
CASH_CONV_CYC Negative Positive Positive NS Positive NS Positive
TOTAL_ACCR Negative NS Positive Negative Negative
SALE_GROWTH Negative Positive Positive NS NS
OP_CASH_GROWTH Negative NS NS Negative Positive
SIZE1 Negative Negative Positive Positive Positive
SIZE2 Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
AGE Negative Negative Negative NS NS
DOA Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative
ROA Negative NS NS NS NS
MTB Negative Positive Negative Positive Positive
OP_CASH Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
IND_LIQ Negative NS Negative Negative NS
IND_AVG Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
CONC Positive NS Negative NS Negative
GDP Negative NS NS NS Positive
REAL_INT Positive Positive NS Positive NS
DEBT Positive Negative NS Negative NS
ECO_INV Positive Positive NS Positive Positive
FE Model
NA











There are several cautions needs to be taken from the above results. 
First, there are quite a few missing values in the data even we have 
deleted out those with high proportion of missing values. This 
represented some form of inaccuracy in regression estimate with 
pairwise deletion and with the imputed data used in FE model. 
Secondly, the explanatory power of the OLS and FE models are 
generally low, therefore a lot of firm specific factors or other factor 
that are not considered could be influencing the cash holding level. 
Thirdly, the cash and cash equivalent is calculated using estimation 
of three variables based on the literatures, therefore potentially 
more errors in reporting can affects these dependent variables.  
Some of the results have followed the trade-off theory where firm is 
likely to hold more cash because external financing is difficult, this 
is shown in sales risks but not debt related variable, since the 
results are more related to pecking order theory. Precautionary 
holding is when the risk is directly related to raising external cash 
such as interest rate, age of the firm or sales risks. This is also 
present when the firm has high level of income and they are less 
likely to distribute cash to shareholders or paid off debt, since the 
cash holding are positively related to income related variables. On 
the other hands, when looking at ratio that determine the current 
health of firm, such as debt to asset ratio and expected growth, 
firms are generally short of cash if debt level is high or there are a 
lot of investment demands for growing firm. This suggested that 
firm generally engage in precautionary cash holding only form 
LQWHUQDO ILUP¶V VDOHVDQGRSHUDWLRQDO ULVNEXWQRW ILQDQFLDO ULVNDQG
only raise debt if it has to.  
4.4.2 Sales Risk 
 
The results from sales risks measure suggested that firms may not 
engage in activity management of the cash holding according to this 
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risk level and there are some evidences of earning management. 
And in some cases the cash holding level should be interpreted as a 
cause to the behaviour in the sales risk measure.  
For earning management, it appears that when firm have higher 
earnings volatility, the manager would actively engage in increasing 
cash holding level as shown in Goel and Thakor (2003). Firms are 
also shown to engage in smoothing use real operation and 
accounting methods.  With negative relation to the accrual level, 
when firm favours the accounting methods, their cash holding would 
have been quite low. Therefore firm is more likely to engage in real 
activity to managing the cost of sales and profit. This shown with 
negative relation to the volatility of profit and cost of goods sold. 
Although it is not sure if this is due to revenue being inherently 
volatile, so passively firm would have low cash holding level, or firm 
is actively using price reduction activity to boost sales in certain 
periods, so that cash is reduce with the additional costs incurred. 
Only one of the models has shown significant negative relationship 
with growth volatility, these firms may not have the ability to 
accumulating high enough cash flow to cushion for the growth 
volatility since its borrowing capacity is lower. One possibility is that 
WKH ILUP¶V YRODWLOLW\ LV QRW REVHUYDEOH IURP LQVLGH RI WKH ILUP
therefore manager may not use this information to managing cash 
holding level. AgDLQWKLVLVDOVRVKRZQWKDWWKHILUP¶VFDVKYDULDWLRQ
with sales level is more explainable by cash to sales ratio and cash 
to asset has effects.  
Considering the results with expected future income, apart from one 
model has shown negative results, there are three others have 
shown positive significance. This confirms the Schwetzler and 
5HLPXQG  WKHRU\ ZKHUH ILUP¶V GHEW DQG FDVK OHYHO DUH
naturally following the income trends. Based on the way these 
expected fields are calculated, high expected sales would means 
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high historical sales, therefore the firm would increase the cash 
holding if there is no incentive to distribute them.  
On to the operational sales risks, the results had shown mixed 
theories that are strongly supported across the models. Firms 
appear to be cautions if their cash conversion cycle is long, so that 
firms would be saving up more cash if the investment is turn around 
slower in the firm. However considering the turn over ratios, firms 
cash level increase when they have tighter credit policy, so 
receivable turnover is high, also increase with when inventory 
turnover is high, accordingly that if payable turnover is low, means 
the firm will have longer time to hold cash after made purchasing 
decisions. All these three ratios fit with the pecking order theory 
that but also means the results contradicts with the cash conversion 
cycle. One possible statistical problem is that these cash conversion 
value is depended on the three turnover ratio, so there is some 
undetected correlation problem. So the model is over fitted that the 
positive and negative effects cancel each out. These variables are 
also not strong predictors compare to the other variables, so the 
sign could be due to error is not correctly determined.  
Overall the influence of the sales risks onto the cash holding level 
only contributed to a small proportion of the variation in cash 
holding level. One problem could be the estimation of volatility is 
not accurate given there is only 10 years of data. On the other hand, 
these variablHV DUH QRUPDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG E\ ILUP¶V DQDO\VWV DQG
shareholders but less to the manager themselves in time. They are 
only affecting the financing ability after it has happened frequently 
in the past, therefore probably the historical volatility would be 
more relevant to the current financing situation. Secondly, not all 
firms have ability to actively managing cash holding level as it is 
constrained with spending and financing options. Even if the 
manager would like to hedge the sales risks with more cash holding, 
73 
 
the firm may not have ability to keep cash holding at desired level.  
Thirdly, because of all the data is collected from accounting report, 
therefore if the manager is engaging in earning smoothing, then the 
forecasted sales, earning and operation cash flows would not be 
DFFXUDWHO\UHIOHFWLQJWKH ILUP¶VVLWXDWLRQ%XW WKHDFFRXQWLQJ LQ WKH
balance sheet is usually more accurate, so there is some mismatch 
between the calculations of these variables therefore resulted in a 
lot of coefficient being insignificant.  
4.4.3 Control variables 
 
The control variables have more significant influence in the cash 
KROGLQJ OHYHO FRPSDUH WR VDOHV ULVN YDULDEOHV )LUP¶V VL]H GHEW WR
asset and market to book ratio have noticeably the biggest impact. 
But contrary to existing literatures that large firm would have lower 
cash holding level three out of the four models suggest the opposite. 
This is potentially due to the timing in the data sample. The 
sampling years are coincided with the financial crisis in 2007-2009, 
therefore the financing aspects of the firm is more difficult and 
many large firms have increase cash holding to reduce the funding 
risks where smaller firms are more difficult to get funding externally 
ZKLFKFDXVHWKHFDVKKROGLQJOHYHOWREHORZHU'¶0HOORHWDO,2009). 
At the same time, the income from sales has reduced during the 
financial crisis, therefore although small firms are financially they 
could not make up the loss in cash holding (Alemida et al., 2004).   
The holding level is however consistently negative related to the 
sales level. As firm increase the sales level the relative cash holding 
will be reduced in the same year. This is more applicable to the 
growth firms; since their cash would continuously being invested to 
increase future growth therefore the cash holding level is always 
lower. For firms with stable income, they will be less investment 
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opportunities so their relative cash level would increase even sales 
stays the same (Opler et al., 1999).  
For debt to asset ratio, the four models have consistently shown 
negative impacts to the cash holding level. This is contrary to the 
trade-off theory where firms would have precautionary cash holding 
to reduce the costs of financing. This is potentially due to the cash 
holding is very expansive when interest rate is high, therefore firm 
would only engage in borrowing when interest rate is low and when 
internal cash is already exhausted. Hence firm with financial 
difficulties are unlikely to have a high cash holding level. This 
results conflict with finding of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and 
Ogundipe et al. (2012), again this is probably due to the financial 
FULVLVKDSSHQHGLQWKHVDPSOHSHULRGV6RDOWKRXJKILUP¶VGHEWVWD\V
the same but the cash holding level would be lower.  
Confirming the previous finding on market to book ratio, that 
coefficients are consistently positive (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010), 
therefore the cash holding does add value to the firm. This was 
under the assumption that the firms are financially constrained, 
which majority of the samples are due to the sampling period and 
the types of company. Firms with high level of cash holding are 
deemed to be safe in crisis therefore consequently would be valued 
higher by shareholders.  
The model also had shown some aspect of trade off theory and 
agency theory. The firm increase its holding when the operational 
cash flow is high, therefore instead of investing or return to 
shareholder, the managers tends to increase the cash holding level. 
Firms are shown not to obtain additional cash when operational 
cash flow is low. Hence the firms in the sample are not aiming for 
DQ RSWLPDO FDVK KROGLQJ OHYHO WR PD[LPLVLQJ WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH EXW
instead the manager would passively managing the cash holding 
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level. Because the Breusch and Pagan Test show that the using OLS 
may be inappropriate, the estimate on time invariant variables is 
FRQVLGHUHG WR EH OHVV FRUUHFW WKHUHIRUH UHVXOWV RI ILUP¶V
diversification, type of firms and industrial type are not conclusive.  
The selected industrial and macroeconomic variables are all shown 
to have significant impacts on the cash holding level, and the 
inclusion of these controls have also improved the significance of 
firm level variables. One of the strongest variables is the industrial 
average cash. Although this information is not visible to the firm, 
however through competition, firms with similar operation type will 
need to have similar level of cash to maintain competitiveness. On 
the other hand, firms also held less cash if the selling and buying 
assets are easier and industries are less competitive. These finding 
have confirmed with results from Subramaniam et al. (2011) and 
'¶0HOORHWDO 
Macroeconomic seemed to be only influential to cash to asset level 
while sales are more affected by industrial and firm level variables. 
This shows different sensitivity to the denominator for dependent 
YDULDEOHV  %HFDXVH ILUPV¶ VL]H DUH XQOLNHO\ WR FKDQJH ZLWK ILUP¶V
performance but asset value are affected heavily by economic 
variables. On the whole, the cash level follows the similar trends 
with economics. At boom, when debt level is low and investment is 
high, firm are likely to have high level of cash holding since more 
cash are available. At bust, when interest rate is high, firm would 
also holding high level of cash since borrowing is more expansive. 
The UK firm seems to only engage in active cash management at 
difficult economic conditions and passively manage cash if there is 







There are several important limitations for the analysis. First, OLS 
model and FE model have either low explanatory power and or high 
Rho values; therefore the relationship identified is weak. Second, 
regression method is best controlled with problem found with the 
data. Thirdly, the imputed data is only an estimate of what missing 
values could be, so it is not accurate. Fourthly, the cash sale ratio 
and cash asset ratio are not directly comparable so the relationship 
can be different with other independent variables.  
4.5 Managerial Implication 
 
4.5.1 Cash holding policies 
 
It is inconclusive to see if companies are follow trade-off theory or 
pecking order theory when managing cash holding level. There are 
some evidences that firms are treating positive and negative 
impacts differently at cash holding management. If manager 
recognize there is risk in cash flow, the manager would engage in 
active cash management to increase the cash holding level. But if 
the influence to cash flow is positive, the results indicated that 
managers do not engage in active management but rather let cash 
DFFXPXODWHV)URPDJHQF\WKHRU\WKDWLWLVLQWKHPDQDJHU¶VLQWHUHVW
to have high cash holding level since this give manager more power 
to spend. There are some evidence in this results which indicated 
this do exist in the UK.  
Therefore there are two shortcoming identified from this results in 
cash management policies. First, managers are not treating all risks 
the same way and biased to unflavoured expectations, therefore not 
following any optimal cash level target. There is a tendency that 
managers would only focus on the spending in the operational cash 
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flows, the current earning risks and the fund risks, but less care 
about risk rise with financing and investing cash outflows. And also 
the managers like to holding cash in hand. Manager should be 
focusing on the cash outflows from debt repayment and investment 
opportunities since maintaining a good liquid position would help 
when firm is in financing trouble. And high level of cash holding 
would allow firms to capture investment opportunities, to increase 
future cash inflows from sales. The practice of earning management 
often related to increasing costs hence lower cash holding, therefore 
manager should try to make up earning in the early period if the 
sales are not forecasted to be high. This will reduce the sudden 
negative impacts to the cash holding level.  
Second, managers seems do not using forecast and risk in cash 
enough to proactively managing cash but rather let economic and 
ILUP¶VRSHUDWLRQWRGHFLGHWKHILUP¶VFDVKKROGLQJOHYHO)Lrms in the 
samples seemed to be unable to held higher level of cash when the 
conditions are adverse to the firm, especially to the macroeconomic 
conditions and operational cashes. On the other hand, managers 
are not reducing the cash level when there is growth in sales and 
cash inflows. This implies that either manager is taking opportunity 
to hold more cash when they can and not care about if the firm will 
be in trouble in the future or that manager does not consider the 
negative sales forecast to be risk to the current liquidity situation 
and not increase the cash level appropriately. A better practice is for 
manager to forecast the sales and cash inflow in the future, and 
built up the cash holding level when needed. Manager can also 
actively invest additional cash in the firm when they are generating 
low returns as cash inflow is higher than cash outflows. 
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4.5.2 Shareholders and managers 
 
Cash holding level finding do not favour the shareholders where 
firms do not hold enough cash when there is high level of risk and 
holding too much cash when the performance is positive. In the UK 
the shareholder protection is high compare to several studies 
reviewed in the literature; therefore distributing cash is not an 
important issue. This means that the UK shareholders are happy for 
firms to hold more cash when the earnings and cash flow are high 
and less likely to put more cash in if the firm is in trouble. This 
means that shareholders in the UK are not actively influencing the 
ILUP¶VGHFLVLRQVEXWRQO\SDVVLYHO\PDQDge those. Part of this is due 
to the UK company has a separate system for management, the 
board and directors managers the company and shareholders have 
right to vote on decision in general meeting (Gov.uk, 2013). This 
separation made shareholder less awarHRIWKHFRPSDQLHV¶VLWXDWLRQ
which can give managers more opportunities to manage the 
company for their own interest.  
Therefore we can see that the managers are holding more cash 
even if the future sales and cash flows are positive, so that 
shareholders VKRXOGVWDUWWRKDYHPRUHLQIOXHQFHLQWKHILUP¶VFDVK
management since shareholders value would be damaged if the 
firms are not release earnings and dividends. This is the downside 
of this system since the shareholders are relying on the board to 
monitor GLUHFWRU¶V EHKDYLRXU WKLV FRXOG FUHDWH PRUDO KD]DUG
problem (Schwetzler and Reimund, 2003; Opler et al., 1999). 
4.5.3 Income smoothing 
 
There are no dividend data to support for dividend smoothing effect, 
but the fact that earning and growth volatility is not very significant 
means that managers could be engaged in income smoothing 
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activities in this sample, or else firms cash level are depended on 
PDQDJHU¶V GLVFUHWLRQV %XW WKH JURVV SURILW RSHUDWLRQDO FDVK IORZ
and production costs are significantly related, means that cash flow 
LQ VRPH GHJUHHV DUH DIIHFWHG E\ WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ XSSHU OD\HU
performance, but they are not reflected in the earning level. The 
total accrual level also implies that are earning management for 
some firms in the sample.  
We can see from the results that real earning management have 
negative impacts based on the cash sale ratio analysis using FE 
model. Although from external shareholders, a stable earning level 
is favoured, but this also means managers are moving the earning 
around at expenses of shareholders. And it is often the firms that 
are having sales problem engage in earning management and 
hoping that the loss in the cash holding can be recovered in the 
QH[W SHULRG 7KLV KLGHV DZD\ WKH ULVNV RI WKH ILUP DQG WKH ILUP¶V
asset not used in the right income generating activities. 
Shareholders therefore should not use earning stability as a single 
measure for a good firm, but using some better accounting 
PHDVXUHV VXFK DV UHYHQXH WR WUDFN WKH ILUP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH 7KLV
PD\ UHGXFH PDQDJHU¶V FRVWO\ LQFHQWLYH WR VPRRWKLQJ HDUQLQJ XVH
H[LVWLQJFDVKKROGLQJDQGFDQDFFXUDWHO\UHSRUWVWKHILUP¶VULVNVWR
the market.  
The involvement of financial crisis could provide a separate 
explanation to the result. Since the start of sampling is before the 
financial crisis and the more recent data is towards the end of 
financial crisis, so that growth and profit volatilities are high. At the 
same time cash holding level is lowered after the financial crisis, 
since the volatility is calculated within 5 years range, therefore it 
appears to be that the past high volatility in earning is reducing the 
cash holding level. 
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5 Conclusions  
5.1 Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, cash holding level are analysed with 2004 - 
2013 data from all firms in 13 industries from Bureau Van Dyke 
Fame database, the banking government related industrial are 
excluded, we left with 7 manufacturing industries and 6 service 
industry. There are two dependent variables used for measuring 
cash holding level, cash to asset ratio and cash to sales ratio. The 
main investigation is around whether the sales risks affect cash 
holding level and additional tests are run against if the significant 
variables identified by previous literature are still valid. There are 
two main sales risk areas focused on, one is the volatility in the 
earning, sales, profit and cash flow, the volatility measure is an 
approximate for the expected risk with forecasted income. The 
second is the risks related with cash conversion cycle in the sale 
process which are payable, receivable and inventory turnover ratio. 
We have attempted to use three different models to test this set of 
panel data, which are Ordinary Least Square regression, fixed 
effects model and random effects model.  Through diagnostic and 
comparison between the statistics, the fixed effect model appears to 
be the most robust model, while OLS still have some form of 
validity and random effects model is rejected. 
The main hypothesis is that cash holding level should be positively 
related to the risk level, suggested with precautionary motives and 
trade-off theory. This also means firm should reduce the level of 
cash if the expected income is high in the future and risk is low. The 
results have implied that firm is precautionary with volatility in the 
sales, earnings and cash, but they are also holding cash even if the 
expected sales are positive. There are also evidences of earning 
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management, where firms would use real activity to move earning 
between the financial periods with a reduction in the cash holding 
level as cost. In term of cash conversions, firm appears to be 
cautions when cash conversion time is long. But from the results of 
WXUQRYHUUDWLRPHDVXUHGILUP¶VFDVKKROGLQJOHYHODOVRPRYHLQWKH
same direction as incomes. This means that if the firm is likely to 
receive cash in short time after sales and if the products are 
produced faster, the firm also likely to accumulate more cash in the 
firm. There sales risk is also more sensitive with cash sales ratio 
compare to cash asset ratio where cash asset ratio is only affected 
by earnings and cash flow risk. Majority of the control variables 
confirms the previous findings, but 8.¶V ILUPV DUH DSSHDUHG WR EH
less active in managing external environment risks since firms are 
cash holding also follows the direction of industrial and 
macroeconomic conditions. In particular the cah holding level is 
positively relate to GDP and negatively related to DEBT. 
2YHUDOO 8.¶V ILUP WUHDWLQJ WKH FDVK KROGLQJ GLIIHUHQW LQ WHUP RI
adverse and positive environment, the firm would like to hold more 
cash regard of the risks. If the risks is high , then the firm would 
hold more cash as a precautionary motive. But if the risk is low the 
firm would also accumulate more cash from operation without 
distributing to shareholder, shows the evidence of pecking order. 
One note is that sampling period is across financial crisis therefore 
firms may have increase the cash holding level and equally some 
firms would also find it more difficult to raise cash. Some 
managerial implication is that firms should anticipating more the 
forecasted future cash level and use the existing cash more wisely. 
7KH8.¶VVKDUHKROGHUDQGGLUHFWRUV¶ VWUXFWXUHFRXOGDOVREHRQHRI
the reasons letting manager hold more cash than needed. The 
manager should also focus less on the income smoothing but 
focused on reducing the actual sales risk to reduce the cash flow 
82 
 
activities. The other dangeU LV WKDW 8.¶V ILUP VHHPV WR EH RQO\
borrowing when they are short off cash and this could reduce the 
ILUP¶VDELOLW\WRUDLVHFDVKZKHn crisis has already happened.  
5.2 Future Research Recommendations 
 
There are several areas where data is not complete, which has 
made analysis impossible. First, there are limited share trading 
related information regarding to those firms, therefore an interest 
area would be to find if there is any relationship between the 
trading status of the firm in the year and cash holding level. This is 
WRVHHLIDKLJKYRODWLOLW\LQWKHVKDUHSULFHZRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHILUP¶V
cash holding since shareholders may see the firm being unstable; 
therefore the cost of equity financing is high. Dividend information 
with longer time series data with older firm can also show if the 
expectation of stable dividend income is adding to the cash holding 
level. 
This research also has not split the firms into financially constrained 
and unconstrained firm to do a different test. Also the testes in 
random effects suggested that there is no random effects existed in 
the data. However from many previously literatures that firms with 
different financial constraints will have different cash holding policy 
and levels. Therefore it is beneficial to first understand how to split 
firms with different access to finance then analyse the cash holding 
level. 
Because half of the data also covers the period of financial crisis 
during 2008 and 2009, therefore it is possibly that these data can 
affects the cash holding level differently. It would beneficial to 
analyse firms that are in these two periods to under the severe 
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Appendix 1 Cash Sale Ratio (Imputed data) firm level Model  
Fixed Effects 
 
Breusch Pagan Tests 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149365) =     7.64       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .70648753   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27133879
       sigma_u    .42096973
                                                                                
         _cons     1.109169   .0190225    58.31   0.000     1.071886    1.146453
       OP_CASH     .0230185   .0016425    14.01   0.000     .0197993    .0262377
           MTB     .0008254   .0000638    12.95   0.000     .0007004    .0009503
           DOA    -.1290638   .0032621   -39.56   0.000    -.1354574   -.1226701
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.82e-07   7.35e-08     3.84   0.000     1.38e-07    4.27e-07
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0004838   .0014389    -0.34   0.737    -.0033039    .0023364
           AGE     .0035287   .0003108    11.35   0.000     .0029196    .0041379
         SIZE2    -1.089265   .0053293  -204.39   0.000     -1.09971   -1.078819
         SIZE1     .9191791   .0059881   153.50   0.000     .9074424    .9309157
    TOTAL_ACCR     -.017132   .0021094    -8.12   0.000    -.0212664   -.0129976
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000304   6.94e-06    -4.39   0.000     -.000044   -.0000168
  PRD_COST_VOL    -.0000123   5.91e-06    -2.08   0.038    -.0000239   -6.93e-07
    GROWTH_VOL    -3.63e-06   7.46e-07    -4.87   0.000    -5.09e-06   -2.17e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.22e-07   7.98e-08     1.53   0.126    -3.43e-08    2.78e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000312   3.82e-06     8.17   0.000     .0000237    .0000387
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000693   3.64e-06    19.03   0.000     .0000622    .0000765
     RECEIV_TO      .000084    .000011     7.67   0.000     .0000626    .0001055
        INV_TO     1.31e-06   9.92e-06     0.13   0.895    -.0000181    .0000207
        PAY_TO    -4.19e-07   8.65e-08    -4.84   0.000    -5.88e-07   -2.49e-07
     EXP_SALES      .007285   .0026686     2.73   0.006     .0020546    .0125154
     EXP_OP_CF     .0230564   .0085506     2.70   0.007     .0062974    .0398155
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2910                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(20,149365)       =   2547.56
       overall = 0.2948                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3280                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2544                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    190189
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1.2e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .1275915       .3571996
                       e     .0736242       .2713378
               CASH_SALE     .2662805       .5160237
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_SALE[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]










                                                                                
           rho    .63488775   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27133778
       sigma_u    .35780428
                                                                                
         _cons     .9694108   .0109718    88.35   0.000     .9479064    .9909151
           TAX    -.0000819   .0000471    -1.74   0.082    -.0001743    .0000104
       OP_CASH     .0259422   .0015904    16.31   0.000      .022825    .0290594
           MTB     .0008369   .0000576    14.54   0.000     .0007241    .0009497
           DOA     -.150227   .0030409   -49.40   0.000     -.156187   -.1442669
OP_CASH_GROWTH     3.41e-07   7.10e-08     4.81   0.000     2.02e-07    4.80e-07
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0037021   .0013537    -2.73   0.006    -.0063553   -.0010489
           AGE    -.0010448   .0000894   -11.69   0.000    -.0012201   -.0008696
         SIZE2    -.9549971   .0039516  -241.68   0.000     -.962742   -.9472522
         SIZE1     .8366301   .0041377   202.20   0.000     .8285204    .8447398
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0129173   .0018672    -6.92   0.000     -.016577   -.0092575
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000394   6.37e-06    -6.19   0.000    -.0000519   -.0000269
  PRD_COST_VOL    -.0000159   5.42e-06    -2.93   0.003    -.0000265   -5.28e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -5.05e-06   7.09e-07    -7.13   0.000    -6.44e-06   -3.66e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.57e-07   7.64e-08     2.06   0.039     7.63e-09    3.07e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000177   .0000106     1.68   0.093    -2.94e-06    .0000384
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000846   3.32e-06    25.49   0.000     .0000781    .0000911
     RECEIV_TO     .0001278   .0000102    12.52   0.000     .0001078    .0001478
        INV_TO     .0000302   8.92e-06     3.39   0.001     .0000127    .0000477
        PAY_TO    -3.74e-07   8.38e-08    -4.47   0.000    -5.39e-07   -2.10e-07
     EXP_SALES     .0110082   .0020127     5.47   0.000     .0070632    .0149531
     EXP_OP_CF     .0194586   .0081409     2.39   0.017     .0035028    .0354145
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =  71810.16
       overall = 0.3240                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3615                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2521                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    190189
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =     2365.26
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149361) =     7.58       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69996312   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27129319
       sigma_u    .41437081
                                                                                
         _cons     .8581948   .0745699    11.51   0.000     .7120393     1.00435
       IND_AVG     .0664113   .0111069     5.98   0.000     .0446419    .0881806
          CONC    -.0372958   .0110748    -3.37   0.001    -.0590022   -.0155894
       IND_LIQ     .0190518   .0540056     0.35   0.724     -.086798    .1249016
           TAX    -.0000715   .0000483    -1.48   0.139    -.0001663    .0000233
       OP_CASH     .0229311   .0016423    13.96   0.000     .0197122    .0261501
           MTB     .0008317   .0000638    13.04   0.000     .0007066    .0009567
           DOA    -.1283468   .0032643   -39.32   0.000    -.1347447   -.1219489
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.85e-07   7.35e-08     3.88   0.000     1.41e-07    4.30e-07
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0004535   .0014387    -0.32   0.753    -.0032733    .0023662
           AGE     .0021357   .0005153     4.14   0.000     .0011257    .0031457
         SIZE2    -1.088804   .0053314  -204.22   0.000    -1.099253   -1.078355
         SIZE1      .917834   .0059915   153.19   0.000     .9060907    .9295772
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0173005   .0021093    -8.20   0.000    -.0214348   -.0131663
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000307   6.94e-06    -4.42   0.000    -.0000443   -.0000171
  PRD_COST_VOL    -.0000124   5.91e-06    -2.10   0.036     -.000024   -8.23e-07
    GROWTH_VOL    -3.66e-06   7.46e-07    -4.91   0.000    -5.12e-06   -2.20e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.25e-07   7.98e-08     1.56   0.118    -3.16e-08    2.81e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000162   .0000109     1.49   0.135    -5.06e-06    .0000375
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000699   3.66e-06    19.08   0.000     .0000627    .0000771
     RECEIV_TO      .000084    .000011     7.66   0.000     .0000625    .0001055
        INV_TO     5.37e-07   9.92e-06     0.05   0.957    -.0000189      .00002
        PAY_TO    -4.19e-07   8.65e-08    -4.84   0.000    -5.89e-07   -2.50e-07
     EXP_SALES     .0072386   .0026691     2.71   0.007     .0020072    .0124699
     EXP_OP_CF     .0246981   .0086226     2.86   0.004     .0077979    .0415983
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2690                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(24,149361)       =   2125.94
       overall = 0.3072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3418                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2546                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804







                                                                                
           rho    .62982991   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27129319
       sigma_u    .35387499
                                                                                
         _cons     .4944036   .0503792     9.81   0.000     .3956622     .593145
        RETAIL     .1434844   .0158449     9.06   0.000     .1124289    .1745399
         TRANS     .1111619   .0169083     6.57   0.000     .0780222    .1443017
          TEXT     .1185138   .0220291     5.38   0.000     .0753377      .16169
           PUB     .0591811   .0186545     3.17   0.002      .022619    .0957432
          POST     .1728839   .0209633     8.25   0.000     .1317965    .2139713
         METAL     .0393642   .0173817     2.26   0.024     .0052968    .0734316
          MANU     .0394876   .0164471     2.40   0.016     .0072518    .0717235
         HOTEL     .0500345   .0173451     2.88   0.004     .0160387    .0840302
          UTIL     .1689485   .0234374     7.21   0.000      .123012    .2148851
          FOOD     .0694358   .0185253     3.75   0.000     .0331269    .1057447
          CONS     .1536863   .0165825     9.27   0.000     .1211851    .1861875
          CHEM     .0189692   .0171237     1.11   0.268    -.0145926     .052531
       IND_AVG     .0844233   .0076017    11.11   0.000     .0695242    .0993223
          CONC    -.0386742   .0107867    -3.59   0.000    -.0598157   -.0175328
       IND_LIQ     .0999448   .0403656     2.48   0.013     .0208297    .1790599
       PRIVATE    -.1035763   .0084504   -12.26   0.000    -.1201388   -.0870138
        GLOBAL    -.0415942   .0062088    -6.70   0.000    -.0537633   -.0294251
           TAX     -.000087   .0000471    -1.85   0.064    -.0001792    5.23e-06
       OP_CASH     .0263912   .0015901    16.60   0.000     .0232747    .0295077
       DIVERSE      -.00059   .0001631    -3.62   0.000    -.0009098   -.0002703
           MTB     .0008059   .0000577    13.97   0.000     .0006928    .0009189
           DOA    -.1489227   .0030376   -49.03   0.000    -.1548763   -.1429691
OP_CASH_GROWTH     3.51e-07   7.09e-08     4.95   0.000     2.12e-07    4.90e-07
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0031063   .0013538    -2.29   0.022    -.0057596    -.000453
           AGE    -.0009447   .0000916   -10.32   0.000    -.0011242   -.0007653
         SIZE2    -.9663199   .0040774  -236.99   0.000    -.9743115   -.9583284
         SIZE1     .8427942   .0042481   198.39   0.000     .8344681    .8511203
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0120386   .0018777    -6.41   0.000    -.0157188   -.0083584
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000393   6.35e-06    -6.18   0.000    -.0000517   -.0000268
  PRD_COST_VOL     -.000017   5.41e-06    -3.14   0.002    -.0000276   -6.38e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -4.94e-06   7.08e-07    -6.98   0.000    -6.33e-06   -3.55e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.45e-07   7.63e-08     1.90   0.057    -4.32e-09    2.95e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000175   .0000105     1.66   0.097    -3.16e-06    .0000382
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000831   3.32e-06    25.05   0.000     .0000766    .0000896
     RECEIV_TO     .0001185   .0000102    11.60   0.000     .0000984    .0001385
        INV_TO     .0000159   9.17e-06     1.73   0.084    -2.11e-06    .0000338
        PAY_TO    -3.67e-07   8.37e-08    -4.38   0.000    -5.31e-07   -2.03e-07
     EXP_SALES     .0117152   .0020556     5.70   0.000     .0076863    .0157442
     EXP_OP_CF     .0209382   .0081476     2.57   0.010     .0049692    .0369072
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(39)      =  73444.63
       overall = 0.3342                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3723                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2533                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    190189
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                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1.2e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .1252275        .353875
                       e        .0736       .2712932
               CASH_SALE     .2662805       .5160237
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_SALE[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =     1978.11
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     IND_AVG      .0664113     .0844233        -.018012         .008098
        CONC     -.0372958    -.0386742        .0013785        .0025099
     IND_LIQ      .0190518     .0999448        -.080893        .0358779
         TAX     -.0000715     -.000087        .0000155        .0000111
     OP_CASH      .0229311     .0263912       -.0034601         .000411
         MTB      .0008317     .0008059        .0000258        .0000273
         DOA     -.1283468    -.1489227        .0205759        .0011951
OP_CASH_GR~H      2.85e-07     3.51e-07       -6.55e-08        1.93e-08
 SALE_GROWTH     -.0004535    -.0031063        .0026528        .0004869
         AGE      .0021357    -.0009447        .0030804        .0005071
       SIZE2     -1.088804    -.9663199       -.1224841        .0034349
       SIZE1       .917834     .8427942        .0750398        .0042252
  TOTAL_ACCR     -.0173005    -.0120386       -.0052619        .0009611
  PROFIT_VOL     -.0000307    -.0000393        8.61e-06        2.79e-06
PRD_COST_VOL     -.0000124     -.000017        4.58e-06        2.38e-06
  GROWTH_VOL     -3.66e-06    -4.94e-06        1.28e-06        2.35e-07
    EARN_VOL      1.25e-07     1.45e-07       -2.05e-08        2.32e-08
CASH_FLOW_~L      .0000162     .0000175       -1.28e-06        2.62e-06
CASH_CONV_~C      .0000699     .0000831       -.0000133        1.55e-06
   RECEIV_TO       .000084     .0001185       -.0000345        3.97e-06
      INV_TO      5.37e-07     .0000159       -.0000153        3.77e-06
      PAY_TO     -4.19e-07    -3.67e-07       -5.23e-08        2.19e-08
   EXP_SALES      7.24e-09     1.17e-08       -4.48e-09        1.70e-09
   EXP_OP_CF      2.47e-08     2.09e-08        3.76e-09        2.82e-09
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149357) =     7.58       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69572566   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27127731
       sigma_u    .41020393
                                                                                
         _cons     .8886202   .0917419     9.69   0.000     .7088079    1.068433
       ECO_INV     .0171147   .0048742     3.51   0.000     .0075613    .0266681
          DEBT     .0286788   .0659435     0.43   0.664    -.1005691    .1579268
      REAL_INT     .0929351   .0654846     1.42   0.156    -.0354135    .2212837
           GDP     .1513432   .0479018     3.16   0.002     .0574566    .2452298
       IND_AVG     .0461135    .012111     3.81   0.000     .0223761    .0698508
          CONC    -.0357122   .0113599    -3.14   0.002    -.0579774    -.013447
       IND_LIQ     .0603942   .0771562     0.78   0.434    -.0908305    .2116189
           TAX    -.0000725   .0000483    -1.50   0.134    -.0001673    .0000222
       OP_CASH     .0228076   .0016433    13.88   0.000     .0195867    .0260286
           MTB     .0008333   .0000638    13.06   0.000     .0007082    .0009583
           DOA    -.1278305   .0032665   -39.13   0.000    -.1342328   -.1214281
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.87e-07   7.35e-08     3.91   0.000     1.43e-07    4.31e-07
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0001988   .0014409    -0.14   0.890    -.0030229    .0026253
           AGE     .0002751   .0008603     0.32   0.749     -.001411    .0019613
         SIZE2    -1.089382   .0053346  -204.21   0.000    -1.099838   -1.078926
         SIZE1     .9168704   .0059956   152.92   0.000     .9051191    .9286218
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0173134   .0021093    -8.21   0.000    -.0214476   -.0131792
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000307   6.94e-06    -4.43   0.000    -.0000443   -.0000172
  PRD_COST_VOL    -.0000126   5.91e-06    -2.13   0.033    -.0000242   -1.02e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -3.67e-06   7.46e-07    -4.92   0.000    -5.13e-06   -2.21e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.26e-07   7.98e-08     1.59   0.113    -2.99e-08    2.83e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000158   .0000109     1.46   0.145    -5.48e-06    .0000371
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000698   3.66e-06    19.06   0.000     .0000626     .000077
     RECEIV_TO     .0000834    .000011     7.61   0.000     .0000619    .0001049
        INV_TO     6.12e-08   9.92e-06     0.01   0.995    -.0000194    .0000195
        PAY_TO    -4.18e-07   8.65e-08    -4.84   0.000    -5.88e-07   -2.49e-07
     EXP_SALES     .0071553   .0026692     2.68   0.007     .0019236    .0123869
     EXP_OP_CF      .024601    .008623     2.85   0.004     .0077001    .0415019
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2566                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(28,149357)       =   1823.21
       overall = 0.3151                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3509                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2547                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804






                                                                                
           rho     .6296224   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27127731
       sigma_u    .35369686
                                                                                
         _cons     .6424254   .0891349     7.21   0.000     .4677243    .8171265
       ECO_INV      .016021   .0042896     3.73   0.000     .0076135    .0244285
          DEBT    -.0141952   .0615387    -0.23   0.818    -.1348088    .1064184
      REAL_INT     .0890825   .0618705     1.44   0.150    -.0321815    .2103465
           GDP     .1294068   .0458805     2.82   0.005     .0394828    .2193309
        RETAIL     .1478782   .0159479     9.27   0.000      .116621    .1791355
         TRANS     .1197623   .0170689     7.02   0.000      .086308    .1532167
          TEXT     .1088672   .0221393     4.92   0.000     .0654749    .1522595
           PUB     .0693093   .0189539     3.66   0.000     .0321603    .1064583
          POST      .199287   .0217794     9.15   0.000     .1566002    .2419738
         METAL     .0324914   .0175136     1.86   0.064    -.0018346    .0668173
          MANU      .039639   .0165716     2.39   0.017     .0071593    .0721187
         HOTEL     .0504984   .0173647     2.91   0.004     .0164643    .0845326
          UTIL     .1968513   .0242544     8.12   0.000     .1493136     .244389
          FOOD      .086948   .0188985     4.60   0.000     .0499076    .1239883
          CONS     .1471443   .0167266     8.80   0.000     .1143607     .179928
          CHEM     .0310666   .0173103     1.79   0.073    -.0028609     .064994
       IND_AVG      .044194   .0117555     3.76   0.000     .0211536    .0672344
          CONC    -.0396005   .0111103    -3.56   0.000    -.0613763   -.0178248
       IND_LIQ     .0620723   .0751366     0.83   0.409    -.0851927    .2093374
       PRIVATE    -.1053078   .0084587   -12.45   0.000    -.1218864   -.0887291
        GLOBAL    -.0428708   .0062149    -6.90   0.000    -.0550518   -.0306898
           TAX    -.0000884   .0000471    -1.88   0.060    -.0001806    3.81e-06
       OP_CASH     .0263348   .0015911    16.55   0.000     .0232163    .0294534
       DIVERSE    -.0005728   .0001631    -3.51   0.000    -.0008926   -.0002531
           MTB     .0008072   .0000577    14.00   0.000     .0006941    .0009202
           DOA    -.1486209   .0030389   -48.91   0.000    -.1545771   -.1426647
OP_CASH_GROWTH     3.53e-07   7.09e-08     4.98   0.000     2.14e-07    4.92e-07
   SALE_GROWTH     -.002804   .0013564    -2.07   0.039    -.0054626   -.0001455
           AGE    -.0009817   .0000921   -10.66   0.000    -.0011622   -.0008012
         SIZE2    -.9666976   .0040788  -237.00   0.000     -.974692   -.9587033
         SIZE1      .842337    .004249   198.24   0.000     .8340091    .8506649
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0120361   .0018776    -6.41   0.000    -.0157162   -.0083561
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000394   6.35e-06    -6.20   0.000    -.0000518   -.0000269
  PRD_COST_VOL     -.000017   5.41e-06    -3.15   0.002    -.0000276   -6.43e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -4.95e-06   7.08e-07    -7.00   0.000    -6.34e-06   -3.56e-06
      EARN_VOL     1.45e-07   7.63e-08     1.91   0.057    -4.16e-09    2.95e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000171   .0000105     1.62   0.105    -3.58e-06    .0000377
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000831   3.32e-06    25.05   0.000     .0000766    .0000896
     RECEIV_TO      .000118   .0000102    11.55   0.000      .000098    .0001381
        INV_TO     .0000152   9.17e-06     1.66   0.098    -2.79e-06    .0000332
        PAY_TO    -3.66e-07   8.37e-08    -4.38   0.000    -5.30e-07   -2.02e-07
     EXP_SALES     .0116877   .0020554     5.69   0.000     .0076591    .0157162
     EXP_OP_CF     .0209998   .0081478     2.58   0.010     .0050304    .0369692
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(43)      =  73483.18
       overall = 0.3341                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3722                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2534                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    190189
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                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1.2e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .1251015       .3536969
                       e     .0735914       .2712773
               CASH_SALE     .2662805       .5160237
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_SALE[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =     2019.31
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     ECO_INV      .0171147      .016021        .0010937        .0023146
        DEBT      .0286788    -.0141952        .0428741        .0236968
    REAL_INT      .0929351     .0890825        .0038527        .0214541
         GDP      .1513432     .1294068        .0219364        .0137683
     IND_AVG      .0461135      .044194        .0019195        .0029129
        CONC     -.0357122    -.0396005        .0038883        .0023684
     IND_LIQ      .0603942     .0620723       -.0016782        .0175379
         TAX     -.0000725    -.0000884        .0000159        .0000111
     OP_CASH      .0228076     .0263348       -.0035272         .000411
         MTB      .0008333     .0008072        .0000261        .0000273
         DOA     -.1278305    -.1486209        .0207904         .001198
OP_CASH_GR~H      2.87e-07     3.53e-07       -6.60e-08        1.93e-08
 SALE_GROWTH     -.0001988     -.002804        .0026052        .0004861
         AGE      .0002751    -.0009817        .0012569        .0008553
       SIZE2     -1.089382    -.9666976       -.1226841        .0034383
       SIZE1      .9168704      .842337        .0745334        .0042301
  TOTAL_ACCR     -.0173134    -.0120361       -.0052773        .0009611
  PROFIT_VOL     -.0000307    -.0000394        8.64e-06        2.79e-06
PRD_COST_VOL     -.0000126     -.000017        4.42e-06        2.38e-06
  GROWTH_VOL     -3.67e-06    -4.95e-06        1.28e-06        2.35e-07
    EARN_VOL      1.26e-07     1.45e-07       -1.90e-08        2.31e-08
CASH_FLOW_~L      .0000158     .0000171       -1.27e-06        2.62e-06
CASH_CONV_~C      .0000698     .0000831       -.0000133        1.55e-06
   RECEIV_TO      .0000834      .000118       -.0000346        3.97e-06
      INV_TO      6.12e-08     .0000152       -.0000151        3.77e-06
      PAY_TO     -4.18e-07    -3.66e-07       -5.18e-08        2.19e-08
   EXP_SALES      7.16e-09     1.17e-08       -4.53e-09        1.70e-09
   EXP_OP_CF      2.46e-08     2.10e-08        3.60e-09        2.82e-09
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Breusch and Pagan Test 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191365) =     9.35       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69190168   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292093
       sigma_u    .25913442
                                                                                
         _cons     .4062667   .0095609    42.49   0.000     .3875276    .4250058
           TAX     .0000323   .0000291     1.11   0.267    -.0000247    .0000893
       OP_CASH     .0150342   .0009579    15.70   0.000     .0131568    .0169116
           MTB     .0083281    .000397    20.98   0.000     .0075501    .0091062
           DOA    -.0616409   .0018194   -33.88   0.000     -.065207   -.0580749
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.78e-07   4.55e-08    -3.91   0.000    -2.67e-07   -8.85e-08
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0007835   .0007311    -1.07   0.284    -.0022165    .0006496
           AGE    -.0000202    .000173    -0.12   0.907    -.0003594    .0003189
         SIZE2    -.0263019   .0018716   -14.05   0.000    -.0299703   -.0226336
         SIZE1     .0168214   .0029449     5.71   0.000     .0110495    .0225933
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0183902   .0010999   -16.72   0.000     -.020546   -.0162343
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.81e-06   1.80e-06    -1.01   0.314    -5.35e-06    1.72e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL     1.93e-07   1.53e-06     0.13   0.900    -2.81e-06    3.19e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -4.89e-08   1.37e-06    -0.04   0.972    -2.74e-06    2.65e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.37e-08   4.25e-08     1.97   0.049     3.96e-10    1.67e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000214   5.35e-06     3.99   0.000     .0000109    .0000319
 CASH_CONV_CYC    -1.14e-08   2.79e-08    -0.41   0.683    -6.62e-08    4.33e-08
     RECEIV_TO     .0000123   5.82e-06     2.11   0.035     8.71e-07    .0000237
        INV_TO     .0000173   5.02e-06     3.44   0.001     7.45e-06    .0000271
        PAY_TO    -1.39e-07   6.16e-08    -2.26   0.024    -2.60e-07   -1.85e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0010746   .0014719     0.73   0.465    -.0018103    .0039596
     EXP_OP_CF     .0005261   .0054073     0.10   0.922    -.0100722    .0111244
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0056                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(21,191365)       =    107.24
       overall = 0.0075                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0063                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  2.1e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0545734       .2336096
                       e     .0299016       .1729209
               CASH_AS~T     .0805412       .2837979
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_ASSET[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]








                                                                                
           rho       .64603   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292093
       sigma_u     .2336096
                                                                                
         _cons     .5369396   .0068223    78.70   0.000     .5235681    .5503111
       PRIVATE    -.0904748   .0049331   -18.34   0.000    -.1001434   -.0808061
        GLOBAL    -.0377373   .0038224    -9.87   0.000    -.0452291   -.0302455
           TAX     .0000508   .0000286     1.77   0.076    -5.34e-06     .000107
       OP_CASH     .0166307   .0009378    17.73   0.000     .0147926    .0184687
       DIVERSE    -.0007329   .0001061    -6.91   0.000    -.0009408    -.000525
           MTB     .0099391   .0003789    26.23   0.000     .0091965    .0106818
           DOA    -.0619678   .0017302   -35.82   0.000    -.0653589   -.0585767
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -2.76e-07   4.41e-08    -6.25   0.000    -3.63e-07   -1.90e-07
   SALE_GROWTH     .0002714   .0007049     0.39   0.700    -.0011101    .0016529
           AGE    -.0008907   .0000548   -16.25   0.000    -.0009981   -.0007833
         SIZE2    -.0146742   .0015966    -9.19   0.000    -.0178035    -.011545
         SIZE1    -.0168374   .0020922    -8.05   0.000    -.0209381   -.0127367
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0137087   .0010071   -13.61   0.000    -.0156826   -.0117347
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.22e-06   1.75e-06    -0.70   0.485    -4.64e-06    2.20e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL    -3.78e-07   1.50e-06    -0.25   0.801    -3.33e-06    2.57e-06
    GROWTH_VOL     3.08e-07   1.35e-06     0.23   0.820    -2.34e-06    2.96e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.75e-08   4.11e-08     2.13   0.033     6.87e-09    1.68e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000267   5.26e-06     5.07   0.000     .0000164     .000037
 CASH_CONV_CYC     1.61e-08   2.73e-08     0.59   0.556    -3.75e-08    6.96e-08
     RECEIV_TO     .0000176   5.55e-06     3.17   0.002     6.74e-06    .0000285
        INV_TO     .0000245   4.69e-06     5.23   0.000     .0000153    .0000337
        PAY_TO    -1.39e-07   6.06e-08    -2.30   0.021    -2.58e-07   -2.08e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0021764   .0011944     1.82   0.068    -.0001646    .0045174
     EXP_OP_CF      .001381   .0051006     0.27   0.787     -.008616    .0113781
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =   3692.95
       overall = 0.0265                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0364                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0104                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    237486
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      935.72
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191362) =     9.32       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69192071   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17289252
       sigma_u     .2591034
                                                                                
         _cons     .4697761   .0418619    11.22   0.000     .3877277    .5518244
       IND_AVG     .0175992   .0062794     2.80   0.005     .0052918    .0299067
          CONC    -.0076767   .0063406    -1.21   0.226    -.0201041    .0047508
       IND_LIQ    -.1569754    .030754    -5.10   0.000    -.2172526   -.0966983
           TAX     .0000326   .0000291     1.12   0.263    -.0000245    .0000896
       OP_CASH     .0149398   .0009578    15.60   0.000     .0130625    .0168171
           MTB     .0083078   .0003969    20.93   0.000     .0075299    .0090858
           DOA    -.0614183   .0018194   -33.76   0.000    -.0649844   -.0578523
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.76e-07   4.55e-08    -3.87   0.000    -2.65e-07   -8.69e-08
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0007777    .000731    -1.06   0.287    -.0022105    .0006551
           AGE     .0001122   .0002921     0.38   0.701    -.0004603    .0006847
         SIZE2     -.026068   .0018716   -13.93   0.000    -.0297364   -.0223996
         SIZE1     .0160094   .0029469     5.43   0.000     .0102335    .0217852
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0184962   .0010998   -16.82   0.000    -.0206518   -.0163406
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.85e-06   1.80e-06    -1.03   0.304    -5.38e-06    1.68e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL     1.62e-07   1.53e-06     0.11   0.916    -2.84e-06    3.16e-06
    GROWTH_VOL    -3.47e-08   1.37e-06    -0.03   0.980    -2.73e-06    2.66e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.73e-08   4.25e-08     2.06   0.040     4.07e-09    1.71e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000214   5.35e-06     3.99   0.000     .0000109    .0000319
 CASH_CONV_CYC    -1.06e-08   2.79e-08    -0.38   0.704    -6.54e-08    4.41e-08
     RECEIV_TO     .0000124   5.81e-06     2.13   0.033     1.01e-06    .0000238
        INV_TO     .0000168   5.02e-06     3.34   0.001     6.94e-06    .0000266
        PAY_TO    -1.41e-07   6.16e-08    -2.28   0.023    -2.61e-07   -1.97e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0011541   .0014717     0.78   0.433    -.0017304    .0040386
     EXP_OP_CF     .0005861   .0054065     0.11   0.914    -.0100105    .0111827
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0058                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(24,191362)       =     96.62
       overall = 0.0079                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0066                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0120                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100







                                                                                
           rho    .64369696   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17289252
       sigma_u    .23238451
                                                                                
         _cons     .3676393   .0285004    12.90   0.000     .3117796     .423499
        RETAIL     .0782624   .0095293     8.21   0.000     .0595854    .0969394
         TRANS      .075399   .0102027     7.39   0.000     .0554021    .0953959
          TEXT     .0782601   .0132801     5.89   0.000     .0522316    .1042886
           PUB     .0549948   .0113791     4.83   0.000     .0326921    .0772975
          POST     .0972886   .0128366     7.58   0.000     .0721293     .122448
         METAL     .0260128   .0104734     2.48   0.013     .0054852    .0465403
          MANU     .0439372   .0099079     4.43   0.000      .024518    .0633564
         HOTEL     .0319859   .0104031     3.07   0.002     .0115962    .0523756
          UTIL     .0335912   .0137679     2.44   0.015     .0066066    .0605759
          FOOD     .0149008   .0112142     1.33   0.184    -.0070785    .0368802
          CONS     .0719967   .0099369     7.25   0.000     .0525208    .0914727
          CHEM       .01333   .0103446     1.29   0.198    -.0069451    .0336052
       IND_AVG     .0414941    .004277     9.70   0.000     .0331113     .049877
          CONC    -.0038992   .0062055    -0.63   0.530    -.0160617    .0082634
       IND_LIQ    -.0663492    .023415    -2.83   0.005    -.1122418   -.0204565
       PRIVATE    -.0934816   .0049268   -18.97   0.000     -.103138   -.0838253
        GLOBAL    -.0373414   .0038155    -9.79   0.000    -.0448195   -.0298632
           TAX     .0000489   .0000286     1.71   0.088    -7.24e-06     .000105
       OP_CASH     .0168954   .0009379    18.01   0.000     .0150571    .0187338
       DIVERSE    -.0006981   .0001057    -6.60   0.000    -.0009053    -.000491
           MTB     .0099311   .0003787    26.23   0.000     .0091889    .0106732
           DOA    -.0617436   .0017293   -35.70   0.000    -.0651329   -.0583542
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -2.68e-07   4.41e-08    -6.08   0.000    -3.55e-07   -1.82e-07
   SALE_GROWTH     .0004799    .000705     0.68   0.496    -.0009018    .0018617
           AGE    -.0008938   .0000566   -15.79   0.000    -.0010048   -.0007828
         SIZE2     -.017332   .0016249   -10.67   0.000    -.0205167   -.0141473
         SIZE1    -.0160117   .0021297    -7.52   0.000     -.020186   -.0118375
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0136329   .0010098   -13.50   0.000     -.015612   -.0116538
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.24e-06   1.75e-06    -0.71   0.476    -4.66e-06    2.18e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL    -4.74e-07   1.50e-06    -0.32   0.753    -3.42e-06    2.47e-06
    GROWTH_VOL     4.06e-07   1.35e-06     0.30   0.764    -2.24e-06    3.05e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.69e-08   4.11e-08     2.11   0.034     6.35e-09    1.68e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000267   5.26e-06     5.07   0.000     .0000164     .000037
 CASH_CONV_CYC     1.50e-08   2.73e-08     0.55   0.583    -3.85e-08    6.85e-08
     RECEIV_TO     .0000154   5.57e-06     2.77   0.006     4.53e-06    .0000263
        INV_TO     .0000196   4.79e-06     4.10   0.000     .0000102     .000029
        PAY_TO    -1.36e-07   6.05e-08    -2.25   0.025    -2.55e-07   -1.75e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0018144   .0011923     1.52   0.128    -.0005225    .0041513
     EXP_OP_CF     .0013954   .0050964     0.27   0.784    -.0085934    .0113842
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(39)      =   4352.37
       overall = 0.0355                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0461                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0111                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    237486
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                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  2.1e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0540026       .2323845
                       e     .0298918       .1728925
               CASH_AS~T     .0805412       .2837979
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_ASSET[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      791.22
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     IND_AVG      .0175992     .0414941       -.0238949        .0045976
        CONC     -.0076767    -.0038992       -.0037775        .0013019
     IND_LIQ     -.1569754    -.0663492       -.0906263        .0199386
         TAX      .0000326     .0000489       -.0000163        5.14e-06
     OP_CASH      .0149398     .0168954       -.0019556        .0001942
         MTB      .0083078     .0099311       -.0016232        .0001191
         DOA     -.0614183    -.0617436        .0003252        .0005656
OP_CASH_GR~H     -1.76e-07    -2.68e-07        9.24e-08        1.10e-08
 SALE_GROWTH     -.0007777     .0004799       -.0012576        .0001934
         AGE      .0001122    -.0008938         .001006        .0002865
       SIZE2      -.026068     -.017332        -.008736        .0009289
       SIZE1      .0160094    -.0160117        .0320211        .0020368
  TOTAL_ACCR     -.0184962    -.0136329       -.0048633        .0004359
  PROFIT_VOL     -1.85e-06    -1.24e-06       -6.08e-07        4.46e-07
PRD_COST_VOL      1.62e-07    -4.74e-07        6.36e-07        2.89e-07
  GROWTH_VOL     -3.47e-08     4.06e-07       -4.41e-07        2.59e-07
    EARN_VOL      8.73e-08     8.69e-08        4.01e-10        1.07e-08
CASH_FLOW_~L      .0000214     .0000267       -5.33e-06        9.74e-07
CASH_CONV_~C     -1.06e-08     1.50e-08       -2.56e-08        5.86e-09
   RECEIV_TO      .0000124     .0000154       -3.03e-06        1.68e-06
      INV_TO      .0000168     .0000196       -2.83e-06        1.52e-06
      PAY_TO     -1.41e-07    -1.36e-07       -4.37e-09        1.16e-08
   EXP_SALES      1.15e-09     1.81e-09       -6.60e-10        8.63e-10
   EXP_OP_CF      5.86e-10     1.40e-09       -8.09e-10        1.80e-09
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191358) =     9.32       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69270603   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17288264
       sigma_u    .25956662
                                                                                
         _cons     .3665582   .0509399     7.20   0.000     .2667171    .4663993
       ECO_INV     .0077504   .0027869     2.78   0.005     .0022882    .0132126
          DEBT    -.0905393   .0365006    -2.48   0.013    -.1620796   -.0189989
      REAL_INT     .1660994   .0379278     4.38   0.000     .0917618    .2404369
           GDP     .0125872    .028248     0.45   0.656    -.0427782    .0679527
       IND_AVG     .0103001   .0068625     1.50   0.133    -.0031501    .0237504
          CONC    -.0065085   .0064979    -1.00   0.317    -.0192442    .0062272
       IND_LIQ    -.0215027   .0431653    -0.50   0.618    -.1061058    .0631003
           TAX      .000033   .0000291     1.13   0.257     -.000024      .00009
       OP_CASH     .0148118   .0009585    15.45   0.000     .0129332    .0166904
           MTB     .0083038   .0003969    20.92   0.000     .0075258    .0090817
           DOA    -.0611894   .0018206   -33.61   0.000    -.0647577   -.0576212
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.77e-07   4.55e-08    -3.90   0.000    -2.66e-07   -8.81e-08
   SALE_GROWTH    -.0007154   .0007315    -0.98   0.328    -.0021491    .0007184
           AGE     .0002548   .0005008     0.51   0.611    -.0007267    .0012363
         SIZE2    -.0260023   .0018719   -13.89   0.000    -.0296712   -.0223334
         SIZE1     .0156814   .0029515     5.31   0.000     .0098965    .0214663
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0185179   .0010998   -16.84   0.000    -.0206735   -.0163624
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.85e-06   1.80e-06    -1.03   0.304    -5.38e-06    1.68e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL     1.14e-07   1.53e-06     0.07   0.941    -2.89e-06    3.11e-06
    GROWTH_VOL     6.60e-09   1.37e-06     0.00   0.996    -2.69e-06    2.70e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.97e-08   4.25e-08     2.11   0.035     6.44e-09    1.73e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000213   5.35e-06     3.98   0.000     .0000108    .0000318
 CASH_CONV_CYC    -9.91e-09   2.79e-08    -0.35   0.723    -6.46e-08    4.48e-08
     RECEIV_TO     .0000121   5.81e-06     2.09   0.037     7.43e-07    .0000235
        INV_TO     .0000167   5.02e-06     3.32   0.001     6.82e-06    .0000265
        PAY_TO    -1.41e-07   6.16e-08    -2.29   0.022    -2.62e-07   -2.02e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0011856   .0014717     0.81   0.420     -.001699    .0040701
     EXP_OP_CF     .0007179   .0054065     0.13   0.894    -.0098788    .0113146
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0226                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(28,191358)       =     83.75
       overall = 0.0054                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0038                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0121                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100





                                                                                
           rho    .64361432   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17288264
       sigma_u    .23232936
                                                                                
         _cons     .4162868   .0499064     8.34   0.000     .3184719    .5141016
       ECO_INV     .0141618   .0024099     5.88   0.000     .0094384    .0188851
          DEBT    -.0661793   .0341406    -1.94   0.053    -.1330937     .000735
      REAL_INT     .1309591   .0358064     3.66   0.000     .0607799    .2011383
           GDP     .0487534   .0268969     1.81   0.070    -.0039635    .1014703
        RETAIL     .0839034   .0095808     8.76   0.000     .0651252    .1026815
         TRANS      .080327   .0102961     7.80   0.000     .0601469     .100507
          TEXT     .0694009   .0133366     5.20   0.000     .0432616    .0955402
           PUB     .0600873    .011556     5.20   0.000      .037438    .0827366
          POST      .121635   .0132937     9.15   0.000     .0955797    .1476902
         METAL     .0178264   .0105495     1.69   0.091    -.0028503    .0385031
          MANU     .0412093     .00998     4.13   0.000     .0216488    .0607697
         HOTEL     .0323246   .0104136     3.10   0.002     .0119144    .0527349
          UTIL     .0600553   .0142278     4.22   0.000     .0321694    .0879412
          FOOD     .0311921   .0114372     2.73   0.006     .0087756    .0536087
          CONS     .0672844   .0100063     6.72   0.000     .0476723    .0868964
          CHEM     .0241635   .0104558     2.31   0.021     .0036705    .0446565
       IND_AVG     .0098951   .0066893     1.48   0.139    -.0032156    .0230059
          CONC    -.0049987   .0063871    -0.78   0.434    -.0175172    .0075198
       IND_LIQ    -.0134596    .042251    -0.32   0.750      -.09627    .0693508
       PRIVATE    -.0945712   .0049293   -19.19   0.000    -.1042325   -.0849099
        GLOBAL     -.038079   .0038168    -9.98   0.000    -.0455599   -.0305982
           TAX     .0000487   .0000286     1.70   0.089    -7.41e-06    .0001048
       OP_CASH     .0167628   .0009385    17.86   0.000     .0149234    .0186023
       DIVERSE    -.0006838   .0001057    -6.47   0.000    -.0008909   -.0004766
           MTB     .0099408   .0003786    26.25   0.000     .0091987    .0106829
           DOA    -.0614296   .0017299   -35.51   0.000    -.0648202    -.058039
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -2.71e-07   4.41e-08    -6.14   0.000    -3.57e-07   -1.84e-07
   SALE_GROWTH     .0006585   .0007056     0.93   0.351    -.0007245    .0020415
           AGE    -.0009277    .000057   -16.26   0.000    -.0010395   -.0008159
         SIZE2    -.0172247   .0016249   -10.60   0.000    -.0204094   -.0140399
         SIZE1    -.0167724    .002134    -7.86   0.000    -.0209549   -.0125899
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0136626   .0010097   -13.53   0.000    -.0156416   -.0116837
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.25e-06   1.75e-06    -0.72   0.474    -4.67e-06    2.17e-06
  PRD_COST_VOL    -5.32e-07   1.50e-06    -0.35   0.723    -3.48e-06    2.41e-06
    GROWTH_VOL     4.56e-07   1.35e-06     0.34   0.736    -2.19e-06    3.10e-06
      EARN_VOL     8.71e-08   4.11e-08     2.12   0.034     6.47e-09    1.68e-07
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000265   5.26e-06     5.04   0.000     .0000162    .0000368
 CASH_CONV_CYC     1.56e-08   2.73e-08     0.57   0.567    -3.79e-08    6.92e-08
     RECEIV_TO      .000015   5.57e-06     2.69   0.007     4.09e-06    .0000259
        INV_TO     .0000193   4.79e-06     4.04   0.000     9.94e-06    .0000287
        PAY_TO    -1.35e-07   6.05e-08    -2.23   0.026    -2.54e-07   -1.64e-08
     EXP_SALES     .0018405   .0011922     1.54   0.123    -.0004961    .0041771
     EXP_OP_CF     .0014367   .0050961     0.28   0.778    -.0085514    .0114248
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(43)      =   4407.92
       overall = 0.0357                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0464                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0113                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100








                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  2.1e+05
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0539769       .2323294
                       e     .0298884       .1728826
               CASH_AS~T     .0805412       .2837979
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        CASH_ASSET[BvDIDNumberID,t] = Xb + u[BvDIDNumberID] + e[BvDIDNumberID,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      785.35
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     ECO_INV      .0077504     .0141618       -.0064114        .0013996
        DEBT     -.0905393    -.0661793       -.0243599        .0129118
    REAL_INT      .1660994     .1309591        .0351403        .0125068
         GDP      .0125872     .0487534       -.0361661        .0086318
     IND_AVG      .0103001     .0098951         .000405         .001532
        CONC     -.0065085    -.0049987       -.0015098        .0011947
     IND_LIQ     -.0215027    -.0134596       -.0080431        .0088374
         TAX       .000033     .0000487       -.0000157        5.14e-06
     OP_CASH      .0148118     .0167628        -.001951        .0001946
         MTB      .0083038     .0099408       -.0016371        .0001191
         DOA     -.0611894    -.0614296        .0002402        .0005673
OP_CASH_GR~H     -1.77e-07    -2.71e-07        9.36e-08        1.11e-08
 SALE_GROWTH     -.0007154     .0006585       -.0013739        .0001929
         AGE      .0002548    -.0009277        .0011825        .0004975
       SIZE2     -.0260023    -.0172247       -.0087776        .0009293
       SIZE1      .0156814    -.0167724        .0324538         .002039
  TOTAL_ACCR     -.0185179    -.0136626       -.0048553         .000436
  PROFIT_VOL     -1.85e-06    -1.25e-06       -6.03e-07        4.46e-07
PRD_COST_VOL      1.14e-07    -5.32e-07        6.46e-07        2.90e-07
  GROWTH_VOL      6.60e-09     4.56e-07       -4.49e-07        2.59e-07
    EARN_VOL      8.97e-08     8.71e-08        2.65e-09        1.07e-08
CASH_FLOW_~L      .0000213     .0000265       -5.21e-06        9.75e-07
CASH_CONV_~C     -9.91e-09     1.56e-08       -2.56e-08        5.86e-09
   RECEIV_TO      .0000121      .000015       -2.86e-06        1.68e-06
      INV_TO      .0000167     .0000193       -2.65e-06        1.52e-06
      PAY_TO     -1.41e-07    -1.35e-07       -5.89e-09        1.16e-08
   EXP_SALES      1.19e-09     1.84e-09       -6.55e-10        8.63e-10
   EXP_OP_CF      7.18e-10     1.44e-09       -7.19e-10        1.81e-09
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Appendix 7 Descriptive Statistics for Cash Sale Ratio Data  
   
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
CASH_SALE 190189 0.34 0.52 3.88 18.61
DIV_GROWTH 1024 1.77 12.01 13.57 212.36
EXP_OP_CF 97219 .0103 .18010 -14.612 3275.327
EXP_SALES 190189 .0923 .87576 39.250 2500.396
PAY_TO 183699 109.74 8740.74 331.02 122948.00
DIV_PAY 1299 -3.73 439.39 -7.30 476.56
INV_TO 162262 47.75 107.19 4.65 25.90
RECEIV_TO 175538 29.03 83.66 6.57 51.50
CASH_CONV_CYC 152868 62.96 122.73 44.21 4379.77
CASH_FLOW_VOL 78198 0.27 120.22 -171.61 45708.75
EARN_VOL 152245 -40.70 9433.24 73.66 16102.01
GROWTH_VOL 155115 -2.81 1388.65 -388.37 152308.11
PRD_COST_VOL 157818 1.00 93.94 200.59 45967.07
PROFIT_VOL 163526 0.46 52.90 333.24 122028.82
TOTAL_ACCR 165166 2.56 0.88 0.25 0.77
SIZE1 190189 3.96 0.72 0.63 1.84
SIZE2 190189 4.15 0.68 0.52 1.64
AGE 190105 24.40 21.92 1.69 3.22
SALE_GROWTH 169996 0.12 0.52 8.14 102.25
OP_CASH_GROWTH 75633 57.79 9446.34 175.23 35861.78
DOA 189419 0.05 0.28 -1.94 256.62
MTB 189970 0.99 65.09 300.87 98391.94
DIVERSE 190189 2.38 15.18 24.73 879.71
OP_CASH 69123 3.02 0.74 0.58 2.62
CE 8092 2.11 1.03 -0.18 -0.02
INV 69196 2.26 1.65 -0.69 1.13
NON_CASH_WC 21112 3.22 0.88 0.10 0.59
TAX 168177 0.06 44.95 -376.53 148921.11
RENUM 1959 9.08 94.77 13.09 186.16
IND_LIQ 190189 0.87 0.03 0.27 -0.64
CONC 190189 0.34 0.16 2.12 6.10
GDP 190189 0.01 0.03 -1.08 -0.10
REAL_INT 190189 0.01 0.02 -0.49 -1.11
DEBT 190189 0.18 0.03 -0.06 -0.78
ECO_INV 190189 3.75 0.54 -0.23 -1.52
IND_AVG 190189 4.29 0.22 0.43 1.08
Descriptive Statistics for Cash Sale Ratio Data
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.241j .058 .058 .27549 .000 2.145 1 53237 .143
j. Predictors: (Constant), PRIVATE, PAY_TO, EXP_OP_CF, RECEIV_TO, SALE_GROWTH, MTB, CASH_CONV_CYC, 
AGE, DOA, DIVERSE, EXP_SALES, OP_CASH, GLOBAL, SIZE2, SIZE1
k. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
Cash Asset Ratio Firml Level Model Summary











Regression 248.439 15 16.563 218.224 .000k
Residual 4040.624 53238 .076
Total 4289.063 53253
k. Predictors: (Constant), PRIVATE, PAY_TO, EXP_OP_CF, RECEIV_TO, SALE_GROWTH, MTB, 
CASH_CONV_CYC, AGE, DOA, DIVERSE, EXP_SALES, OP_CASH, GLOBAL, SIZE2, SIZE1
10
Cash asset firm level data ANOVA
a
Model
Change F Change df1 df2 Change
15
.260o .068 .067 .27408 .000 2.556 1 53227 .110
p. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
o. Predictors: (Constant), WOOD, PROFIT_VOL, PAY_TO, MTB, GLOBAL, FOOD, SALE_GROWTH, RECEIV_TO, PUB, UTIL, 
CASH_CONV_CYC, METAL, CHEM, AGE, DOA, CONS, HOTEL, MANU, DIVERSE, OP_CASH, PRIVATE, IND_LIQ, SIZE2, 
IN _AVG, SIZE1
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics





Regression 290.492 25 11.620 154.678 .000p
Residual 3998.571 53228 .075
Total 4289.063 53253
p. Predictors: (Constant), WOOD, PROFIT_VOL, PAY_TO, MTB, GLOBAL, FOOD, SALE_GROWTH, 
RECEIV_TO, PUB, UTIL, CASH_CONV_CYC, METAL, CHEM, AGE, DOA, CONS, HOTEL, MANU, 
15








.261p .068 .067 .27407 .000 .871 1 53224 .351
p. Predictors: (Constant), WOOD, PROFIT_VOL, PAY_TO, MTB, TEXT, FOOD, PRIVATE, RECEIV_TO, SALE_GROWTH, PUB, UTIL, 
CASH_CONV_CYC, METAL, CHEM, AGE, DOA, CONS, HOTEL, MANU, DIVERSE, REAL_INT, TRANS, DEBT, OP_CASH, GLOBAL, 
SIZE2, SIZE1, ECO_INV
q. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
Cash Asset Ratio All Data Model Summary
q
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change Statistics
Squares df Square F Sig.
Regression 291.228 28 10.401 138.473 .000q
Residual 3997.835 53225 .075
Total 4289.063 53253
q. Predictors: (Constant), WOOD, PROFIT_VOL, PAY_TO, MTB, TEXT, FOOD, PRIVATE, 
RECEIV_TO, SALE_GROWTH, PUB, UTIL, CASH_CONV_CYC, METAL, CHEM, AGE, DOA, CONS, 
16












Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.650 .065 9.987 .000 .523 .778
PAY_TO 3.135E-07 .000 .010 2.412 .016 .000 .000 .011 .010 .010 .999 1.001
RECEIV_TO 8.617E-05 .000 .025 5.927 .000 .000 .000 .027 .026 .025 .967 1.034
CASH_CONV_CYC 6.939E-05 .000 .054 12.678 .000 .000 .000 .057 .055 .053 .953 1.049
PROFIT_VOL
-7.310E-06 .000 -.007 -1.723 .085 .000 .000 -.003 -.007 -.007 .997 1.003
SIZE1
-.012 .004 -.029 -3.147 .002 -.020 -.005 -.085 -.014 -.013 .205 4.876
SIZE2
-.052 .003 -.129 -15.616 .000 -.059 -.046 -.097 -.068 -.065 .257 3.886
AGE
.000 .000 -.037 -8.333 .000 -.001 .000 -.089 -.036 -.035 .874 1.144
SALE_GROWTH
.012 .002 .021 5.067 .000 .007 .016 .035 .022 .021 .976 1.024
DOA
-.049 .005 -.041 -9.087 .000 -.060 -.038 -.063 -.039 -.038 .862 1.161
MTB
.076 .002 .165 37.864 0.000 .072 .080 .185 .162 .158 .919 1.088
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.034 -7.554 .000 -.001 -.001 -.050 -.033 -.032 .879 1.138
OP_CASH
.032 .003 .079 10.457 .000 .026 .038 -.043 .045 .044 .305 3.276
GLOBAL
-.019 .005 -.026 -3.840 .000 -.029 -.009 .012 -.017 -.016 .389 2.571
PRIVATE
-.073 .006 -.081 -12.232 .000 -.085 -.061 -.049 -.053 -.051 .395 2.533
IND_LIQ
-.247 .056 -.027 -4.395 .000 -.357 -.137 -.047 -.019 -.018 .477 2.096
IND_AVG
.025 .009 .020 2.777 .005 .007 .043 .023 .012 .012 .344 2.907
CHEM
-.063 .005 -.055 -12.226 .000 -.073 -.053 -.040 -.053 -.051 .858 1.166
CONS
-.021 .005 -.025 -4.421 .000 -.030 -.012 .011 -.019 -.019 .568 1.761
FOOD
-.057 .007 -.039 -8.311 .000 -.071 -.044 -.028 -.036 -.035 .798 1.252
UTIL
-.080 .012 -.033 -6.648 .000 -.103 -.056 .005 -.029 -.028 .717 1.394
HOTEL
-.065 .005 -.057 -11.931 .000 -.075 -.054 -.018 -.052 -.050 .769 1.300
MANU
-.031 .005 -.038 -6.376 .000 -.041 -.021 -.030 -.028 -.027 .490 2.043
METAL
-.052 .007 -.041 -7.607 .000 -.066 -.039 -.041 -.033 -.032 .592 1.689
PUB
-.029 .008 -.018 -3.806 .000 -.044 -.014 .001 -.016 -.016 .804 1.243
WOOD
-.079 .009 -.036 -8.420 .000 -.097 -.061 -.033 -.036 -.035 .943 1.060
15
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET














Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.517 .013 38.668 0.000 .491 .543
PAY_TO 3.132E-07 .000 .010 2.410 .016 .000 .000 .011 .010 .010 .999 1.001
RECEIV_TO 8.541E-05 .000 .025 5.873 .000 .000 .000 .027 .025 .025 .966 1.035
CASH_CONV_CYC 6.882E-05 .000 .054 12.564 .000 .000 .000 .057 .054 .053 .951 1.051
PROFIT_VOL
-7.354E-06 .000 -.007 -1.733 .083 .000 .000 -.003 -.008 -.007 .997 1.003
SIZE1
-.012 .004 -.028 -3.018 .003 -.019 -.004 -.085 -.013 -.013 .205 4.872
SIZE2
-.053 .003 -.131 -15.818 .000 -.060 -.046 -.097 -.068 -.066 .255 3.921
AGE
-.001 .000 -.038 -8.445 .000 -.001 .000 -.089 -.037 -.035 .875 1.143
SALE_GROWTH
.012 .002 .022 5.256 .000 .008 .017 .035 .023 .022 .974 1.026
REAL_INT
.219 .087 .013 2.505 .012 .048 .390 .012 .011 .010 .615 1.625
DEBT
-.137 .076 -.015 -1.797 .072 -.286 .012 -.008 -.008 -.008 .238 4.205
ECO_INV
.016 .004 .031 3.761 .000 .008 .025 .000 .016 .016 .259 3.855
DOA
-.049 .005 -.041 -9.076 .000 -.060 -.038 -.063 -.039 -.038 .861 1.162
MTB
.076 .002 .166 37.968 0.000 .072 .080 .185 .162 .159 .919 1.088
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.034 -7.517 .000 -.001 -.001 -.050 -.033 -.031 .878 1.138
OP_CASH
.032 .003 .080 10.558 .000 .026 .038 -.043 .046 .044 .304 3.292
GLOBAL
-.020 .005 -.028 -4.076 .000 -.030 -.011 .012 -.018 -.017 .384 2.606
PRIVATE
-.075 .006 -.083 -12.430 .000 -.086 -.063 -.049 -.054 -.052 .390 2.566
CHEM
-.064 .005 -.056 -12.535 .000 -.074 -.054 -.040 -.054 -.052 .875 1.143
CONS
-.035 .004 -.042 -8.960 .000 -.043 -.028 .011 -.039 -.037 .810 1.235
FOOD
-.051 .006 -.035 -8.030 .000 -.064 -.039 -.028 -.035 -.034 .927 1.079
UTIL
-.060 .011 -.025 -5.601 .000 -.081 -.039 .005 -.024 -.023 .895 1.118
HOTEL
-.077 .005 -.068 -14.516 .000 -.088 -.067 -.018 -.063 -.061 .795 1.258
MANU
-.053 .004 -.065 -13.873 .000 -.060 -.045 -.030 -.060 -.058 .799 1.251
METAL
-.078 .006 -.062 -13.976 .000 -.089 -.067 -.041 -.060 -.058 .898 1.113
PUB
-.045 .007 -.028 -6.352 .000 -.059 -.031 .001 -.028 -.027 .919 1.089
TEXT
-.027 .010 -.011 -2.683 .007 -.046 -.007 -.001 -.012 -.011 .966 1.035
TRANS
-.017 .005 -.017 -3.789 .000 -.026 -.008 .026 -.016 -.016 .846 1.182
WOOD
-.091 .009 -.042 -9.800 .000 -.109 -.073 -.033 -.042 -.041 .964 1.037
16
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
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.583g .340 .340 .41914 .000 1.782 1 53111 .182
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
g. Predictors: (Constant), PRIVATE, MTB, CASH_FLOW_VOL, EXP_OP_CF, SALE_GROWTH, RECEIV_TO, INV_TO, 
PROFIT_VOL, AGE, CASH_CONV_CYC, TOTAL_ACCR, DOA, DIVERSE, EXP_SALES, GLOBAL, OP_CASH, SIZE2, SIZE1
h. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE





Regression 4816.716 18 267.595 1523.190 .000h
Residual 9330.765 53112 .176
Total 14147.481 53130
h. Predictors: (Constant), PRIVATE, MTB, CASH_FLOW_VOL, EXP_OP_CF, 
SALE_GROWTH, RECEIV_TO, INV_TO, PROFIT_VOL, AGE, CASH_CONV_CYC, 
7








.589k .348 .347 .41694 .000 1.909 1 53100 .167 1.067
l. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
k. Predictors: (Constant), RETAIL, CASH_FLOW_VOL, MTB, EXP_OP_CF, AGE, PRIVATE, CASH_CONV_CYC, RECEIV_TO, 
PROFIT_VOL, TEXT, SALE_GROWTH, UTIL, CONC, FOOD, PUB, INV_TO, TOTAL_ACCR, DOA, HOTEL, DIVERSE, TRANS, 
POST, EXP_SALES, GLOBAL, OP_CASH, SIZE2, IND_AVG, SIZE1, CONS
Cash Sale Ratio Industrial Level ModelSummary
l













Regression 4916.318 29 169.528 975.188 .000l
Residual 9231.163 53101 .174
Total 14147.481 53130
l. Predictors: (Constant), RETAIL, CASH_FLOW_VOL, MTB, EXP_OP_CF, AGE, 










.589o .347 .347 .41695 .000 1.173 1 53100 .279 1.067
p. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
o. Predictors: (Constant), DIVERSE, MTB, TEXT, CASH_FLOW_VOL, UTIL, POST, RECEIV_TO, FOOD, PRIVATE, PUB, 
SALE_GROWTH, CASH_CONV_CYC, PROFIT_VOL, TRANS, AGE, HOTEL, CONS, DOA, TOTAL_ACCR, EXP_OP_CF, INV_TO, 
EXP_SALES, OP_CASH, GLOBAL, SIZE2, CONC, SIZE1, IND_LIQ, RETAIL
Model Summary
p









Squares df Square F Sig.
Regression 4916.154 29 169.523 975.138 .000p
Residual 9231.327 53101 .174
Total 14147.481 53130
p. Predictors: (Constant), DIVERSE, MTB, TEXT, CASH_FLOW_VOL, UTIL, POST, 


















Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.946 .080 11.858 .000 .790 1.103
EXP_OP_CF 0.084-          .000 -.029 -6.601 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.029 -.023 .618 1.617
EXP_SALES 0.016          .000 .027 5.916 .000 .000 .000 -.017 .026 .021 .580 1.725
INV_TO 7.228E-05 .000 .015 3.821 .000 .000 .000 .022 .017 .013 .796 1.256
RECEIV_TO
.000 .000 .038 10.511 .000 .000 .000 .042 .046 .037 .961 1.041
CASH_CONV_CYC
.000 .000 .103 27.619 .000 .000 .000 .203 .119 .097 .891 1.123
CASH_FLOW_VOL 8.029E-05 .000 .019 5.224 .000 .000 .000 .001 .023 .018 .958 1.043
PROFIT_VOL
.000 .000 -.018 -5.055 .000 .000 .000 .004 -.022 -.018 .998 1.002
TOTAL_ACCR
.008 .003 .014 2.302 .021 .001 .015 .007 .010 .008 .342 2.920
SIZE1
.655 .007 .915 98.767 0.000 .642 .668 .105 .394 .346 .143 6.990
SIZE2
-.805 .006 -1.062 -131.291 0.000 -.817 -.793 -.185 -.495 -.460 .188 5.325
AGE
-.001 .000 -.024 -6.393 .000 -.001 .000 -.044 -.028 -.022 .869 1.151
SALE_GROWTH
.010 .004 .010 2.936 .003 .003 .017 .002 .013 .010 .976 1.025
DOA
-.229 .007 -.123 -31.778 .000 -.243 -.215 -.133 -.137 -.111 .818 1.222
MTB
-9.579E-05 .000 -.012 -3.216 .001 .000 .000 .006 -.014 -.011 .871 1.149
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.032 -8.049 .000 -.001 -.001 -.013 -.035 -.028 .764 1.309
OP_CASH
.085 .005 .122 18.035 .000 .076 .094 .073 .078 .063 .269 3.715
GLOBAL
-.016 .007 -.011 -2.174 .030 -.030 -.002 .029 -.009 -.008 .469 2.132
PRIVATE
-.078 .009 -.042 -8.241 .000 -.096 -.059 -.048 -.036 -.029 .476 2.102
IND_LIQ
-.174 .087 -.010 -2.000 .046 -.344 -.003 -.009 -.009 -.007 .448 2.230
CONC
-.076 .016 -.023 -4.674 .000 -.108 -.044 -.034 -.020 -.016 .494 2.025
CONS
.060 .008 .038 7.550 .000 .045 .076 .019 .033 .026 .478 2.093
FOOD
.048 .011 .018 4.461 .000 .027 .069 -.028 .019 .016 .777 1.287
UTIL
.144 .018 .032 7.961 .000 .108 .179 .118 .035 .028 .769 1.301
HOTEL
.039 .009 .019 4.172 .000 .020 .057 .129 .018 .015 .613 1.631
POST
.160 .017 .043 9.695 .000 .128 .193 .035 .042 .034 .633 1.580
PUB
.052 .011 .018 4.926 .000 .031 .072 .025 .021 .017 .883 1.132
TEXT
.040 .015 .009 2.595 .009 .010 .070 -.006 .011 .009 .961 1.040
TRANS
.082 .007 .046 10.935 .000 .067 .097 .027 .047 .038 .703 1.421
RETAIL
.085 .007 .077 13.000 .000 .073 .098 -.089 .056 .046 .350 2.854
15
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
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.202l .041 .041 .27797 .000 1.540 1 237452 .215
m. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
l. Predictors: (Constant), WOOD, CASH_CONV_CYC, EXP_SALES, MTB, TAX, GDP, OP_CASH_GROWTH, TEXT, 
FOOD, PRIVATE, UTIL, POST, SALE_GROWTH, PUB, RECEIV_TO, DOA, METAL, INV_TO, CHEM, AGE, HOTEL, 
CONS, MANU, DIVERSE, REAL_INT, TRANS, DEBT, OP_CASH, GLOBAL, SIZE1, ECO_INV, CASH_FLOW_VOL
Cash Asset All Data Imputed Model Summary
m















Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
.528 .008 64.558 0.000 .512 .544
EXP_SALES 0.0028      .000 .008 3.597 .000 .000 .000 -.023 .007 .007 .810 1.235
INV_TO 3.092E-05 .000 .012 5.347 .000 .000 .000 .027 .011 .011 .788 1.269
RECEIV_TO 3.899E-05 .000 .012 5.631 .000 .000 .000 .020 .012 .011 .955 1.047
CASH_CONV_CYC 4.967E-08 .000 .009 4.269 .000 .000 .000 .009 .009 .009 .998 1.002
CASH_FLOW_VOL 5.403E-05 .000 .050 9.460 .000 .000 .000 .007 .019 .019 .143 6.987
SIZE1
-.058 .002 -.140 -37.853 0.000 -.061 -.055 -.085 -.077 -.076 .296 3.377
AGE
-.001 .000 -.057 -27.368 .000 -.001 -.001 -.089 -.056 -.055 .919 1.089
SALE_GROWTH
.006 .001 .013 6.281 .000 .004 .008 .021 .013 .013 .990 1.010
GDP
.087 .041 .008 2.145 .032 .008 .167 -.001 .004 .004 .329 3.043
REAL_INT
.144 .043 .009 3.362 .001 .060 .228 .012 .007 .007 .593 1.686
DEBT
-.188 .041 -.021 -4.627 .000 -.268 -.109 -.008 -.009 -.009 .192 5.219
ECO_INV
.022 .003 .042 7.355 .000 .016 .028 .000 .015 .015 .123 8.144
OP_CASH_GROWTH
-5.452E-07 .000 -.018 -8.738 .000 .000 .000 -.024 -.018 -.018 .997 1.003
DOA
-.069 .002 -.066 -30.365 .000 -.074 -.065 -.053 -.062 -.061 .861 1.161
MTB
.020 .000 .083 40.926 0.000 .019 .021 .097 .084 .082 .986 1.014
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.030 -13.631 .000 -.001 -.001 -.050 -.028 -.027 .810 1.234
OP_CASH
.029 .001 .083 21.789 .000 .026 .031 -.051 .045 .044 .280 3.578
TAX
.000 .000 .019 3.738 .000 .000 .000 -.003 .008 .008 .150 6.647
GLOBAL
-.030 .002 -.040 -12.249 .000 -.034 -.025 .012 -.025 -.025 .385 2.597
PRIVATE
-.086 .003 -.097 -30.070 .000 -.092 -.081 -.049 -.062 -.060 .390 2.561
CHEM
-.058 .002 -.051 -23.613 .000 -.063 -.053 -.040 -.048 -.047 .875 1.143
CONS
-.024 .002 -.028 -12.263 .000 -.027 -.020 .011 -.025 -.025 .785 1.274
FOOD
-.053 .003 -.036 -17.082 .000 -.059 -.047 -.028 -.035 -.034 .921 1.086
UTIL
-.015 .005 -.006 -3.030 .002 -.025 -.005 .005 -.006 -.006 .941 1.063
HOTEL
-.053 .003 -.047 -21.374 .000 -.058 -.049 -.018 -.044 -.043 .831 1.204
MANU
-.045 .002 -.056 -24.840 .000 -.049 -.042 -.030 -.051 -.050 .799 1.251
METAL
-.071 .003 -.056 -26.608 .000 -.077 -.066 -.041 -.055 -.053 .900 1.111
POST
.027 .005 .012 5.976 .000 .018 .036 .033 .012 .012 .944 1.060
PUB
-.025 .003 -.016 -7.529 .000 -.032 -.019 .001 -.015 -.015 .929 1.077
TEXT
-.018 .005 -.008 -3.721 .000 -.027 -.008 -.001 -.008 -.007 .966 1.035
TRANS
-.010 .002 -.010 -4.280 .000 -.015 -.005 .026 -.009 -.009 .736 1.358
WOOD
-.087 .004 -.040 -19.445 .000 -.095 -.078 -.033 -.040 -.039 .963 1.038
12
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_ASSET
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Appendix 11 Model Results of Cash Sale Ratio OLS (Imputed Data) 
          
        
R Square 




.577d .333 .333 .42157 .000 1.846 1 190156 .174 .964
d. Predictors: (Constant), DEBT, CASH_FLOW_VOL, FOOD, GROWTH_VOL, DOA, DIVERSE, TEXT, UTIL, OP_CASH_GROWTH, 
POST, PUB, SALE_GROWTH, PRIVATE, METAL, PRD_COST_VOL, HOTEL, RECEIV_TO, CHEM, AGE, CONS, SIZE2, INV_TO, 
GDP, PROFIT_VOL, IND_LIQ, EXP_SALES, REAL_INT, GLOBAL, TOTAL_ACCR, CONC, SIZE1
e. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
Model Summary
e


















Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 1.808 .038 47.541 0.000 1.734 1.883
EXP_SALES 0.0112      .000 .019 8.998 .000 .000 .000 -.017 .021 .017 .781 1.281
INV_TO
.000 .000 .033 15.135 .000 .000 .000 .021 .035 .028 .745 1.341
RECEIV_TO
.000 .000 .046 18.752 .000 .000 .000 .020 .043 .035 .591 1.691
CASH_FLOW_VOL 1.197E-05 .000 .005 2.640 .008 .000 .000 .000 .006 .005 .987 1.014
GROWTH_VOL
-2.224E-06 .000 -.006 -2.723 .006 .000 .000 -.008 -.006 -.005 .678 1.476
PRD_COST_VOL
-2.419E-05 .000 -.008 -4.004 .000 .000 .000 .007 -.009 -.008 .920 1.087
PROFIT_VOL
-4.906E-05 .000 -.018 -7.777 .000 .000 .000 -.001 -.018 -.015 .653 1.532
TOTAL_ACCR
.007 .001 .016 5.130 .000 .005 .010 .006 .012 .010 .373 2.682
SIZE1
.748 .003 1.046 252.533 0.000 .742 .754 .105 .501 .473 .205 4.885
SIZE2
-.831 .003 -1.096 -267.789 0.000 -.837 -.825 -.185 -.523 -.502 .209 4.774
AGE
-.001 .000 -.039 -19.941 .000 -.001 -.001 -.044 -.046 -.037 .920 1.087
SALE_GROWTH
.012 .002 .013 6.864 .000 .009 .016 .001 .016 .013 .985 1.015
OP_CASH_GROWTH 5.545E-07 .000 .011 5.930 .000 .000 .000 .014 .014 .011 .989 1.011
DOA
-.192 .003 -.104 -54.970 0.000 -.199 -.185 -.132 -.125 -.103 .986 1.014
DIVERSE
-.001 .000 -.023 -10.887 .000 -.001 -.001 -.013 -.025 -.020 .801 1.248
GLOBAL
-.028 .004 -.019 -6.985 .000 -.036 -.020 .029 -.016 -.013 .459 2.177
PRIVATE
-.085 .005 -.046 -16.710 .000 -.095 -.075 -.048 -.038 -.031 .466 2.145
IND_LIQ
-1.121 .043 -.068 -26.197 .000 -1.205 -1.037 -.009 -.060 -.049 .527 1.897
CONC
-.091 .013 -.028 -7.050 .000 -.116 -.066 -.034 -.016 -.013 .224 4.471
CHEM
-.069 .004 -.034 -15.354 .000 -.078 -.060 -.008 -.035 -.029 .731 1.369
CONS
.012 .004 .007 3.180 .001 .004 .019 .019 .007 .006 .647 1.545
FOOD
-.035 .005 -.013 -6.554 .000 -.046 -.025 -.028 -.015 -.012 .894 1.119
UTIL
.032 .009 .007 3.476 .001 .014 .050 .118 .008 .007 .855 1.170
HOTEL
-.053 .004 -.026 -12.082 .000 -.062 -.045 .129 -.028 -.023 .773 1.294
METAL
-.023 .007 -.010 -3.362 .001 -.036 -.009 -.030 -.008 -.006 .420 2.383
POST
.072 .010 .019 6.997 .000 .052 .092 .035 .016 .013 .470 2.127
PUB
.026 .006 .009 4.452 .000 .015 .038 .025 .010 .008 .813 1.229
TEXT
.016 .008 .004 1.913 .056 .000 .032 -.006 .004 .004 .946 1.058
GDP
.342 .047 .017 7.279 .000 .250 .434 .005 .017 .014 .668 1.496
REAL_INT
-.347 .076 -.012 -4.586 .000 -.495 -.198 .019 -.011 -.009 .518 1.930
DEBT
.364 .045 .023 8.093 .000 .276 .453 -.014 .019 .015 .442 2.261
4
a. Dependent Variable: CASH_SALE
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Appendix 12 FE Model of Sales risks measure with Control 
variables in cash asset model 
Expected Operating Cash Flow 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69200852   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e      .172922
       sigma_u    .25920096
                                                                                
         _cons     .3849299   .0097844    39.34   0.000     .3657528    .4041071
       ECO_INV     .0097252   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070292    .0124212
          DEBT    -.0875387   .0241349    -3.63   0.000    -.1348425   -.0402349
      REAL_INT     .1912594   .0275679     6.94   0.000     .1372269    .2452918
       OP_CASH      .010204   .0007979    12.79   0.000     .0086401    .0117679
           MTB     .0083021    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075241    .0090802
           DOA    -.0586935   .0017986   -32.63   0.000    -.0622187   -.0551682
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.07e-08
         SIZE2     -.024436     .00184   -13.28   0.000    -.0280423   -.0208297
         SIZE1     .0183755   .0029096     6.32   0.000     .0126727    .0240783
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182771   .0010994   -16.62   0.000    -.0204319   -.0161223
     EXP_OP_CF     .0023877    .005367     0.44   0.656    -.0081314    .0129068
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0076                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.61
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
















F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69202262   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292177
       sigma_u     .2592092
                                                                                
         _cons     .3851022   .0097872    39.35   0.000     .3659195     .404285
       ECO_INV     .0097229   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070269    .0124189
          DEBT    -.0875456   .0241345    -3.63   0.000    -.1348486   -.0402426
      REAL_INT     .1914441    .027569     6.94   0.000     .1374095    .2454787
       OP_CASH     .0102116   .0007976    12.80   0.000     .0086484    .0117748
           MTB     .0083021    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075241    .0090802
           DOA    -.0586916   .0017986   -32.63   0.000    -.0622169   -.0551664
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.81e-07   4.55e-08    -3.98   0.000    -2.70e-07   -9.17e-08
         SIZE2     -.024481   .0018408   -13.30   0.000    -.0280889   -.0208731
         SIZE1     .0183564   .0029097     6.31   0.000     .0126534    .0240594
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182836   .0010993   -16.63   0.000    -.0204382    -.016129
     EXP_SALES      .001223    .001462     0.84   0.403    -.0016425    .0040885
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0078                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.66
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0058                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
















F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69199293   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292161
       sigma_u     .2591909
                                                                                
         _cons     .3849454   .0097841    39.34   0.000     .3657689     .404122
       ECO_INV     .0097229   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070269    .0124189
          DEBT    -.0874963   .0241343    -3.63   0.000    -.1347989   -.0401936
      REAL_INT     .1912048   .0275678     6.94   0.000     .1371725     .245237
       OP_CASH     .0102801   .0008001    12.85   0.000      .008712    .0118483
           MTB     .0083022    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075241    .0090803
           DOA     -.058733    .001799   -32.65   0.000    -.0622589   -.0552071
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.08e-08
         SIZE2    -.0244631   .0018402   -13.29   0.000    -.0280698   -.0208564
         SIZE1     .0183448   .0029098     6.30   0.000     .0126417    .0240479
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182714   .0010994   -16.62   0.000    -.0204261   -.0161166
        PAY_TO     4.50e-08   4.38e-08     1.03   0.305    -4.09e-08    1.31e-07
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0073                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.69
       overall = 0.0072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100






F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.42       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69195087   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17291725
       sigma_u     .2591588
                                                                                
         _cons      .384084   .0097868    39.25   0.000     .3649021    .4032658
       ECO_INV     .0096851   .0013755     7.04   0.000     .0069891    .0123812
          DEBT     -.087876    .024134    -3.64   0.000    -.1351781    -.040574
      REAL_INT      .190225   .0275688     6.90   0.000     .1361908    .2442592
       OP_CASH     .0101894   .0007976    12.78   0.000     .0086262    .0117526
           MTB     .0083062    .000397    20.92   0.000     .0075282    .0090843
           DOA    -.0588149   .0017989   -32.69   0.000    -.0623407    -.055289
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.95   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.06e-08
         SIZE2    -.0248242   .0018438   -13.46   0.000    -.0284379   -.0212105
         SIZE1     .0188334   .0029127     6.47   0.000     .0131245    .0245423
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182779   .0010993   -16.63   0.000    -.0204324   -.0161233
        INV_TO     .0000164   5.02e-06     3.27   0.001     6.58e-06    .0000262
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0065                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    204.58
       overall = 0.0074                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0062                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.42       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69198574   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17291973
       sigma_u    .25918372
                                                                                
         _cons       .38467   .0097843    39.32   0.000      .365493     .403847
       ECO_INV     .0097134   .0013755     7.06   0.000     .0070174    .0124094
          DEBT     -.087616   .0241341    -3.63   0.000    -.1349183   -.0403137
      REAL_INT     .1910091   .0275677     6.93   0.000     .1369772    .2450411
       OP_CASH     .0102122   .0007975    12.80   0.000     .0086491    .0117754
           MTB     .0082988    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075207    .0090768
           DOA    -.0587214   .0017986   -32.65   0.000    -.0622466   -.0551961
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.09e-08
         SIZE2    -.0245841   .0018411   -13.35   0.000    -.0281926   -.0209756
         SIZE1     .0184984     .00291     6.36   0.000      .012795    .0242018
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182577   .0010993   -16.61   0.000    -.0204124    -.016103
     RECEIV_TO     .0000131   5.73e-06     2.28   0.022     1.85e-06    .0000243
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0070                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    204.07
       overall = 0.0072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0060                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69201122   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292201
       sigma_u    .25920263
                                                                                
         _cons     .3848397   .0097847    39.33   0.000     .3656619    .4040174
       ECO_INV     .0097243   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070283    .0124203
          DEBT    -.0874569   .0241344    -3.62   0.000    -.1347596   -.0401541
      REAL_INT     .1912801   .0275681     6.94   0.000     .1372472    .2453129
       OP_CASH     .0102133   .0007976    12.81   0.000     .0086501    .0117765
           MTB     .0083024    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075243    .0090805
           DOA    -.0586941   .0017986   -32.63   0.000    -.0622193   -.0551688
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.08e-08
         SIZE2    -.0244684   .0018418   -13.29   0.000    -.0280782   -.0208586
         SIZE1     .0184328    .002912     6.33   0.000     .0127253    .0241402
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182875   .0010994   -16.63   0.000    -.0204422   -.0161328
 CASH_CONV_CYC    -3.41e-09   8.27e-09    -0.41   0.680    -1.96e-08    1.28e-08
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0077                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.61
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.42       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69194871   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e     .1728892
       sigma_u    .25911545
                                                                                
         _cons     .3885598   .0097915    39.68   0.000     .3693686     .407751
       ECO_INV     .0096838   .0013753     7.04   0.000     .0069883    .0123794
          DEBT    -.0876973   .0241298    -3.63   0.000    -.1349911   -.0404036
      REAL_INT     .1875206    .027566     6.80   0.000     .1334918    .2415494
       OP_CASH     .0146739   .0009534    15.39   0.000     .0128053    .0165425
           MTB     .0083018   .0003969    20.92   0.000     .0075238    .0090797
           DOA    -.0609622   .0018178   -33.54   0.000     -.064525   -.0573994
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.76e-07   4.54e-08    -3.88   0.000    -2.65e-07   -8.71e-08
         SIZE2    -.0253132   .0018425   -13.74   0.000    -.0289245    -.021702
         SIZE1     .0153059   .0029313     5.22   0.000     .0095607    .0210511
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0184978   .0010994   -16.83   0.000    -.0206525    -.016343
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000149   1.75e-06     8.53   0.000     .0000115    .0000184
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0051                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    210.29
       overall = 0.0076                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0065                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0119                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
















F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69200033   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292016
       sigma_u    .25919323
                                                                                
         _cons     .3849524   .0097839    39.35   0.000     .3657762    .4041286
       ECO_INV     .0097241   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070281      .01242
          DEBT    -.0874227   .0241341    -3.62   0.000     -.134725   -.0401205
      REAL_INT     .1923774   .0275732     6.98   0.000     .1383347    .2464202
       OP_CASH     .0102477   .0007977    12.85   0.000     .0086842    .0118112
           MTB     .0083025    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075245    .0090806
           DOA    -.0587394   .0017987   -32.66   0.000    -.0622649    -.055214
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.06e-08
         SIZE2    -.0244793   .0018401   -13.30   0.000    -.0280858   -.0208728
         SIZE1     .0183822   .0029095     6.32   0.000     .0126796    .0240848
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182767   .0010993   -16.63   0.000    -.0204313   -.0161221
      EARN_VOL     8.32e-08   4.03e-08     2.06   0.039     4.20e-09    1.62e-07
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0075                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.99
       overall = 0.0072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100















F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69200032   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292206
       sigma_u    .25919607
                                                                                
         _cons     .3849423   .0097862    39.34   0.000     .3657615    .4041231
       ECO_INV     .0097231   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070271    .0124191
          DEBT    -.0874624   .0241344    -3.62   0.000    -.1347652   -.0401597
      REAL_INT     .1912047    .027568     6.94   0.000      .137172    .2452375
       OP_CASH     .0102156   .0007976    12.81   0.000     .0086524    .0117788
           MTB     .0083021    .000397    20.91   0.000      .007524    .0090801
           DOA    -.0586978   .0017986   -32.63   0.000     -.062223   -.0551725
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.95   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.06e-08
         SIZE2    -.0244344     .00184   -13.28   0.000    -.0280407   -.0208281
         SIZE1     .0183682   .0029102     6.31   0.000     .0126643    .0240721
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182801   .0010994   -16.63   0.000    -.0204349   -.0161254
    GROWTH_VOL     3.03e-08   1.20e-07     0.25   0.801    -2.06e-07    2.66e-07
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0074                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.60
       overall = 0.0072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69200165   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292208
       sigma_u    .25919691
                                                                                
         _cons     .3849128   .0097858    39.33   0.000     .3657329    .4040927
       ECO_INV     .0097234   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070274    .0124194
          DEBT    -.0874656   .0241344    -3.62   0.000    -.1347684   -.0401628
      REAL_INT     .1912159   .0275681     6.94   0.000      .137183    .2452487
       OP_CASH     .0102151   .0007976    12.81   0.000     .0086519    .0117783
           MTB     .0083021    .000397    20.91   0.000      .007524    .0090802
           DOA    -.0586974   .0017986   -32.63   0.000    -.0622227   -.0551722
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.06e-08
         SIZE2    -.0244322   .0018401   -13.28   0.000    -.0280387   -.0208256
         SIZE1     .0183743   .0029105     6.31   0.000     .0126697    .0240789
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182818   .0010994   -16.63   0.000    -.0204365    -.016127
  PRD_COST_VOL     1.47e-08   1.18e-07     0.12   0.901    -2.17e-07    2.46e-07
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0075                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.60
       overall = 0.0072                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100













F test that all u_i=0:     F(46099, 191375) =     9.43       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho     .6920167   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .17292113
       sigma_u    .25920463
                                                                                
         _cons     .3851775   .0097859    39.36   0.000     .3659974    .4043576
       ECO_INV     .0097228   .0013755     7.07   0.000     .0070268    .0124188
          DEBT    -.0873228   .0241344    -3.62   0.000    -.1346257   -.0400199
      REAL_INT      .191351   .0275678     6.94   0.000     .1373187    .2453833
       OP_CASH     .0102305   .0007976    12.83   0.000     .0086672    .0117938
           MTB     .0083015    .000397    20.91   0.000     .0075234    .0090796
           DOA    -.0586957   .0017986   -32.63   0.000    -.0622209   -.0551704
OP_CASH_GROWTH    -1.80e-07   4.54e-08    -3.96   0.000    -2.69e-07   -9.07e-08
         SIZE2    -.0246138    .001844   -13.35   0.000    -.0282281   -.0209995
         SIZE1     .0184742   .0029102     6.35   0.000     .0127703    .0241781
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0182771   .0010993   -16.63   0.000    -.0204317   -.0161225
    PROFIT_VOL    -1.88e-06   1.29e-06    -1.46   0.145    -4.40e-06    6.46e-07
                                                                                
    CASH_ASSET        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0079                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,191375)       =    203.79
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0059                                        avg =       5.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     46100
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    237486
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Appendix 13 FE Model of Sales risks measure with Control 
variables in cash sale model 











F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69653454   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27166125
       sigma_u    .41157066
                                                                                
         _cons     .9583109   .0445944    21.49   0.000     .8709068    1.045715
       ECO_INV     .0195773   .0027462     7.13   0.000     .0141947    .0249598
           GDP     .1877997   .0409942     4.58   0.000     .1074519    .2681476
       IND_AVG      .044925   .0110132     4.08   0.000     .0233393    .0665107
          CONC    -.0308125   .0109967    -2.80   0.005    -.0523659   -.0092592
       OP_CASH     .0077502   .0012483     6.21   0.000     .0053036    .0101968
           MTB     .0002331   .0000443     5.26   0.000     .0001463      .00032
           DOA    -.1197389   .0032101   -37.30   0.000    -.1260306   -.1134471
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.89e-07   7.23e-08     3.99   0.000     1.47e-07    4.30e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098391   .0051841  -211.88   0.000    -1.108552    -1.08823
         SIZE1     .9296976   .0059293   156.80   0.000     .9180762    .9413189
    TOTAL_ACCR     -.006355   .0019501    -3.26   0.001    -.0101772   -.0025328
     EXP_OP_CF     .0208004   .0084853     2.45   0.014     .0041694    .0374314
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2601                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4205.65
       overall = 0.3125                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3479                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2525                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804















F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69634482   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27165836
       sigma_u    .41138163
                                                                                
         _cons     .9601245   .0445992    21.53   0.000      .872711    1.047538
       ECO_INV     .0194562   .0027467     7.08   0.000     .0140727    .0248396
           GDP     .1873805   .0409943     4.57   0.000     .1070326    .2677285
       IND_AVG     .0451158   .0110134     4.10   0.000     .0235297    .0667019
          CONC    -.0309779   .0109968    -2.82   0.005    -.0525314   -.0094245
       OP_CASH     .0080512   .0012447     6.47   0.000     .0056116    .0104907
           MTB     .0002292   .0000443     5.17   0.000     .0001423     .000316
           DOA    -.1197833   .0032099   -37.32   0.000    -.1260746   -.1134919
OP_CASH_GROWTH     3.25e-07   7.35e-08     4.43   0.000     1.81e-07    4.70e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098829   .0051864  -211.87   0.000    -1.108995   -1.088664
         SIZE1     .9293403   .0059305   156.71   0.000     .9177166     .940964
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0064799   .0019496    -3.32   0.001     -.010301   -.0026588
     EXP_SALES     .0080374   .0026511     3.03   0.002     .0028414    .0132335
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2587                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4206.01
       overall = 0.3128                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3482                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804















F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69659554   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27165711
       sigma_u    .41162377
                                                                                
         _cons     .9580813   .0445936    21.48   0.000     .8706787    1.045484
       ECO_INV     .0196249   .0027461     7.15   0.000     .0142426    .0250072
           GDP     .1877112   .0409936     4.58   0.000     .1073645    .2680578
       IND_AVG     .0448007    .011013     4.07   0.000     .0232154    .0663859
          CONC    -.0307498   .0109966    -2.80   0.005    -.0523029   -.0091968
       OP_CASH     .0079549   .0012445     6.39   0.000     .0055157    .0103942
           MTB     .0002321   .0000443     5.24   0.000     .0001453     .000319
           DOA    -.1198202   .0032099   -37.33   0.000    -.1261115   -.1135289
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.77e-07   7.23e-08     3.83   0.000     1.35e-07    4.19e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098096   .0051845  -211.80   0.000    -1.108258   -1.087935
         SIZE1     .9295784   .0059294   156.78   0.000      .917957    .9411999
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0065737   .0019498    -3.37   0.001    -.0103953   -.0027521
        PAY_TO    -2.76e-07   8.50e-08    -3.25   0.001    -4.43e-07   -1.10e-07
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2601                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4206.16
       overall = 0.3123                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3477                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804








F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.72       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69650959   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27166505
       sigma_u    .41155212
                                                                                
         _cons     .9576456   .0445958    21.47   0.000     .8702388    1.045052
       ECO_INV     .0195935   .0027463     7.13   0.000     .0142108    .0249762
           GDP     .1878158   .0409951     4.58   0.000     .1074662    .2681654
       IND_AVG     .0447561   .0110135     4.06   0.000     .0231699    .0663424
          CONC     -.030762   .0109969    -2.80   0.005    -.0523157   -.0092083
       OP_CASH     .0080723   .0012461     6.48   0.000       .00563    .0105147
           MTB       .00024   .0000449     5.35   0.000     .0001521     .000328
           DOA    -.1199709   .0032118   -37.35   0.000    -.1262659   -.1136758
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.85e-07   7.23e-08     3.94   0.000     1.43e-07    4.26e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098642   .0051887  -211.74   0.000    -1.108812   -1.088472
         SIZE1     .9300792   .0059358   156.69   0.000     .9184452    .9417133
    TOTAL_ACCR     -.006623   .0019529    -3.39   0.001    -.0104507   -.0027953
        INV_TO     .0000134   9.87e-06     1.35   0.176    -5.98e-06    .0000327
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2604                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4205.19
       overall = 0.3125                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3480                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2525                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804








F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.72       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69653577   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27166114
       sigma_u    .41157168
                                                                                
         _cons      .957453   .0445948    21.47   0.000      .870048    1.044858
       ECO_INV     .0195244   .0027465     7.11   0.000     .0141414    .0249075
           GDP     .1870227   .0409963     4.56   0.000     .1066708    .2673746
       IND_AVG     .0449892   .0110133     4.08   0.000     .0234033    .0665751
          CONC    -.0308231   .0109967    -2.80   0.005    -.0523765   -.0092697
       OP_CASH     .0073019   .0012749     5.73   0.000     .0048031    .0098007
           MTB     .0001786    .000049     3.65   0.000     .0000826    .0002746
           DOA    -.1194889   .0032128   -37.19   0.000    -.1257858    -.113192
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.88e-07   7.23e-08     3.98   0.000     1.46e-07    4.30e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098927   .0051893  -211.77   0.000    -1.109098   -1.088756
         SIZE1     .9301193   .0059317   156.81   0.000     .9184933    .9417453
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0055092   .0019877    -2.77   0.006    -.0094051   -.0016132
     RECEIV_TO     .0000256   .0000103     2.48   0.013     5.35e-06    .0000459
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2603                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4205.67
       overall = 0.3126                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3480                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2525                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    190189
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.69       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho     .6958196   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27145352
       sigma_u    .41056148
                                                                                
         _cons     .9452792   .0445679    21.21   0.000     .8579269    1.032631
       ECO_INV     .0199708   .0027441     7.28   0.000     .0145924    .0253492
           GDP     .1907776   .0409631     4.66   0.000     .1104908    .2710645
       IND_AVG     .0443966   .0110048     4.03   0.000     .0228275    .0659658
          CONC    -.0309377   .0109883    -2.82   0.005    -.0524746   -.0094008
       OP_CASH     .0165914   .0013645    12.16   0.000      .013917    .0192657
           MTB     .0008538   .0000601    14.20   0.000      .000736    .0009717
           DOA      -.12443   .0032215   -38.62   0.000    -.1307441   -.1181159
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.56e-07   7.23e-08     3.54   0.000     1.14e-07    3.97e-07
         SIZE2     -1.08882   .0052172  -208.70   0.000    -1.099046   -1.078594
         SIZE1     .9235927   .0059382   155.53   0.000     .9119539    .9352315
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0185844   .0021025    -8.84   0.000    -.0227053   -.0144636
 CASH_CONV_CYC     .0000496   3.24e-06    15.32   0.000     .0000432    .0000559
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2579                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4231.15
       overall = 0.3137                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3498                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2537                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    190189
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho     .6966681   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27164459
       sigma_u    .41167547
                                                                                
         _cons     .9619452   .0445986    21.57   0.000     .8745328    1.049358
       ECO_INV     .0196384    .002746     7.15   0.000     .0142564    .0250204
           GDP     .1880897   .0409915     4.59   0.000     .1077471    .2684323
       IND_AVG     .0449544   .0110125     4.08   0.000     .0233701    .0665387
          CONC    -.0309778   .0109961    -2.82   0.005      -.05253   -.0094256
       OP_CASH      .011669   .0014511     8.04   0.000     .0088249    .0145131
           MTB     .0001504   .0000472     3.19   0.001      .000058    .0002429
           DOA    -.1218921    .003237   -37.66   0.000    -.1282365   -.1155476
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.91e-07   7.23e-08     4.03   0.000     1.50e-07    4.33e-07
         SIZE2    -1.099955    .005194  -211.78   0.000    -1.110135   -1.089775
         SIZE1      .926908   .0059561   155.62   0.000     .9152343    .9385818
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0053675   .0019622    -2.74   0.006    -.0092134   -.0015215
 CASH_FLOW_VOL     .0000184   3.72e-06     4.93   0.000     .0000111    .0000257
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2607                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4207.70
       overall = 0.3125                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3479                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804








F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69655106   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27166663
       sigma_u    .41159487
                                                                                
         _cons     .9579908   .0445953    21.48   0.000      .870585    1.045397
       ECO_INV     .0196233   .0027463     7.15   0.000     .0142407     .025006
           GDP     .1880291   .0409953     4.59   0.000     .1076791    .2683791
       IND_AVG     .0448609   .0110136     4.07   0.000     .0232745    .0664472
          CONC    -.0307796    .010997    -2.80   0.005    -.0523334   -.0092258
       OP_CASH      .007985   .0012446     6.42   0.000     .0055457    .0104243
           MTB     .0002304   .0000443     5.20   0.000     .0001436    .0003173
           DOA     -.119835   .0032102   -37.33   0.000    -.1261269   -.1135431
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.85e-07   7.23e-08     3.95   0.000     1.44e-07    4.27e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098363   .0051844  -211.86   0.000    -1.108524   -1.088202
         SIZE1     .9297218   .0059297   156.79   0.000     .9180998    .9413438
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0064688   .0019496    -3.32   0.001    -.0102901   -.0026476
      EARN_VOL     2.45e-08   7.82e-08     0.31   0.754    -1.29e-07    1.78e-07
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2602                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4205.00
       overall = 0.3124                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3478                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2525                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804








F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69655721   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27166264
       sigma_u    .41159482
                                                                                
         _cons     .9588122    .044596    21.50   0.000     .8714049     1.04622
       ECO_INV     .0196432   .0027461     7.15   0.000     .0142608    .0250256
           GDP     .1882827   .0409944     4.59   0.000     .1079346    .2686309
       IND_AVG     .0448468   .0110132     4.07   0.000     .0232611    .0664325
          CONC    -.0307942   .0109968    -2.80   0.005    -.0523477   -.0092408
       OP_CASH     .0082375   .0012501     6.59   0.000     .0057873    .0106877
           MTB     .0002227   .0000444     5.01   0.000     .0001356    .0003098
           DOA    -.1199524   .0032105   -37.36   0.000    -.1262449   -.1136599
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.84e-07   7.23e-08     3.93   0.000     1.43e-07    4.26e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098685   .0051865  -211.83   0.000    -1.108851    -1.08852
         SIZE1     .9298706   .0059299   156.81   0.000     .9182481     .941493
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0067897   .0019555    -3.47   0.001    -.0106223    -.002957
    GROWTH_VOL     1.07e-06   5.06e-07     2.12   0.034     7.98e-08    2.06e-06
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2605                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4205.48
       overall = 0.3124                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3479                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2525                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    190189
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69652019   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27165459
       sigma_u    .41154659
                                                                                
         _cons     .9592398   .0445944    21.51   0.000     .8718356    1.046644
       ECO_INV     .0197113   .0027461     7.18   0.000     .0143289    .0250937
           GDP     .1886393   .0409933     4.60   0.000     .1082932    .2689854
       IND_AVG     .0447876   .0110129     4.07   0.000     .0232025    .0663726
          CONC    -.0308647   .0109965    -2.81   0.005    -.0524176   -.0093118
       OP_CASH     .0080205   .0012445     6.44   0.000     .0055813    .0104597
           MTB     .0002289   .0000443     5.17   0.000     .0001421    .0003157
           DOA    -.1198376   .0032098   -37.33   0.000    -.1261289   -.1135464
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.80e-07   7.23e-08     3.87   0.000     1.38e-07    4.22e-07
         SIZE2    -1.098946   .0051865  -211.89   0.000    -1.109112   -1.088781
         SIZE1     .9299539   .0059296   156.83   0.000     .9183321    .9415758
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0063978   .0019496    -3.28   0.001     -.010219   -.0025765
  PRD_COST_VOL    -.0000207   5.67e-06    -3.65   0.000    -.0000318   -9.60e-06
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2603                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4206.47
       overall = 0.3124                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3480                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804








F test that all u_i=0:     F(40803, 149373) =     7.73       Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                
           rho    .69654485   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
       sigma_e    .27165307
       sigma_u    .41156829
                                                                                
         _cons     .9582969    .044593    21.49   0.000     .8708956    1.045698
       ECO_INV     .0196803   .0027461     7.17   0.000     .0142981    .0250626
           GDP     .1884215   .0409929     4.60   0.000     .1080762    .2687668
       IND_AVG      .044881   .0110128     4.08   0.000     .0232961    .0664659
          CONC    -.0308451   .0109964    -2.81   0.005    -.0523979   -.0092924
       OP_CASH     .0079714   .0012445     6.41   0.000     .0055322    .0104105
           MTB     .0002306   .0000443     5.21   0.000     .0001438    .0003174
           DOA    -.1198006   .0032098   -37.32   0.000    -.1260918   -.1135094
OP_CASH_GROWTH     2.84e-07   7.23e-08     3.93   0.000     1.42e-07    4.26e-07
         SIZE2     -1.09862   .0051843  -211.91   0.000    -1.108782   -1.088459
         SIZE1     .9298523   .0059293   156.82   0.000      .918231    .9414736
    TOTAL_ACCR    -.0064613   .0019495    -3.31   0.001    -.0102823   -.0026402
    PROFIT_VOL    -.0000183   4.72e-06    -3.87   0.000    -.0000275   -9.03e-06
                                                                                
     CASH_SALE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2602                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(12,149373)       =   4206.66
       overall = 0.3125                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3479                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.2526                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: BvDIDNumbe~D                    Number of groups   =     40804
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    190189
